In 1905 a Corrupt and Incompetent Fleet Limped from the Baltic Sea to the Far East over Seven Months, only to be Sunk in One Day
The following is an excerpt from the first chapter of my book on modern Japanese military history, which can be seen at https://www.linkedin.com/pulse/preface-chapter-1-from-brief-military-history-japanese-andrew-wright-rzt7c/?trackingId=BaIiR7KgTbWICcLnkkOD1Q==. Russia and Japan went to war with each other in early 1904 and despite the Russian Empire’s massive military, economic, and manpower advantages Japan won victory after victory. In a desperate attempt to regain the initiative Tsar Nicholas ordered his Baltic fleet on a 18,000 mile voyage to defeat the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Much like Russia’s unprovoked invasion of Ukraine in 2022 the venture was a disaster and exposed the pathetic state of the Russian navy (plagued by poor morale, incompetence, and corruption). If Russian naval power was humility in recent times with the sinking of the Moskva and a third of its Black Sea’s fleet, by a country without a navy, 120 years ago Japan’s destruction of the Russian Second Pacific Squadron reduced Russia from having the third largest fleet in the world to sixth place in an afternoon.
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“If you do not know your enemies nor yourself, you will be imperilled in every single battle.” -Sun Tzu
The voyage of the Second Pacific Squadron (Russia renamed its Baltic fleet during the journey for propaganda effect) from the Baltic Sea to the Far East was a trial of comedies, errors, tragedies, and diplomatic mishaps; described brilliantly in Alistair Horne’s Hubris and Constantine Pleshakov’s The Tsar’s Last Armada.
To cite a few examples, several ships ran aground in the first days of the voyage, Russian ships fired on British fishing trawlers in the North Sea (almost leading to war between Britain and Russia), and several mutinies had to be put down. The food was often spoiled and moldy, many sailors died of heatstroke, and some even jumped overboard to commit suicide. Firing exercises off Madagascar were found wanting as gunnery was poor, ships almost collided with each other, and Alistair Horne noted that during a torpedo exercise “out of seven fired, one jammed, four darted off eccentrically at right angles either to port or starboard, and one went around and around of circles.”
The poor soul chosen to lead the fleet, Vice Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky, short tempered with a habit of throwing his binoculars overboard, or at shipmates, had no faith in the venture and had argued against it. At least he was untainted by corruption, and had the confidence of most of his subordinates, which has not exactly been regular regarding Russian military leaders in history. Rozhestvensky did not think highly of most of his admirals and captains and complained his sailors had to be told five times to do the most mundane things and then had to check five more times to see if they remembered the order.
On the other hand, given the lack of Russian naval bases abroad and massive amounts of coal, food and supplies that was needed to sustain the fleet, the voyage was an impressive feat of logistics given the 18,000 mile journey! The issue of coal in particular would prove to be a constant annoyance for the Russians. There were no less than 32 re-coaling operations throughout, coal often had to be stored in any available space (including living quarters), and a shortage of coal near the end of the voyage meant the fleet had to take the most direct, dangerous, route to Vladivostok through the Tsushima Strait, dominated by the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Unsurprisingly, when the fleet finally got to the Far East its ships were in poor condition. Unlike the Japanese navy that had months to refit, train, and maneuver in preparation for the showdown, the Russian fleet enjoyed little opportunity to do so. Its ships were also covered with barnacles and weeds that compromise their speed, which was already inferior to their Japanese counterparts. On paper, at least, the Russian fleet had advantages including more battleships and superior firepower, with 41 10-12-inch guns versus 17 for Japan.
But the Japanese battleships were more modern, while many Russian battleships and other vessels were old or obsolete. Japanese ships also benefitted from new range finders whereas the Russians had older ones dating from the 1880s, meaning the former could fire quicker and with much better accuracy. Japanese accuracy was also likely helped by the BRIGHT YELLOW funnels on Russian battleships! As if all of this wasn’t bad enough many Russian shells were duds while Japanese ones had four times the amount of explosive charge.
Regarding the respective crews Japan’s advantages were even more lopsided. While many Russian sailors were illiterate, defeatist, and demoralized, their Japanese equivalents were more educated, confident after many successes, and better trained. Many Russian sailors were labelled unfit for service, had criminal records, or even had revolutionary sympathies. A Russian saying at the time concerning the posting of new officers went “drinkers to the fleet, dimwits to the infantry.” Japanese crews were better fed, better treated, and served much more time at sea.
Japanese ships also had considerable experience working and maneuvering together, while the Tsar’s hastily assembled Baltic fleet did not. The Japanese commander, Vice Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, assembled his admirals and captains prior to the battle to explain his plan and how to conduct the battle. Vice Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky, the Russian commander, did none of this, nor did he make any notable tactical plans. He even refused to confer with his second-in-command, who complained he received no information on what to do in the upcoming battle.
For the battle the Russians had 11 battleships (many were modern but the three coastal battleships in particular were weak), nine cruisers, and nine destroyers. Against this the Imperial Japanese Navy had five battleships (four modern), over 20 cruisers, 21 destroyers, and 45 torpedo boats. Except for battleships the Japanese significantly outnumbered the Russians, but the battle would be decided by the guns of Japan’s modern battleships and cruisers during daylight hours, while its destroyers and torpedoes waited to attack at night.
In the early morning of May 27, 1905, Tōgō’s scouting ships located the Russian fleet attempting to bypass the Japanese unnoticed to escape to Vladivostok. As the weather was unfavourable for torpedo attacks Tōgō ordered his destroyers and torpedo boats to fall back while his battleships and cruisers hit the Russian fleet throughout the day.
Hoping to use the classic crossing the T naval tactic, where his ships would maneuver in a line in front of the Russian ships (allowing Japanese vessels to use all of their guns while Russian ones could only use their forward turrets) Tōgō had his ships turn in sequence, which made them vulnerable for a few minutes as they turned slowly. Fortunately for them, the Russians didn’t, or more likely couldn’t, take advantage of this. Against this, Tōgō’s own ship in the vanguard drew the brunt of enemy hits in the initial exchanges of fire. However, the maneuver paid off and before long the Imperial Japanese Navy dominated the battle.
Japanese shells crashed down on Russian decks, causing devastation amongst gun controls and it’s been suggested Russian ships scored no hits against the Japanese after the first half hour of combat. Much like the Battle of Midway nearly forty years later the naval balance between both sides was decisively altered in a matter of minutes. The Japanese scored 3.2 hits per hundred shells fired versus 1.5 for the Russians, which seems disproportionate but probably better than expected for Russia given the numerous disadvantages suffered by its crews and ships. Notably, older Russians ships that Rozhestvensky had wanted to leave behind in Europe and little was expected from displayed impressive gunnery, forcing some Japanese cruisers out of action. However, this was an exception as the Japanese navy crushed Russia’s Second Pacific Squadron in the most decisive naval battle since Trafalgar 100 years earlier.
All of Russia’s battleships were sunk or captured, the majority of its cruisers and destroyers were also sunk, and a few ships fled to be interned in neutral ports. A mere cruiser and two destroyers broke through the gauntlet of destruction to reach Vladivostok. Almost 5000 Russians sailors were killed, several hundred were wounded, and 6000 were captured. With these losses, along with the squadron it had lost at Port Arthur, Russia’s rank as the third largest navy in 1904 changed instantly to a tenuous sixth place by the end of the day.
With Russia’s last fleet imprisoned in the Black Sea via treaty and infected by revolutionary sentiment, Russian naval power became an oxymoron. This was hardly the gift the Tsar wanted on the 9th anniversary of his coronation! Japanese losses were three torpedo boats and 700 killed or wounded, including future Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, who lost two fingers. Whatever his flaws Rozhestvensky took complete responsibility for the disaster while Tōgō visited him in the hospital after the battle and showed kindness and respect.
With Russia’s naval power broken, its armies humiliated in the field, and with increasing revolution at home, Russian political will to continue the war imploded. So the Tsar reached out to American President Theodore Roosevelt to provide mediation between Russia and Japan. This led to the Treaty of Portsmouth, signed in September 1905. With it Japan secured paramount influence in Manchuria (along with the former Russian railway concession in the south), regained Port Arthur, was ceded the southern part of Sakhalin Island, and effectively replaced Russia as the most influential power in Northeast Asia until 1945.
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Few would have thought in 1904 when the war began Russia could lose to a smaller nation with far less people, resources, and military power. In 2022 most people and experts thought Ukraine would fall in weeks or days. What isn’t deniable is that Japan in 1905 and Ukraine today crushed Russian naval power against all expectations.
