“Hannibal is the hero of lost causes and perfect battles.” -Barry Strauss, Masters of Command
Could Hannibal Barca have won the Second Punic War? The historical consensus say’s not likely, but not impossible. Rome’s advantages in manpower, ships, and political will arguably doomed Hannibal from the start. But Rome wasn’t invincible, losing countless battles and seeing allies defect in Sicily and Southern Italy. What if Hannibal had conquered Rome, or received more Carthaginian or Italian support? What if the Romans failed to adapt after Hannibal’s early victories. If Alexander the Great could conquer Persia (the superpower of his time) with his small army, then Hannibal had, at least, a chance against Rome.
Roman Advantages:
Hannibal’s victory was unlikely because Rome had more manpower, ships, and political will. Hannibal’s army was the best in the war (besides maybe Scipio Africanus’s at the end), but Carthage’s military and psychological strengths were inferior to Rome’s.
Both nations had similar population levels but Rome’s acceptance of conquered foes gave them rights and incentives to fight for it. Carthage mostly oppressed its conquered peoples, and rarely mobilized its citizens unless Carthage was threatened directly. Caring more about trade than fighting for glory Carthage relied on mercenaries and elite units from colonial subjects. Polybius noted when the war began Rome and its allies’ potential manpower was 700,000. This dwarfed Hannibal’s 26,000 veterans that survived the harsh passage of the Alps. Given he got few reinforcements from Carthage during the war, numbers weren’t on his side.
Rome’s naval advantage gave it a crucial edge over Carthage. Rome started the war with more than two times the ships and more aggressive, confident sailors than Carthage. It’s what forced Hannibal’s risky march over the Alps. Roman ships interdicted his supply routes (on land and sea), and let Rome take the fight to Carthage: In Spain, Sicily, and finally North Africa.
Rome was also more committed to winning the war. The Romans viewed conflict as a life-or-death struggle where it could only conquer, or be conquered. Carthage, a mercantile society focused on wealth, saw war as a venture to be abandoned if it proved too costly. As Jules Michelet remarked “the life of an industrious merchant, of a Carthaginian, was too precious to be risked, as long as it was possible to substitute advantageously for it that of a barbarian from Spain or Gaul.”
Rome was Not Invincible:
However, Rome had weaknesses and suffered many setbacks in the war. Besides losing to Hannibal at Trebia (218 BC), Trasimene (217 BC), and Cannae (216 BC) it had other defeats. This included losing its army in Spain in 211 BC, Hannibal’s victories at Herdonia in 212 and 210 BC, and the defections of Capua and Tarentum (Rome’s 2nd and 3rd largest cities). Roman leadership, especially during 218-216 BC, was often too aggressive, predictable, and outthought and outfought, by Hannibal’s veterans.
Rome saw rebellions from Gauls in North Italy, an uprising in Sardinia, and Macedonia enter the war against it. Syracuse, other cities in Sicily, and much of Southern Italy also defected to Carthage.
Despite its manpower advantage Rome didn’t have unlimited troops. It’s estimated Rome lost 20% of its males between 18 and 50 at Cannae, and 50% of them during the war! Rome’s Latin allies struggled to keep providing troops and 40% of them refused to in 209 BC. The defection of Capua, Tarentum, and much of Southern Italy robbed Rome of manpower for much of the war.
While Carthage and Hannibal could never match Roman manpower, it’s possible more defections and disasters like Trebia and Cannae, could have bled Rome white or forced it to negotiate.
Could Hannibal have Taken Rome?:
One of the great what ifs of history is could Hannibal have conquered Rome, whether by assault, siege, or shock? Historians are divided but most think it was unlikely, and never part of his strategy (to defeat Roman armies to cause its allies to defect). The main arguments against attacking Rome include Hannibal’s lack of siege weapons, Rome’s defenses, the difficulty of maintaining a long siege, and Rome’s ability to mobilize reinforcements to relieve the city.
But some scholars question how much these factors were true, arguing Hannibal did have a chance to take Rome. While Hannibal’s march on Rome in 211 BC to draw Roman forces away from Capua, which was under-siege, was a bluff, he had two previous chances to realistically threaten the city. Hannibal had a decent chance to take Rome in 216 BC after Cannae, and a better one to take it in 217 BC after Trasimene.
What if Hannibal Marched on Rome after Trasimene?:
Hannibal is usually faulted for not attacking Rome after Cannae, but he missed a better chance after his crushing victory at Trasimene. Rome’s other army in Italy was soon neutralized when Hannibal’s cavalry destroyed its calvary force, and it became stuck fighting Gauls near Ariminum. Roman forces in Sicily, Spain, and elsewhere could have returned to defend Rome, but it would have taken awhile. Carthage had a fleet off Italy that could have temporarily held off such reinforcements. Hannibal was also only 85 miles to Rome and would have arrived quickly.
This left Rome’s defenses and garrison to hold off Hannibal. The garrison had 10,000 troops and while more would have been raised this would be ongoing when Hannibal’s 50,000 soldiers arrived. Some scholars believe Rome’s defenses have been exaggerated and Plutarch noted there weren’t enough troops to defend the walls. There was also panic in Rome, with even its leaders realizing the danger, like when a Praetor said “we have been beaten in a great battle.”
Hannibal had outwitted the Romans by outmaneuvering them through the Alps, and later the Arno Marshes. He had beaten them at Ticinus River, Trebia, Trasimene, and ambushed their latest cavalry force. Perhaps Hannibal’s presence at the gates of Rome would have given him a psychological dominance in any assault or siege.
It’s been argued by writers like Richard Gabriel that besieging Rome was not impractical. Hannibal did have siege machines at many times, including his attempts to take Petelia, Nola, and Acerrae. If he didn’t have them after Trasimene they could have been built near Rome as Carthaginian engineers were among the best in the world. There was also enough fertile land in the area to support his army for the month or two window scholars suggest he had to assault or besiege Rome before major Roman reinforcements arrived.
Thus, Hannibal had the means to credibly threaten Rome after Trasimene, and attacking it offered a better chance to win the war than trying to get Roman allies to defect. What would have happened if Rome was attacked in 217 BC is debatable, but a leading expert on Hannibal, Dexter Hoyos, believes the decision not to advance on it after Trasimene was Hannibal’s most influential decision of the war.
What if Hannibal Marched on Rome after Cannae?:
The odds of Hannibal taking Rome after Cannae weren’t as favorable as after Trasimene. If Trasimene was only 85 miles from Rome, Cannae was 250 miles. This gave Rome more time, even weeks, to prepare for Hannibal’s arrival. It also limited the time to launch an assault, or besiege the city, before reinforcements arrived.
Hannibal had less troops after Cannae than Trasimene, perhaps 40,000-45,000. Rome’s garrison also had more troops this time including 8000 in Rome, 5000 marines in nearby Ostia, and raised more by recruiting slaves, criminals, and others. Roman survivors from Cannae, and forces in North Italy and other fronts, could also have been recalled.
Yet there’s a paradox where scholars like Adrian Goldsworthy think it’s unlikely Hannibal could have directly taken Rome after Cannae, but also believe it was his best chance to win the war. The question is not if the Romans could have resisted, but WOULD THEY HAVE? There was panic in the city after Trasimene, and after the disaster at Cannae (where Rome lost between 50,000-75,000 soldiers), maybe the will of the senate and people might have broken. It’s not impossible a traitor would have conspired to let Hannibal in, like at Tarentum in 212 BC.
Hannibal later admitted not advancing on Rome after Cannae was his biggest mistake, which suggests the likelihood of capturing it was not as far-fetched as many scholars contend.
What if Carthage had Given Hannibal More Support?:
During the war Carthage only sent Hannibal reinforcements once, in 215 BC when they landed 4000 troops and 40 elephants in Southern Italy. Meanwhile Carthage sent 80,000 troops to other fronts. Indeed, Carthage preferred safeguarding Spain, trying to retake Sardinia, and especially regaining Sicily (which it lost in the First Punic War). It’s often thought Carthage didn’t want to send Hannibal reinforcements or couldn’t. To be fair, Roman naval superiority, and Carthage’s lack of naval bases between North Africa and Italy, were significant obstacles.
But these limitations have been overstated. During the war Roman naval superiority narrowed from 2-1 to 3-2 as Carthaginian ship production increased. Rome’s navy couldn’t be everywhere at once so Carthage could have made more attempts to land troops in Italy. As Carthage sent troops to distant Sardinia and Liguria in North Italy it’s clear Roman naval superiority, and lack of friendly ports, didn’t stop Carthage from shipping forces overseas. Such landings weren’t contested and didn’t need the massive logistical support in the 20th Century like at Gallipoli or Normandy. Most likely Carthage chose not to send to major forces to Hannibal rather than being unable to.
However, Carthage did try sending Hannibal forces occasionally, planned to at others, and there were three ways it could: Marching them from Spain, securing Sicily to get direct access to Southern Italy, or landings in Italy itself.
Potential Reinforcements sent by Spain and Sicily:
Spain, with silver mines and mercenaries, was a prize jewel for Carthage, and offered a land route to supply Hannibal. Carthage planned to send 13,000 troops to Italy in 215 BC but these were diverted to Spain after Rome scored victories against it there. Unlike Hannibal, other Carthaginian generals including his brother Hasdrubal Barca in Spain, weren’t as effective and usually defeated by the Romans. Not until 211 BC did Carthage score a major victory in Spain when it crushed Rome’s divided forces there.
Yet Carthage didn’t send forces to Italy from Spain until 208-207 BC after Hasdrubal lost to Scipio at Baecula. This led to Roman fears of a linkup between Hannibal and Hasdrubal, leading to the battle at Metaurus River (207 BC), one of the decisive moments of the conflict. Once Hasdrubal’s army was crushed at Metaurus the Carthaginians couldn’t send anymore forces from Spain, which soon fell to Rome.
While Hasdrubal lost the engagement, and his army was destroyed, this wasn’t inevitable. Hasdrubal crossed the Alps sooner than anticipated, and had he not wasted time on the siege of Placentia, the Romans would have had less time to catch him. If Hasdrubal’s messenger to Hannibal wasn’t captured the Romans may not have cornered him near Metaurus. If consul Nero hadn’t executed his surprise march north under Hannibal’s nose the outcome of the battle could have been different. It’s plausible with a few different decisions, or circumstances, Hannibal and Hasdrubal would have linked up, giving Hannibal 30,000 more soldiers and maybe the means to regain the initiative in Italy.
Sicily was also important for Carthage with rich agriculture, an important ally in Syracuse, and a safe sea route to Hannibal across the Strait of Messina. After Syracuse allied with Carthage in 214 BC the latter sent 40,000 troops and major naval units to Sicily during the war. The respected historian John Lazenby makes a good case suggesting the war was decided in Sicily.
It’s debatable if Carthage could have retaken Sicily but it wasn’t impossible. Syracuse, with the help of the genius Archimedes’s inventions, kept Rome distracted in a two-year siege. Had the Romans not breached Syracuse’s defenses when its citizens got drunk during a three-day festival, dedicated to the goddess Artemis, the siege could have lasted much longer.
The Romans were also vulnerable in 212 BC when a Carthaginian fleet of 150 warships and 700 transports tried relieving Syracuse. But despite having more ships in the area the Carthaginian Admiral refused to attack and retreated, dooming Syracuse and Carthage’s position in Sicily. It’s not guaranteed the Carthaginians would have beaten the Romans (given the latter were more bolder and more confident at sea), but the battle that never was off Cape Pachynus is one of the big what ifs of the war.
Carthage suffered another disaster in Sicily when one of its armies was wiped out by disease. It also erred by alienating one of its few good military leaders there, Muttines, who defected to Rome. Despite sending 40,000 troops to Spain, and maintaining a presence until at least 210 BC, Carthage lost the campaign, along with its chance of establishing a secure sea route between North Africa and Italy.
Potential Reinforcements sent by Sea:
If Carthage didn’t send many troops to Hannibal by Spain or Sicily, it could have sent them by sea. As noted above, despite Roman naval superiority, Carthage sent forces to Sardinia and Liguria, farther away from Carthage than Southern Italy where Hannibal spent most of the war. Even if Rome’s navy could have prevented some convoys a few successful ones could have given Hannibal enough troops to make a difference in Italy.
While Carthage prioritized Sicily and Spain, Rome could only be defeated in Italy. Rome’s centers of gravity for its war effort included its political will (the Senate and Roman people), and its manpower (Roman and allied). Carthage couldn’t overcome these by victories in Spain and Sicily (as seen by Roman setbacks in Spain during the war, and in Sicily during the First Punic War). This meant Carthage could only win by taking Rome to crush its political will, or inflict enough battlefield defeats, and defections, to wear down Roman manpower until Rome couldn’t continue the war.
Hannibal and his 26,000 veterans that crossed the Alps caused disproportionate damage to Roman forces. He did benefit from recruiting Gauls but from 218-216 BC alone he inflicted up to 150,000 casualties on Rome and its allies. This includes all those killed and captured in big battles like Trebia, Trasimene and Cannae, smaller engagements like Ticinus River and Geronium, and the usual losses from other combat.
Hannibal, with little outside assistance, caused far more damage and problems for Rome than the 80,000 troops Carthage sent to other fronts. It was only after Cannae some Italian cities defected to him but these weren’t always reliable, as will be seen. Again, Carthage only sent him reinforcements once, 4000 troops in 215 BC.
So what if Carthage had sent Hannibal sizable forces, especially the few years after Cannae when Rome was also busy in Spain, Sardinia, and Sicily? Perhaps 20,000-40,000 extra troops could have given him the means to conduct more sieges, storm more cities, and ambush more Roman armies. It must be stressed Hannibal was the only consistently successful Carthaginian general of the war. Hannibal would have made better use of Carthaginian forces, that besides for crushing Roman forces in Spain in 211 BC, were generally ineffective.
It’s plausible with more troops Hannibal could have further worn-down Roman manpower, forced more defections, and even marched on Rome under better circumstances in the years after Cannae. But we’ll never know as Carthage adopted limited war aims to secure Spain, and regain Sicily and Sardinia, while Rome adopted total war to destroy Carthage’s ability to resist.
With hindsight, it’s obvious which strategy worked.
Hannibal’s Potential Allies in Italy:
Hannibal’s main strategy wasn’t to take Rome but get its allies to defect. While the Gauls willingly provided troops, Rome’s Italian allies, and especially its Latin ones, were more reluctant. Some of this was due to legitimate affection for Rome, especially for the Latins, and the threat of retaliation, especially for the ordinary allies. Hannibal would be disappointed by his lack of success in getting Roman allies to defect.
A common view among scholars is Hannibal, a product of Greek and Hellenistic education, thought Rome would negotiate after continuous defeats in the field. Failing that, Rome would be neutralized by enough defections by allies after decent treatment and seeing Rome unable to protect them. With hindsight, and the fact most Roman allies didn’t defect, it’s tempting to suggest Hannibal’s strategy was flawed, and he didn’t understand Roman culture. Richard Gabriel suggested “one of Hannibal’s most significant failures was his inability to understand the conservative culture and moralistic values that underlay Roman society and that, ultimately, shaped the Roman’s view of war.”
But even if the odds weren’t favorable, was Hannibal’s attempts to pry off Rome’s allies doomed? While Hannibal would have benefited more from Carthaginian forces, being more similar and motivated like his own army, versus Italian allies who culturally closer to the Romans, it’s plausible Hannibal could have gotten more defections, or made better use of their forces.
Rome’s Latin Allies: Vital or Overrated?:
Too much emphasis has been put on the fact none of Rome’s 30 Latin allies defected during the war. These were closer to Rome than its other Italian allies, having more racial and cultural ties, enjoying more perks, and were often direct descendants from Romans. But the importance of the Latin allies to Roman victory has been overstated.
If Rome’s direct manpower was almost 300,000 troops, and its other allies allegedly more than 450,000, it’s crucial to note the Latin allies only had 85,000. This was barely over 10% and close to the size of the army Hannibal routed at Cannae. This number shouldn’t be dismissed but given Rome’s heavy casualties in the war it wasn’t decisive. If Hannibal won over most of Rome’s other Italian allies the Latin allies couldn’t have compensated. As mentioned before, in 209 BC 40% of Rome’s Latin allies refused to provide more soldiers so they weren’t always reliable.
The Latin allies did benefit from being relatively secure after the first few years of the war once Hannibal moved passed their colonies and spent the rest of the war fighting mostly in Southern Italy. Yet had he remained closer to them, inflicted more defeats on their armies, and kept pillaging their lands, maybe they would have been more likely to defect. Failing that, their losses would have mounted, and they would have provided even less soldiers after 209 BC than they did.
Thus, while none of the Latin allies defected to Hannibal it’s hard to suggest they made a crucial difference in the war.
Rome’s Ordinary Allies: A Missed Opportunity?
What about Rome’s other Italian allies (called the ordinary allies) who could mobilize close to 275,000 soldiers? Could Hannibal have forced more to defect, or made better use of those that did? While the ordinary allies were politically, racially, and geographically dissimilar to Rome, they also didn’t have much in common with Carthage. Like Pyrrhus 60 years earlier, Hannibal would have a complicated, and ultimately fruitless, alliance with much of Southern Italy.
While gaining allies in Italy gave Hannibal bases, recruits, and eased his logistics, there was a price. By having to defend friendly cities against Roman retribution Hannibal had to keep coming to their aid. This robbed Hannibal of the initiative and mobility he used to outwit and defeat the Romans in the first years of the war. Even worse, the gracious terms he granted his allies meant he couldn’t conscript their soldiers and few volunteered to join his army. Most allied soldiers stayed in their own regions and weren’t as effective as Hannibal’s veterans or the Gauls.
There was little unity among Hannibal’s new allies who often distrusted each other. In particular, many were wary of Capua, which wanted to dominate neighboring cities. Hannibal supported this by letting Capua take Cumae and Casilinum, which alienated many potential allies. As Patrick Hunt put it “Hannibal had to walk a fine line between forcing the South Italians to deploy against Rome and respecting their independence, since he had made a case for restoring the liberties Rome has taken.”
The ordinary allies generally put their self-interests first and mostly stayed loyal, or defected, based on the likelihood of a Roman or Carthaginian victory. Hence why many defected after the disaster at Cannae, and seizure of Tarentum, and why many rejoined Rome after Capua surrendered to it, and after Hannibal retreated further south In Italy after Hasdrubal lost at Metaurus.
While these allies didn’t provide many soldiers for Hannibal’s army, and weren’t a match for Roman forces, they could have benefited him in two ways. More defections would have meant less manpower for Rome’s war effort. Given Rome’s high casualties, and the limited manpower of the Latin allies, if a majority of the ordinary allies defected, Rome’s position could have become critical. More cities, especially ports, could have given Carthage a better capacity to reinforce Hannibal directly.
It’s hard to see how Hannibal could have won over most of them who stayed loyal to Rome. The obvious answer would be more crushing defeats of Roman forces, or more Carthaginian reinforcements to let Hannibal conduct more sieges, or shows of force, to secure more cities.
This was almost a catch-22 situation where Hannibal would have been able to secure more cities with more reinforcements, but he needed to take more cities and ports to make it easier for Carthage to supply him. Meanwhile more battlefield victories could have gained more defections, but this was difficult as Rome re-adopted Fabius Maximus’s cautious stratagems in the years after Cannae.
Rome’s Steep Learning Curve:
Besides Roman manpower, naval power, and political will, its ability to adapt its war effort was critical to victory. Numbers and willpower don’t guarantee sound strategy or military success. Military history is full of nations that failed to leverage their strengths from Russia in World War 1 and Chechnya to the constant Arab defeats in the Arab-Israeli Wars. It wasn’t inevitable the Romans would adapt in time against Hannibal, especially given some of their flaws.
The typical Roman mindset was aggressive and predictable, which Hannibal exploited against Roman leaders such as Longus at Trebia, Flaminius at Trasimene, Minucius at Geronium, and Varro at Cannae. Rome’s yearly elected positions, like consuls, meant experience wasn’t always retained, commands changed too often, and many leaders sought risky battles to win glory before their terms expired. Rome’s practice of mobilizing essentially citizen militias, with varying experience, meant soldier per soldier they weren’t a match for Hannibal’s veterans during most of the war.
Unfortunately for Carthage the Romans successfully adapted their war effort. The election of dictators in emergency situations, like after Trasimene and Cannae, allowed cooler heads like Fabius to restrain typical Roman aggression in critical periods. Fabius’s cautious strategy against Hannibal would generally be maintained by the Romans from Cannae to Zama in 202 BC. Rather than trying to defeat his army they focused on hitting his logistic and allies, and beating Carthage in Sicily, Spain, and finally North Africa. Thus, Hannibal was never defeated in Italy, but recalled to Carthage in a last-ditch attempt to save it after Scipio had nearly brought it to its knees.
Other Roman Adaptations:
The Romans were flexible in other areas. After taking heavy casualties they began recruiting slaves, criminals, and increasingly younger males. They stripped temples of weapons captured in previous wars to replace equipment losses; despite warnings this would anger their gods. And while in the early years of the war Rome’s citizen armies kept losing to Hannibal, as the conflict continued Roman soldiers and commanders gained more experience and became professional soldiers.
Indeed, the Romans changed their command structure to allow consuls like Fabius, Marcellus, and Scipio to keep their positions longer than a year, preventing issues with constant turnovers in command. In 214 BC Rome stopped appointing new legion and army commanders each year and kept many in command for longer terms, sometimes the rest of the war. This was crucial as proven leaders were a cut above the usual bold, predictable Roman consuls who lost so many battles.
No less important was that Roman generals, especially Scipio, became increasingly skilled at surprise, maneuver, and cunning stratagems (things usually associated with Hannibal). While Marcellus was a competent commander who conducted the siege of Syracuse well, and Fabius’s methods saved Rome from disaster on many occasions, the outstanding Roman general of the war was Scipio.
Despite being young Scipio clearly learned from Hannibal’s successes and conducted brilliant operations of his own. Taking New Carthage in 209 BC after a surprise forced march, beating Hasdrubal at Baecula despite the latter having a strong, uphill position, and his sophisticated maneuvers at Ilipa that defeated a larger army, showed his genius in Spain. In North Africa he ambushed and set fire to an enemy camp that destroyed one Carthaginian army, and decisively defeated another at the Battle of the Plains in 203 BC. This forced Carthage to recall Hannibal from Italy where he was finally beaten at Zama in 202 BC (with the help of Numidian cavalry), which ended the war in Rome’s favor.
Other Roman generals were also capable of military excellence. Consul Nero’s quick march north, which Hannibal missed, to join the army confronting Hasdrubal at Metaurus gave the Romans a decisive edge. During the battle he executed a complicated maneuver by taking his best forces behind the Roman lines to envelop the Carthaginian right flank, which decided the outcome.
Roman Flexibility was not Guaranteed:
As already noted, the typical Roman mindset was aggressive and predictable. Hannibal exploited this many times and provoked the Romans into unfavorable battles by insults and pillaging their lands. Fabius’s tactics saved Rome from defeat for much of the war, but they were unpopular to Romans and often abandoned with disastrous results. Had he not been elected as dictator in 217 BC, and had his stratagems not been continued after Cannae, Rome would have suffered more disasters and perhaps ran out of manpower.
Rome’s other great general of the war, Scipio, wasn’t destined to rise to fame. He was one of the few to survive Cannae, and lucky he got the command in Spain despite being too young to quality for it. His plan to invade North Africa was not popular with the Senate, and he had to bypass it to recruit enough forces to launch it. Had Scipio died at Cannae, or not rose to command, Rome would have lost its most innovative leader who conquered Spain, beaten Hannibal at Zama, and ended the war on Roman terms.
It’s difficult to see the Romans winning in Spain and North Africa, or as quickly and at relatively minimal loss, without Scipio’s military genius. Most likely the war would have gone on for many more years or resulted in a stalemate that exhausted Rome.
It wasn’t obvious Rome would also alleviate its manpower issues by recruiting slaves, criminals and those who previously didn’t qualify for service. The proud, traditional Romans could have seen this as dishonorable, and been stubborn like Carthage, which only recruited its own citizens when Scipio landed in North Africa. It was also surprising the Romans stripped their temples of weapons after they ran low on them. The Romans were a very spiritual people, taking omens and religious rites seriously, even succumbing to human sacrifices after Cannae. Many nations have been unwilling to compromise with their traditions and beliefs for the sake of military necessity.
Finally, what if Rome hadn’t been as flexible with its military structure, allowing the election of dictators, and longer terms of command? The Romans, during the Republic at least, were wary of tyrants and citizens gaining too much power. Hence why they had two consuls per year instead of one leader, a senate that could hold them accountable, and tribunes which kept the Senate in check.
While Roman law allowed the election of dictators, and wisely elected Fabius in 217 BC, this was compromised by electing his subordinate Minucius to his equal after winning a skirmish against Hannibal. This undermined Fabius’s command, divided the Roman army, and almost led to disaster when Hannibal ambushed Minucius near Geronium. Indeed, Fabius’s cautious leadership after Trasimene was an anomaly from the beginning of the war until Cannae. The rest of the period saw the Romans stubbornly continuing to fight Hannibal head on, fall into his traps and rotating commanders. Only after Cannae did the real reforms and longer terms of command begin. This was not a given, and a few more disasters, and significant defections, could have given Hannibal a decisive edge.
Most armies are learning organizations, and many like Russia, the Arab States, even America in Vietnam, often adapt too little, too late to change the outcome. It’s easy to compare Rome’s flexible war effort versus Carthage to make a damning comparison.
Unlike the Romans, Carthage didn’t mobilize its citizens until North Africa was invaded, nor did its political leadership and Hannibal agree on strategy and priorities. Carthage’s political leadership seldom gave clear directives to its commanders, and much of their decisions were just reactions to Roman initiatives. Carthaginian generals were timid and often ineffective, likely due to fears of crucification. While Roman forces became more skilled and professional as the war progressed, Carthaginian forces (except for Hannibal’s) rarely improved.
Conclusion:
Rome had advantages over Carthage including manpower, naval superiority, and superior political will. But Rome was far from invincible. Hannibal crushed Rome’s armies constantly in the first years of the war, got many of its allies to defect, and Roman casualties became almost unsustainable.
While the odds were against Hannibal winning the war, he had at least two times to march on Rome with some prospects of success. Carthage should have made more efforts to send Hannibal sizable reinforcements, as he was the only Carthaginian leader who consistently beat the Romans, and the war could only be won in Italy. Hannibal could have gained more defections in Italy, which at best could have forced Rome to negotiate, and at worst wear down its manpower to force a stalemate. It wasn’t inevitable Rome would adapt as effectively to Hannibal’s methods as it did, and a few more major battlefield victories and defections might have given Hannibal a decisive edge in the conflict.
As Clausewitz said, “war is the realm of chance.” As the ever-changing conflict in Ukraine reminds us even military historians and experienced generals get most predictions about war wrong. Few thought the 8000 CCP soldiers who survived the Long March would conquer China 15 years later. Few Romans believed the 26,000 cold and starving soldiers Hannibal brought down from the Alps would nearly defeat Rome’s 700,000 available manpower.
If Hannibal won most of his battles, but lost the war, he still came out on top in history. The Second Punic War is often referred to as Hannibal’s War, and even Scipio (who won the conflict) is mostly portrayed as a secondary character. This is despite Rome destroying Carthage in a brutal genocide in 146 BC, and Roman authors controlling the historical narrative on Hannibal and the war. Not even they could deny his military genius and as Adrian Goldsworthy noted “the best thing a Roman could say was that they had fought against Hannibal.”
There’s no higher praise for a general than the grudging respect, even admiration, of his enemies.
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