November 20, 2023
Preface
Unlike similar empires created by the British, French, and Spanish the Japanese Empire was a relatively recent, short endeavor. However, the impact it had upon Asia and the Pacific cannot be overstated. The rise and fall of the Japanese Empire significantly influenced the end of western colonialism in Asia, the rise of communism in China, Korea, and Vietnam, and resulted in many wars which claimed the lives of tens of millions of human beings. Starting in the latter half of the 19th Century Japan turned itself from an agrarian, inward looking nation into a modern world power within a generation. By the early 1940s it had accumulated one of the largest empires in history. Japan’s decline and collapse was even quicker, barely three years after the Battle of Midway in World War 2.
This book is the first of two volumes detailing a brief military history of the Japanese Empire. The first book summarizes the First Sino-Japanese War, the Russo-Japanese War, World War 1, the interwar years, the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the Asia-Pacific War until mid-1942. The second book will focus on the military contest after the Battle of Midway, concentrating upon Asia and the Pacific. The second book will also cover the main short, and long term, affects of Japanese Imperialism upon the world in general and East Asia in particular. A major focus throughout both volumes will be the conflicts between Japan and China, especially the years from 1937 through 1945, which until the last decade has arguably been neglected in western military historiography.
At the outset, it is worth noting what this book is about and what it is not. As a traditional work of military history, it will focus upon the main conflicts, battles, and most important strategic, political, economic, and diplomatic factors involving the Japanese Empire. In that sense it resembles newer historical works covering similar topics such as The Battle for China: Essays on the Military History of the Sino-Japanese War of 1937-1945 compiled by notable historians, as well as Tower of Skulls by Richard B. Frank.
Increasingly it appears as though many historical circles neglect, even dismiss, military history. One of my favorite history teachers once referred to it as “old white men talking about their favorite battles.” As tempting as such sentiments are they have not vanished warfare from the globe, or helped nations learn the lessons of warfare in order to avoid it if possible, or wage it if necessary. As S.C.M. Paine noted in The Wars for Asia “the failure to study war does not make wars go away; rather it positions a country badly to survive war when it comes and to commit foreign policy blunders in wars fought by others.” Russia’s recently unexpected aggressive war against Ukraine is a timely reminder of such unfortunate realities.
As such this book is not a social, or cultural history of the Japanese Empire and generally does not include details involving these historical aspects. For anyone interested in more social or cultural aspects regarding the Japanese Empire the author recommends the following books from his admittedly limited knowledge such as Forgotten Ally by Rana Mitter, China at War by Hans Van de Ven, and Reading Colonial Japan by Michele M. Mason and Helen J.S. Lee.Additionally, despite being a military history this book generally does not detail the struggles of individual soldiers and civilians, or the intricacies of technology and weaponry that won, or lost, these conflicts (as interesting as they are). Although this book does contain such aspects, in most instances the general narrative favors a more comprehensive view of the Japanese Empire and its military history. For those more interested in the soldier/civilian point of view, or details regarding weapons and technology there are excellent works such as the War in the Far East series by Peter Harmsen, China’s Wars by Philip Jowett, as well as Kangzhan by Leland Ness and Bin Shih, among others.
Besides detailing the most relevant conflicts, events and factors concerning modern Japanese military history this book also highlights certain themes concerning Japan’s empire building. Much as it was often assumed, incorrectly, that Hitler had detailed plans to conquer Europe before going to war in 1939, it has been alleged that Japan had comprehensive plans to dominate Asia and the Pacific as well. In reality, Japanese military actions were often conducted ad hoc, motivated by opportunism, or even unleashed by miscalculations or mistakes. Likewise, with notable exceptions, there was rarely consensus between political or military officials (even between the army and navy). Japanese officers stationed abroad also often ignored orders from Tokyo, or aggressively exercised their own initiatives, which occasionally escalated tensions or led to hostilities with other countries.
As stated above these volumes will also emphasize Japan’s long-term aggression against China. This includes not only the First and Second Sino-Japanese Wars, and the infamous Mukden Incident, but the various actions, interventions, and undeclared conflicts from 1894 onwards as well. Finally, Japanese war crimes, atrocities, and other unpleasantries are covered throughout (the crimes and flaws of Japan’s enemies are noted as well). While these have been documented extensively in many historical works Japan’s war crimes during its imperial era have arguably not received the same attention, or condemnation, as those of the Third Reich or even Allied war crimes during World War 2. Indeed, the firebombing of Tokyo, the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, as well as the internment of Japanese Americans (and Japanese Canadians) are relatively well known to large sections of the western world. By contrast besides the Rape of Nanjing and the use of “comfort women” by Japan it could be argued the tens of millions killed by Japanese expansion, the nearly 100,000,000 war refugees created by the Second Sino-Japanese War, the widespread use of chemical weapons against China, and the cruel human experiments by Unit 731, are less well known in the West.
While Germany has made considerable efforts to address its dark past, and make amends with its neighbors, Japan has not been as committed in such regards. On one hand it is crucial to point out that far more people in Japan are aware of its checkered past, and condemn its former Imperial excesses, than is commonly assumed. It is also worth noting that much of the literature that has exposed the unpleasantries of Empire was written by Japanese authors and historians who have often faced threats, or worse, from Japanese Empire apologists, or ultranationalists. On the other hand, these latter elements have constantly made robust attempts to sanitize warcrimes and morally questionable policies, or deny them outright. If the consequences of this only affected Japanese society perhaps it would not be so ruinous.
Unfortunately, whereas Germany’s earnest efforts to atone for past wrongs has done much to heal old wounds in Europe, and facilitate cooperation among European nations, Japan’s less satisfactory actions in comparison has done much to poison relations with many of its neighbors and create significant diplomatic hurdles across Asia. This is not meant to single out Japan as most countries including America, Britain, and Canada, have their own historical blinders or bogus rationalizations for regrettable past conduct. Likewise, just as it is unfair to blame contemporary Germans for the crimes of Nazism the same goes for the Japanese people for crimes committed nearly 80 years ago, and who have dedicated their efforts to economic growth and peace since 1945.
That said this is a book that seeks to analyze not only wars, battles, and other important events, but also the excesses and warcrimes committed in the name of Japanese Imperialism. If this work seems occasionally severe concerning Japan’s recent past, and many of its former leaders, this is due to the well-established historical records that corroborate the cruelties and human costs created by the Japanese Empire.
The ultimate purpose of this book is to be a primer on modern Japanese Military History, a relatively simple introduction to its main events and consequences. It is the author’s hope that it will help develop individuals’ interest in the subject to read other works in the field, from western, Chinese, Japanese, and other scholars alike. Despite the many controversies, and strong feelings involved, these topics bring to the surface it is far better to face them head on than trying to bury historical truths. For honest reflections and sincere apologies regarding past wrongs are necessary not only for nations to heal and move on, but to also learn the importance to forgive, but never forget, important historical realities. Those are lesson many nations and societies in our time have yet to learn.
Chapter 1: The End of Japanese Isolation, the First Sino-Japanese War, and the Russo-Japanese War
“Rich Nation, Strong Army.” -Meiji Leadership Slogan
Initial Modernization and Beginnings of Empire
In 1853 Commodore Matthew Perry of the United States Navy entered Tokyo Bay with a fleet of modern warships demanding Japan open up to foreign influence and trade. Nearly a century later the Japanese surrendered to the Allies on the U.S.S. Missouri, again in Tokyo Bay, bringing World War 2 to a close. Between these events Japan changed from an isolated, pre-industrial country into a strong, modern power that accumulated one of the most far-flung empires in history which often defeated states larger and more powerful than itself. The story was as much about wise, thoughtful Japanese leaders creating a modern nation in a mere generation, as it was of naked aggression, imperial overstretch, and the follies of ultra-militarism and hubris. Japan’s rise as a major power irrevocably changed the geopolitical order in Asia while the legacies of its imperial past linger with potentially dark consequences for the future.
After Commodore Perry’s none too subtle threat he left vowing to return the next year. This led to a crisis of leadership for the Tokugawa Shogunate which solicited the advice of the Daimyo, Japan’s feudal lords, on how to address the situation. This indecision, and de facto admission of weakness, undermined the Shogun’s leadership, and along with economic and social issues of the time, resulted in the overthrow of the Tokugawa Shogunate by the Choshu and Satsuma domains during the Boshin War of 1868-1869. This paved the way for the Meiji Restoration in 1868, which returned the Japanese Emperor to significant political rule, as well as numerous reforms initiated by Japan’s leaders that would modernize Japan.
These events would have considerable impact upon East Asia’s subsequent history. The propping up of the Japanese Emperor would allow military factions in Japan to dominate its domestic and foreign policy, and use his position as a unifying symbol for the nation; even to the point of deification and telling Japanese soldiers the highest calling in life was to die for the emperor. There remains considerable debate regarding the degree to which the Meiji Emperor, and his successors, had power and influenced events. However, what cannot be denied is that major Japanese initiatives at home and abroad were done so in their names. Meanwhile the Meiji generation’s reforms would make Japan the first industrial power in Asia and create a modern military to reshape the region for its own interests. Indeed, the Meiji statesmen thought an aggressive foreign policy would be useful to motivate the Japanese people to support their reforms at home. The road to Japan’s Empire, and World War 2 in Asia, had begun.
In the generation after the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s leadership carefully modernized the nation. The objectives were to stave off western colonialism, which by the late 19th Century had carved up all of Asia save Thailand and Japan (and made many inroads into China), as well as creating Japan’s own empire. Some apologists of Japanese Imperialism have subsequently blamed many of its crimes inflicted upon Asia due to western encroachment, but this downplays Japan’s own previous tendencies towards militarism and expansion.
Certainly, Japan had some imperial precedents of its own including two failed invasions of Korea and China in the late 16th Century. Additionally, Japan’s heavily militaristic samurai society often glorified war. Japanese theorists such as Aizawa Seishisai had laid down the intellectual framework used for expansion abroad before Perry entered Tokyo Bay. Indeed, most of Japan’s ensuing wars, annexations, and empire building initiatives would be the result of opportunism rather than legitimate exercises in self-defense. However, it could be said that western imperialism, particularly Perry’s actions in 1853, provided the initial catalyst which began Japan’s modern quest for empire.
Regardless, Japan’s modernization after 1869 saw an incredible generation of catching up with the West. It did so thanks to the practical vision of Japan’s new leaders, as well as foreign finance and expertise (ironically to eventually use the Westerners’ strengths against them). In a matter of decades Japan built considerable industries, impressive infrastructure like telegraphs and railroads, integrated with the global economy, instituted the trappings of parliamentary democracy, and created impressive land and naval forces. Japan’s leadership and society also cautiously embraced Western education, science, technology, and even culture to help the Japanese cultivate a mindset for these modern capabilities. A few slogans described Japan’s goals during this period including “Knowledge shall be sought throughout the world so as to strengthen the foundation of imperial rule,” “Copy, improve, and innovate,” and “Rich Nation, Strong Army.”
Japan’s initial imperial expansion occurred close to home. Afraid of Russian encroachment from the north and aware of the potential for agricultural cultivation and creating a colony for Japanese settlers, Japan annexed Hokkaido Island in 1869. Hokkaido was the first instance of Japanese empire building and provided a blueprint, to some degree, for cultivation of later imperial acquisitions. Okinawa and the Ryukyu Islands were annexed in 1879 and their inhabitants would be the subject of considerable discrimination (some of which remains to this day) even as Japan began modernization projects similar to those in Hokkaido.
The First Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895)
“In war, numbers alone confer no advantage. Do not advance relying on sheer military power.” -Sun Tzu
Japan’s first major test after modernization occurred in 1894-1895 with the First Sino-Japanese War. This conflict was essentially waged over which nation, China or Japan, would enjoy paramount influence in Korea. Traditionally Korea had been a tributary state of China and was hugely influenced by its giant neighbor and Confucianism. However, Japan increasingly saw its fate linked to Korea and had invaded it twice in the late 16th Century.
From a defensive standpoint Korea was a buffer zone for Japan against Russia and China. This is comparable to Belgium’s traditional significance for France, Germany, and Britain, as well as Poland for Germany and Russia. Additionally, as Japan became stronger and China weaker throughout the latter part of the 19th Century the former began seeing Korea as a potential colony, a market for its exports, and a bridge towards expansion on the Asian mainland. The Japanese obsession over Korea would contribute towards its wars between China and Russia, the 1931 annexation of Manchuria, and untold misery for the Chinese people that would continue for half a century.
The immediate context leading to the First Sino-Japanese War involved treaty obligations between Japan and China regarding Korea as well as the Donghak Peasant Rebellion that plagued Korea at the time. The Korean leadership was worried about the ever-increasing rebellion and asked China’s Qing dynasty to send troops to help quell it. However, the Chinese did not forewarn Japan they were sending troops to Korea which they were obligated to do according to the 1885 Convention of Tientsin. Japan seized this as a pretext to send larger forces than China to the Korean Peninsula. Thereupon the hawks among the Japanese leadership gave a strong ultimatum to China which they expected the latter would reject. This would give Japan an excuse to start a war, kick the Chinese troops out of Korea, and guarantee Japanese domination of the country.
Unsurprisingly, China rejected Japan’s ultimatum and war began in late July 1894. Japanese plans changed slightly during the war but in general Japan sought to conquer Korea, quash China’s modern Beiyang Fleet, and take its major naval bases at Port Arthur and Weihaiwei. If necessary, Japan would also advance on Beijing either via Manchuria or landings in the bay of Bohai after naval supremacy was secured.
Chinese strategy, formulated by the old but wise Viceroy Li Hongzhang, who was aware of China’s weaknesses, hoped for western intervention and initially planned to hold the Japanese at the Korean capital at Seoul, and failing that at Pyongyang farther north. If the Japanese advance could not be halted China would engage Japan in a war of attrition which the latter was desperate to avoid. Interestingly enough, Chiang Kai-shek, China’s Nationalist leader during World War 2, would adopt a similar strategy against Japan more then forty years later.
However, given the considerable imbalances in regard to size, population, and military forces between China and Japan many foreign observers predicted a decisive Chinese victory. The German General Staff, among the most respected military establishments of the world at the time, believed Japan would lose. A British advisor to the Qing’s military also confidently stated “in the end, there is no doubt that Japan must be utterly crushed.” Amongst the Chinese themselves, besides a few more informed officials such as Li Hongzhang, most were dismissive of the Japanese who were often referred to as dwarf pirates.
***
The First Sino-Japanese War began, as later ones against Russia and America would, by a Japanese attack against naval forces before any declaration of war, via the Battle of Pungdo on July 25, 1894. After winning this battle the Japanese naval contingent encountered the Kowshing, a British ship charted by China to ferry troops to reinforce the Chinese presence in Korea. The Japanese demanded the Kowshing follow them back to port but after failed negotiations, and Chinese threats to kill the British crew, the Japanese commander, Tōgō Heihachirō (who would later command Japan’s fleet in the Russo-Japanese War) decided to sink the ship.
In the aftermath, the Japanese did not bother trying to rescue the Chinese soldiers but made attempts to rescue the European crew and military advisors. Close to 1000 elite Chinese soldiers, which some observers considered the best China had, drowned which was a similar amount to the total number of Japanese soldiers killed in action during the entire war! While controversial at the time the sinking of the Kowshing was later judged to be in accordance with international law.
The main military engagements of the war included the Battle of Seonghwan, the Battle of Pyongyang, the Battle of the Yalu River, the Battle of Jiuliancheng, the capture of Port Arthur, and the fall of Weihaiwei.
From July 28-29, 1894, the first land battle of the war occurred south of Seoul at Seonghwan between roughly 4000 soldiers on each side. The Japanese began with a diversionary attack at night, followed by a flanking attack in the morning that forced the Chinese to flee north to Pyongyang (abandoning weapons, artillery, and ammunition) before they could be encircled. The Japanese inflicted disproportionate losses on the Chinese who suffered 500 casualties versus 88 for the former.
As the Japanese army advanced north the Chinese had time to reinforce and prepare considerable defenses for Pyongyang which also benefited from the Taedong River and surrounding cliffs which made the city hard to approach from the south and east. The Japanese outnumbered the Chinese forces but were low on rations so attacked without delay hoping to capture enemy supplies. The Chinese army at Pyongyang for its part was hopelessly disorganized, with four different forces under four different commands, that barely communicated with each other. The Chinese forces were also in a dubious state as they had celebrated an autumn festival and drank and gambled heavily the night before Japanese forces arrived!
Using artillery barrages and feints to distract the Chinese, the Japanese force attacked on September 15 from the north after the Chinese failed to counterattack the enemy while it was vulnerable crossing a bridge. The Chinese forces failed to work together and essentially fought their own battles. Their fortifications could not withstand Japanese artillery and their soldiers were no match for the training and morale of their Japanese counterparts. Although suffering perhaps 7000 casualties to less than 600 for the Japanese a significant amount of the Chinese soldiers retreated during the night, taking advantage of heavy rain.
A few days later, on September 17, the Imperial Japanese Navy and China’s Beiyang Fleet fought the defining naval engagement of the war at the Battle of the Yalu River. On paper both sides were closely matched but while Chinese ships had more firepower and tonnage the Japanese ships were generally faster, more modern and had a far better rate of fire. Meanwhile, Japanese sailors were better trained, more disciplined, the Chinese guns were not standardized, and thanks to corruption much of the Beiyang Fleet’s ammunition was filled with cement and non-explosive ordnance. During the battle Chinese coordination and communications were poor versus the Japanese who suffered roughly 400 casualties and a handful of ships damaged while China lost 5 ships and 1350 casualties. The battle severely demoralized the Beiyang Fleet which never confronted the Japanese at sea again, and once the latter took Port Arthur two months later the Chinese no longer had repair facilities to fix their modern ships.
However, the Japanese victory was not as one sided as it appeared considering most of their ships had been battered even with much of the Chinese ammunition being defective. Had the ammunition been effective and had one of China’s other three fleets combined with the Beiyang Fleet, it is conceivable the Japanese navy could have been devastated and Japan would have been hard pressed to supply its forces in Korea. Instead, petty regional differences on the Chinese side prevailed as its Southern Sea’s Squadron (which Li Hongzhang had failed to support in the earlier French-Sino War) sat on the sidelines and refused to come to the Beiyang Fleet’s aid.
***
Having beaten the Chinese at the Battle of Pyongyang, the Japanese army waited for reinforcements then headed north to cross the Yalu River and push into Manchuria. The next engagement would occur at Jiuliancheng, a strong, fortified position occupied by the Chinese that was protected by the formidable Yalu River. Unlike at Pyongyang, the Chinese enjoyed a healthy numerical superiority over Japanese forces. As at Pyongyang, the Chinese at Jiuliancheng hoped their strong defenses would carry the day while the Japanese again launched a feint attack (this time a frontal assault) while their main force would flank the Chinese at Hushan.
In late October 1894 the Japanese laid down a pontoon bridge across from Jiuliancheng’s fortifications and once more the Chinese failed to attack the former while they were vulnerable crossing the river. In fact, most of the Chinese soldiers abandoned Jiuliancheng and Hushan without much resistance which allowed the Japanese to seize these cities, along with considerable weapons and supplies left behind. Casualties may have been 2000 for the Chinese and as little as 150 for Japan although the latter may have underreported their losses for propaganda.
Considerable fighting would occur between Chinese and Japanese forces in Manchuria for many months, especially at Haicheng, a strategically located city that allowed access to the heart of the Manchuria Plain. Japan occupied Haicheng in December 1894, and the Chinese would try retaking it five times between mid-January and late February 1895. Although Japanese forces would advance to the Liao River in Manchuria a subsequent move on Beijing was halted due to supply issues, winter conditions, and the decision by the Japanese leadership to focus on naval operations to conclude the war. In part this decision was made due to fears that rogue Japanese elements would ignore directives from Tokyo to continue onto Beijing and risk western intervention in the conflict. Indeed, in the future rogue Japanese officers stationed abroad would occasionally go against political and military policy which sometimes led to unnecessary escalations and even the outbreak of hostilities.
Having previously won naval superiority at the Battle of the Yalu River the Japanese landed several divisions on the Liaodong Peninsula in late October 1894 while other forces crossed into Manchuria in the aftermath of Jiuliancheng. The main objective on the peninsula was Port Arthur, one of two of the Beiyang Fleet’s naval bases that guarded Bohai Bai (along with Beijing) and China’s only port capable of fixing modern warships. Moving south Japanese forces took Jinzhou on November 6, isolating Port Arthur from the rest of Manchuria, as well as Dalian on November 7. In a major stroke of luck, the Japanese captured Chinese plans regarding the minefields in Dalian’s port, as well as defensive arrangements for Port Arthur! The defense of Port Arthur was also undermined by the evacuation of the Beiyang Fleet to Weihaiwei rather than face the Imperial Japanese Navy again.
On the other hand, Port Arthur should have been difficult to conquer given its defenses were modern, carefully situated, well supplied, and backed by powerful artillery. Meanwhile the Japanese were having trouble with their own artillery and did not have many more troops (15,000-13,000) than the Chinese. It is possible a competent, resolute defense on the part of the garrison could have repulsed an assault and survived a siege of considerable length. Unsurprisingly, given the generally poor performance of Chinese arms in the war so far the battle for Port Arthur was concluded swiftly, easily and at little cost for Japan. Although the Chinese garrison beat back the first attacks the Japanese soon reduced the former’s positions.
Rather than coordinating their forces amongst the forts in the hills around the city the Chinese remained passive as the Japanese took these out one by one and then turned the forts’ guns against Port Arthur itself. Senior Chinese officers fled by sea. Panic and looting began amongst the garrison and the city, its docks, over 200 fortress guns, and a large supply of munitions and coal fell into the hands of the Japanese on November 22, 1894. Chinese casualties were potentially above 4000 while Japan suffered less than 300 (far less than it would lose fighting Russia for the same port ten years later). With defeats at the Yalu River and now Port Arthur the Qing leadership was so desperate and disorganized it dreamt of astonishing schemes such as purchasing the Chilean fleet to compensate for Chinese naval losses!
In the aftermath of this victory Japan’s reputation was somewhat tarnished by what became known as the Port Arthur massacre. At the time Japan claimed when its soldiers attempted to enter the city Chinese soldiers in civilian attire shot at them. Additionally, the soldiers entering Port Arthur allegedly found many corpses of their countrymen that had been mutilated, and often hung from fortress walls and trees. Unsurprisingly, in the course of the next few days, the Japanese soldiers massacred between 1000-60,000 Chinese in an event that disturbed many western nations.
According to Jonathan Fenby some Chinese civilians were forced into a lake and drowned, many were shot, and apparently Japanese soldiers placed heads on spikes while others marched through the streets with heads on bayonets. Yet most likely the real number of victims was between 1000-2000 as the higher figures were the result of sensational journalism by papers such as the New York World. Additionally, western nations had little justification in their pious attitude given their similarly cruel conduct during the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion a few years later. A Japanese newspaper at the time noted “the history of savage nations that have come in contact with Christian Occidentals is all but written in blood.”
However, the massacre perhaps foreshadowed later Japanese atrocities and hinted the Japanese Empire was not destined to be more humane, even towards fellow Asians, than its western equivalents. Indeed, the Port Arthur massacre arguably mirrored the Rape of Nanjing decades later in many respects including Japan downplaying the event, refusing to punish offenders, the lack of discipline amongst Japanese forces, and suggestions that many of the victims were soldiers disguised in civilian clothing. Ironically, the far bloodier subjugation of Taiwan by Japan after the war is less well known than the Port Arthur massacre. To be fair not all Japanese officials wanted to whitewash the incident and quickly bury it. Ariga Nagao, a legal advisor to the commanding Japanese general, suggested Japan bore responsibility for the massacre and wrote an account that was circulated in the West.
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Japan’s last major effort in the war was the Battle of Weihaiwei, a combined land and sea effort to destroy the remnants of the Beiyang Fleet and seize its remaining base, located on the Shandong Peninsula. Like Port Arthur the Weihaiwei forts were deemed formidable, having been designed by the German army and equipped with modern artillery. However, it was assumed Japan would assault it by a direct naval attack; a flawed assumption that would also doom the British naval base at Singapore decades later. While the Beiyang Fleet stayed in port and blocked the harbor with obstacles and a minefield, the Japanese planned to launch a feint landing to the west of Weihaiwei while the main force landed to the east.
Despite harsh winter conditions the Japanese made good progress and in late January 1895 launched a multi-prong attack that succeeded in taking the forts and city in a matter of days. Stuck between the guns from the forts and the Japanese navy that breached the harbor defenses, the Beiyang Fleet was slowly worn down and its remnants were either scuttled or captured by the Japanese ten days later. Taking responsibility for the disaster Admiral Ding Ruchang took poison and the Japanese showed him respect by lowering their flags as a Chinese ship sailed away with his body. After the war the Qing dynasty asked the British to train its naval forces but the latter, no doubt politely, turned down the request. With this, China effectively lost its status as a significant naval power, and it would not be until the 1990s that it began rebuilding a blue-water fleet.
With the Beiyang Fleet destroyed and Japan now in a position to make landings in the Bay of Bohai to threaten Beijing the Chinese sued for peace. The ensuing Treaty of Shimonoseki in April 1895 ended the conflict, guaranteed Japanese paramount influence in Korea, and allowed Japan to annex Taiwan and the Liaodong Peninsula. It also forced China to pay a harsh indemnity to Japan in the amount of 200 million Kuping Taels (equivalent to 310,000,000 yen which meant the war enriched Japan as its war effort had cost 250,000,000 yen).
However, Japan’s triumph was somewhat soured by the Triple Intervention by Germany, France, and Russia which pressured Japan to withdraw from the Liaodong Peninsula (which Russia later occupied via a 25 year lease) in exchange for a larger indemnity paid by China. Russia, which was eager to expand its influence in the Far East via constructing the Trans-Siberian Railway, creeping influence in Manchuria, and desiring a warm water port all year round, was surprised by Japan’s victory against China and wary of its rise as a great power. By getting France and Germany to help pressure Japan to give up the Liaodong Peninsula (which had the warm water port of Port Arthur) Russia gained a significant strategic asset in the Far East and denied it to a potential enemy. Japan reluctantly accepted the agreement, but the next decade saw considerable antagonism between Japan and Russia increase as their respective interests in Manchuria and Korea clashed. To add to China’s woes other European nations also took advantage of its weakness to gain their own Chinese ports and concessions such as the Germans at Qingdao, the British at Weihaiwei, and the French at Kwangchouwan.
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Why did Japan win the First Sino-Japanese War so decisively? Edward J. Drea in Japan’s Imperial Army, and S.C.M. Paine in The Japanese Empire go into considerable detail regarding the relevant factors and a few can be stated here. Japan’s superior railways and fleet allowed it to mobilize and concentrate forces at decisive locations to win battles whereas China’s poor communications meant its armies were outnumbered in many engagements despite its far larger army. Japan’s arms were standardized, usually modern, its forces were united by doctrine and training, and the army benefited from competent, aggressive leadership, and generally high morale.
By contrast, China’s armed forces were an amalgamation of many force structures with different weapons of varying quality, many forces refused to coordinate with each other, its leadership was of mixed quality and generally cautious, and its soldiers often fled prematurely. Japan benefitted from modernization and westernization which gave it superior industry, infrastructure, education, and modern armed forces based on Germany and Britain (who possessed the most effective army and navy in the world respectively). Before the war the Japanese also secured a Chinese sailor’s dictionary filled with peculiar numbers which allowed them to decipher China’s signaling codes, which meant during the conflict Japan was able to read the enemy’s encrypted communications.
Philip Jowett noted contemporary accounts describing Chinese forces using modern artillery alongside spears, as well as bows and arrows. There was terrible marksmanship and discipline with Chinese soldiers habitually expending all their bullets then fleeing, while opium and drug use was widespread amongst Chinese forces. Finally, the human factor should not be neglected with S.C.M. Paine suggesting the Qing dynasty’s leadership put money into military hardware but failed to adequately invest in its soldiers and military leadership. Whenever China’s modern forces and equipment went up against Japan in cases such as the battles of the Yalu River, Port Arthur and Weihaiwei they lost due to their inferior skill, leadership, training, and morale. Technology and military hardware are only as effective as the people who wield them and like the Arab armies that often matched, or sometimes surpassed, Israeli equipment during the Arab-Israeli Wars the Chinese forces in the First Sino-Japanese War were simply outclassed in terms of leaders, officers and soldiers.
Yet in one significant aspect during the war the Japanese were not proficient: Logistics. The army had not made detailed logistical plans before the conflict, its maps were poor, over 150,000 civilian contractors (essentially coolies) were needed to supply its advances, and the navy had to enlist many ships to supply forces on the Asian mainland. Even after these ad hoc measures the war could have turned out differently, or continued significant longer, had the Japanese not consistently taken food and supplies left after Chinese forces abandoned battlefields such as Seonghwan, Pyongyang, Jiuliancheng, and Port Arthur. Such logistical issues would continuously plague Japan’s armed forces in the future, with especially dire results during the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the war in the Pacific against America. However, given the overwhelming victory against China in 1895 logistical considerations were not adequately addressed.
Chinese casualties in the war were perhaps 35,000 while Japan suffered 5000-6000 killed or wounded in combat and at least 10,000 more killed by disease. The conquest of Taiwan would also result in 700 combat losses for Japan, as well as thousands killed by disease, against an estimated 14,000 dead Taiwanese soldiers and civilians.
The Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905)
“The general who wins the battle makes many calculations in his temple before the battle is fought. The general who loses makes but few calculations beforehand.” -Sun Tzu
In 1899 an anti-foreign/christian uprising called the Boxer Rebellion took place in China. This saw foreigners and Chinese Christians attacked, and placed under siege, by a secret society known as the Boxers who resented foreign influence and had beliefs such as thinking they were immune to bullets! Initially the Qing government stayed neutral but eventually sided with the Boxers hoping the latter could limit foreign meddling in China. Unfortunately for them, several European powers, along with America and Japan, reacted decisively, forming the Eight-Nation Alliance and sending roughly 50,000 troops to relieve the Beijing Legation Quarter which they did so in August 1900. They took Beijing, suppressed the Boxer Rebellion, and committed significant war crimes including widespread executions, rape, looting and burning down villages. They also pressured the Qing leadership to sign the Boxer Protocol which resulted in another ruinous indemnity to be paid to foreign powers and the further decline of the Qing dynasty.
Russia took advantage of these events by moving considerable forces into Manchuria to gain more influence in the region and thwart Japan from penetrating farther onto the Asian mainland. This, along with Russia’s continued construction of the Trans-Siberian Railway, the build up of strong naval forces at Port Arthur, and Russian attempts to gain more influence in Korea convinced Japan that Russia would have to be confronted sooner than later.
On paper the Russians had major advantages over Japan. As S.C.M. Paine has pointed out “Russia had nearly three times Japan’s population, eight times its gross national product, twice its per-capita standard of living, and seven times its armed forces.” Unsurprisingly, given the lopsided strength between Russia and Japan the latter initially tried peaceful means to resolve their conflicting interests. As such, Japan signed an alliance with Britain, that was keen to limit the power of imperial rivals like France and Russia, in 1902. The alliance guaranteed any war between Japan and Russia would not see the intervention of another power on Russia’s behalf. Additionally, Japan sought to make a deal with Russia regarding their respective interests in the region, suggesting Russia could maintain its paramount position in Manchuria while Japan would retain its equivalent position in Korea.
However, the Japanese wisely hedged their bets in this period by continuing their military build up, especially by acquiring a modern battle fleet built by Britain, in order to challenge Russian naval power in the Far East. Eventually, the negotiations went nowhere as Russia felt no need to compromise given its considerable strength versus Japan and some racism on the part of Russia’s leadership such as Tsar Nicolas II often referring to the Japanese as “monkeys.” Apparently being hit on the head by a sabre from a Samurai during an earlier visit to Japan did not improve the Tsar’s disposition towards the Japanese people. Thus, Japan decided to launch a preventive war before the Trans-Siberian Railway was completed and Russia became too strong in the region. While Japan could initially ship troops to North China faster than Russia could send reinforcements along the 5500 mile single-track Trans-Siberian Railway, Russian engineers were adding more tracks to it which would eventually neutralize this advantage.
Japanese plans for the Russo-Japanese War could easily have been influenced by Clausewitzian theory and German military methods on land, as well as British training and Mahanian naval doctrine at sea. Japan’s objectives were to secure Korea and Manchuria from Russia’s grasp, retake the Liaodong Peninsula (along with Port Arthur) that had been relinquished in 1895 by Japan, and crush Russian naval power in the Far East. This would secure Japan from Russian threats on land and sea, expand its presence on the Asian mainland, and put it in a good position to increase influence in North China.
The military means to accomplish these strategic objectives were to be decisive battles of annihilation on land and sea in the likes of Cannae and Trafalgar. This would be facilitated by aggression and speed designed to take the initiative, keep the Russians off balance, and hopefully win the military contest before Russia’s vast superiority in manpower and resources overwhelmed Japan. Essentially, Japan was in a race against time to crush the Russian army in Manchuria before the Trans-Siberian Railroad was completed as well as taking Port Arthur and destroying Russia’s First Pacific Squadron before it was potentially reinforced by the Russian Baltic fleet.
By contrast Russia’s leadership, surprised by the outbreak of hostilities, found it hard to agree on how to prosecute the war. An oblivious Tsar said “God will help us” upon hearing of the attack on Port Arthur. The Russian theatre commander and the head of the army in Manchuria disliked each other, often contradicting one another’s plans, while the main generals in Port Arthur also had a dysfunctional relationship that would undermine its resistance. If there was a plan at all it was mostly defensive with Port Arthur holding out while the Russians massed enough troops in Manchuria to overwhelm the far less numerous Japanese forces that could be deployed there.
The Russian conduct on land and sea was, with a few exceptions, cautious, indecisive, and defensive even when Russian forces significantly outnumbered the Japanese. Thus, the Russians were generally passive, failed to take advantage of Japanese mistakes, and according to Robert Citino “the Japanese would take all the risks, launch virtually all the attacks, and drive the Russians from one defensive position after another.”
However, due to recent military developments such as technology and weaponry that favored defensive warfare, Japanese shortcomings including logistics and occasional questionable generalship, as well as stubborn Russian resistance, meant Russia would turn out to be a tougher opponent than initially thought. The Japanese army did not help its chances by launching desperate, uninspired frontal attacks during several battles either.
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The war began with a surprise torpedo attack on Russia’s First Pacific Squadron at Port Arthur by Japanese destroyers on the night of February 8-9, 1904. Like Pearl Harbor more then three decades later this was launched without a declaration of war. Unlike Pearl Harbor the physical damage at Port Arthur was limited despite the lack of Russian precautions as well as them positioning several ships outside the harbor. While two battleships became sunk on the harbor bottom, they were later refloated. Three Japanese attempts during subsequent months to block Port Arthur by sinking old transports in the harbor also failed to neutralize Russia’s First Pacific Squadron. However, the psychological effects were significant and temporarily put the Russians on the defense at sea which allowed the Japanese navy to ferry troops unimpeded to Korea and later South Manchuria. The first major landing occurred at Inchon halfway up the Korean Peninsula where Japanese forces had landed in 1894, and where General Douglas MacArthur’s forces would land in 1950 during the Korean War.
Japanese forces in Korea advanced north to the Yalu River where they met Russian soldiers for the first time at the end of April 1904. Despite having months to prepare for battle the Russians, who had not studied the lessons of the First Sino-Japanese War, were quickly beaten. While the Japanese had more troops and deployed howitzers the outnumbered and outgunned Russians had not even bothered to make strong defenses or gather intelligence on the approaching enemy. After building a decoy bridge to distract the Russians, the Japanese constructed more bridges upstream, crossed the Yalu River, and routed the smaller Russian force. Russian casualties were approximately 2700 versus 1000 for Japan and suddenly the major powers, especially Russia, realized Japanese chances in the war were not so unfavorable. Having won this battle and seized a foothold in Manchuria the Japanese advanced north towards the main Russian army in the region to seek a battle of annihilation.
Meanwhile another Japanese army landed on the Liaodong Peninsula to cut the railway between Mukden and Port Arthur, effectively cutting off the Russian forces in Manchuria from those in the port. Next it advanced south down the Liaodong Peninsula to seize Port Arthur to retake Japan’s lost prize from 1895 and eliminate Russia’s First Pacific Squadron. For at sea, the Russian fleet at Port Arthur generally refused to sail out to face the Imperial Japanese Navy.
This was despite enjoying a six to four superiority in battleships after two Japanese battleships were sank by mines in May 1904, and especially after the death of Vice Admiral Stepan Makarov, one of the few energetic and competent Russian leaders of the war (whose battleship was also sank by a mine). Indeed, mines would prove to be very effective in the conflict, sinking eleven Japanese ships and seven Russian ones. Either way, after a failed attempt by the Russian squadron to escape to Vladivostok during the Battle of the Yellow Sea in August 1904, where Makarov’s successor was killed from a lucky hit by a Japanese shell, the fleet stayed in port until the end of the siege of Port Arthur.
With the Russian squadron at Port Arthur intact and unwilling to fight the Japanese navy the latter was forced to maintain a costly blockade of the port which prevented its ships from being able to return home for maintenance and refitting. The exploits of Russian ships launching raids from Vladivostok that sank Japanese transports and vessels (including one carrying important heavy artillery needed for the siege of Port Arthur), and terrorized Japanese coastal cities, was also a burden for the Japanese navy. As long as these threats remained the Japanese navy would be unable to recuperate and be ready to face the Russian Baltic fleet if it were sent to the Far East. Therefore, considerable pressure was put on the Japanese 3rd Army, under General Nogi Maresuke, to take Port Arthur as soon as possible to help the navy. The Imperial Japanese Army would also goad him on so his army could then reinforce its forces in Manchuria to facilitate the battle of annihilation it sought against the Russian army.
The 3rd Army’s first test was the Battle of Nanshan in late May 1904. The fighting centered on a heavily fortified hill located at the narrowest point of the Liaodong Peninsula near Jinzhou. The Russian defenses were well prepared, comparable to the battlefields of World War 1 (with minefields, barbed wire, machine guns and artillery), and were concentrated in a bottle neck of only two miles that was impossible to flank. In such a case, the Japanese, who outnumbered the Russians 35,000 to 4000, launched multiple human wave attacks after a short three-hour artillery bombardment.
Much like the Battle of the Somme, a decade later, the artillery had little affect on the defenses and despite launching nine separate attacks throughout the day the Japanese soldiers were beaten back with severe losses each time. However, an amphibious assault on the Japanese right flank, supported by gunboats, advanced enough to panic the Russian commander who blew up the ammunition reserves and ordered a premature retreat. This was fortunate for the Japanese who had fired more shells in this battle than during the entire First Sino-Japanese war and were running low on ammunition. While the Japanese victory allowed them to continue onwards to Port Arthur the cost was disproportionate with Japan suffering more battlefield casualties here than its previous war against China.
The remaining Russian forces retreated to the main defenses around Port Arthur which General Nogi, who had captured it 10 years earlier, hoped would fall quickly. Instead, it would hold out in a siege lasting five months which saw little tactical prowess, but plenty of aggressive assaults, and disregard for casualties, on the part of the Japanese. To be fair to Nogi, Port Arthur’s defenses, which had been kept secret from Japan, were generally thorough, well sited and the Russians resisted stubbornly. On the other hand, Nogi and his staff dropped the ball throughout most of the siege. For example, Nogi could not understand a topographical map of the area, his deputy did not appreciate modern defenses, and their staff officers rarely showed initiative or outstanding ability. The Japanese would launch four major attacks to overrun the defenses: The first occurred August 19-24 resulting in 16,000 casualties for the Japanese against 3000 for the Russians, the second occurred September 19-21 incurring 7500 losses for Japan and 1500 for Russia, while the third occurred October 26-30 with the Japanese suffering another 6000 casualties.
These severe losses and lack of progress lowered morale and convinced many Japanese leaders that Nogi was incompetent. Therefore, General Kodama Gentarō was temporarily sent to solve the crisis, taking de facto command of Nogi’s forces. It was recognized that Hill 203, the highest elevation in the area, had an excellent view of Port Harbor and its ships. With its capture Japanese guns could rain down accurate artillery fire on them and compromise the Russian garrison. Thus, a fourth attack was launched November 26-December 6 to conquer Hill 203. This assault succeeded although Kodama had to throw in the 3rd Army’s last reserves to beat back a Russian counterattack that tried retaking it. Although the cost for Japan was another 14,500 losses compared to 6000 for Russia the Japanese finally gained a decisive advantage in the siege.
Throughout the next month Japanese spotters on Hill 203 guided artillery fire that sank much of the Russian squadron at Port Arthur (including several battleships) while the rest were either scuttled, or later captured by Japan. At the beginning of January 1905 the Russian commander surrendered Port Arthur, despite the fact there was enough ammunition and food to hold out at least another month. The victory at Port Arthur finally allowed the Japanese navy to return home to refit and repair its ships and gave it time to train for the showdown with the Russian Baltic fleet that had been belatedly sent to the Far East by the Tsar.
The end of the siege also allowed Nogi’s 3rd Army to join Japan’s other four armies in Manchuria in what would become the quintessential land battle of the war between Russia and Japan. The losses sustained by the Japanese in the campaign for Port Arthur were approximately 90,000-100,000 (60,000 battle casualties and the rest via disease) against perhaps 31,000 Russian battle casualties and 30,000 captured when the port fell. Given Japan had conquered Port Arthur with less than a few dozen dead 10 years earlier in the First Sino-Japanese War this was a costly victory indeed.
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The fighting in Manchuria was also marked by Japanese aggression and Russian caution. As at Nanshan and Port Arthur it was disproportionately bloody, attritional, and highlighted the weapons and technology that would dominate World War 1. The Japanese made several attempts to encircle and destroy the Russian army in line with Clausewitzian doctrine, while the Russians mounted a few attacks of their own with less vigor. However, the former failed to crush the Russian forces in Manchuria for several reasons. This included the inherent difficulties of trying to overcome the considerable firepower of artillery and machine guns that gave the defenders a strong advantage, while Japan also lacked a decisive arm of exploitation such as tanks or mechanized infantry (which were not invented yet). Additionally, the Japanese forces were always outnumbered during the major engagements, notably in artillery.
However, thanks in part to their elan and bold leadership the Japanese won notable operational victories and slowly pushed the enemy back to Mukden, the main Russian position in South Manchuria. There would be four major battles in Manchuria. These included the Battle of Liaoyang in August to September 1904 resulting in 24,000 Japanese casualties against 18,000 Russian, the Battle of Shaho a month later where Japan suffered 20,000 casualties but inflicted twice as many on Russia, and the smaller Battle of Sandepu in late January 1905 that saw Japan lose 9500 men versus 14,000 for Russia. Yet the Battle of Mukden would be the climax of the war on land.
Waged from February 20 to March 10, 1905, the Battle of Mukden was arguably the largest battle in history to that point. It was fought over a front of 100 miles, involved as many as 600,000 soldiers, perhaps 330,000 Russian and 270,000 Japanese, with approximately 1400 artillery pieces for Russia and 900 for Japan (although the Japanese had more than double the number of machine guns). Japan was desperate for a crippling blow and threw in all its forces as the army’s reserves had been all but depleted and hoped this all out effort would crush the larger Russian army. Meanwhile, the Russian force in Manchuria had its own problems as the 1905 Russian Revolution, which broke out in January, meant for the time being many potential reinforcements had to be diverted to safeguard the Tsar’s regime at home.
The Japanese plan was a simple pin and hook operation with their eastern flank mounting an aggressive attack to distract the Russians while Nogi’s newly arriving 3rd army on the far left flank would be unleashed a week later to outflank the Russian army in the west and fall upon its rear behind Mukden. It was anticipated Japanese forces could cut the road and railway leading to the city, encircle the Russians, and crush them like the Prussians had done to the French at Sedan during the Franco-Prussian War. Given the Russian commander, General Aleksey Kuropatkin, believed the main Japanese effort would come from the east (thanks in part to Japanese disinformation), and was also oblivious to Nogi’s army approaching from the west it seemed reasonable, on a map at least, that Japan had a good chance of annihilating the Russian army.
As planned, the battle opened with a major attack from the Japanese right flank. Believing this was the major effort the Russians shifted 42 battalions and 128 artillery guns to contain it which not only committed their reserves to this part of the battlefield but also prevented them from launching their own planned offensive against what they thought was the Japanese left flank. In response to Russia countering this diversionary thrust the Japanese launched attacks by their forces in the center which resulted in terrible losses, although their heavy artillery did inflict significant damage on the entrenched Russians. More importantly the Japanese attacks in the east and center pinned down the Russian forces, committed their reserves, and thus a week into the battle Nogi’s 3rd Army commenced its flanking attack to the west of the Russian left to fall upon the latter’s rear to cut its communications. Unfortunately for the Russians, they had little immediate forces available to meet this new threat and the hastily organized forces sent to do so slowed, but were unable to halt, Nogi’s advance.
However, due to a combination of Nogi’s slow advance, snowstorms, and the difficultly of Japanese commanders controlling complex maneuvers on such an unprecedented scale, meant the Russians were never completely encircled and retreated a few weeks after Nogi’s initial advance. Realizing the impending disaster Kuropatkin decided to abandon Mukden to save the Russian army. This was unlike what later Soviet and German commanders, pressured by Hitler and Stalin, would often do so in the future as at Kiev in 1941 and Stalingrad in 1942. The retreat was chaotic with Russian troops continuously pushing aside Japanese soldiers periodically occupying the road and railway north. Russian troops looted the available vodka stocks, while their wounded, many weapons, and countless supplies were left behind.
The Japanese inflicted dreadful casualties on the retreating forces from both sides of the closing pincers. Despite this, most of the Russian army escaped destruction and the Japanese forces were unable to pursue them effectively due to logistical and transport issues, running low on ammunition, and having suffered heavy losses. Indeed, 75,000 out of 270,000 Japanese and 90,000 out of 330,000 Russians soldiers committed to the battle became casualties.
While Japan had won another impressive operational victory, and kicked the Russians out of South Manchuria, the latter retained their army and simply retreated north out of the reach of Japanese forces. There, it would receive significant reinforcements via the Trans-Siberian Railway while Japan had all but exhausted its potential manpower. The Japanese army had thus failed in its quest to inflict an annihilating victory over the Russians in Manchuria and would become disproportionately outnumbered in the field in a matter of months. Fortunately for Japan, the Russians had been humiliated and demoralized by their defeat at Mukden and this would be the last notable land engagement of the war.
Instead, Russia put its faith in its large Baltic fleet that left Europe in the fall of 1904 and was now only weeks away from the Far East. Having been consistently defeated on land in Manchuria, and with revolution threatening the Tsar’s regime at home, it was left to the Baltic fleet to salvage something from the conflict for Russia and seize victory from the jaws of defeat.
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The voyage of the Second Pacific Squadron (Russia renamed its Baltic fleet during the journey for propaganda effect) from the Baltic Sea to the Far East was a trial of comedies, errors, tragedies, and diplomatic mishaps; described brilliantly in Alistair Horne’s Hubris and Constantine Pleshakov’s The Tsar’s Last Armada. To cite a few examples, several ships ran aground in the first days of the voyage, Russian ships fired on British fishing trawlers in the North Sea (almost leading to war between Britain and Russia), and several mutinies had to be put down. The food was often spoiled and moldy, many sailors died of heatstroke, and some even jumped overboard to commit suicide. Firing exercises off Madagascar were found wanting as gunnery was poor, ships almost collided with each other, and Horne noted that during a torpedo exercise “out of seven fired, one jammed, four darted off eccentrically at right angles either to port or starboard, and one went around and around of circles.”
The poor soul chosen to lead the fleet, Vice Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky, reputably short tempered with a habit of throwing his binoculars overboard, or at shipmates, had no faith in the venture and had argued against it. At least he was untainted by corruption, and had the confidence of most of his subordinates, which has not exactly been prevalent regarding Russian military leaders, even in modern times. Rozhestvensky did not think highly of most of his admirals and captains and complained his sailors had to be told five times to do the most mundane things and then had to check five more times to see if they even remembered the order.
On the other hand, given the lack of Russian naval bases abroad, and the massive amounts of coal, food and supplies that was needed to sustain the fleet, the voyage was an impressive feat of logistics given the journey of 18,000 miles! The issue of coal, in particular, would prove to be a constant annoyance for the Russians. There were no less than 32 re-coaling operations throughout, coal often had to be stored in any available space (including living quarters), and a shortage of coal near the end of the voyage meant the fleet had to take the most direct, dangerous, route to Vladivostok through the Tsushima Strait dominated by the Imperial Japanese Navy.
Unsurprisingly, when the fleet finally got to the Far East its ships were in poor condition. Unlike the Japanese navy that had months to refit, train, and maneuver in preparation for the showdown the Russian fleet enjoyed little opportunity to do so. Its ships were also covered with barnacles and weeds that would compromise its speed which was already inferior to their Japanese counterparts. On paper, at least, the Russian fleet had advantages including more battleships and superior firepower with forty-one 10-12-inch guns versus seventeen for Japan.
However, the Japanese battleships were more modern, with many of the Russian battleships, and other vessels, being old or obsolete. The Japanese ships also benefitted from new range finders whereas the Russians had older ones dating from the 1880s, guaranteeing the former would be able to fire quicker and with considerably better accuracy. Japanese accuracy was also probably aided by the BRIGHT YELLOW funnels on Russian battleships! As if all of this was not bad enough many Russian shells were duds while Japanese ones had four times the amount of explosive charge.
Regarding the respective crews, the advantages for Japan were even more lopsided. Whereas many of the Russian sailors were illiterate, defeatist, and demoralized their Japanese equivalents were better educated, confident after their successes, and in high spirits. Many of the Russian sailors were previously labelled unfit for service, had criminal records, or even had revolutionary sympathies. A Russian saying for the time concerning the posting of new officers went “drinkers to the fleet, dimwits to the infantry.” Japanese crews were better fed, better treated, trained harder, and had seen much more time at sea.
Japanese squadrons also had considerable experience working and maneuvering together whereas the hastily assembled Baltic fleet did not. The Japanese commander, Vice Admiral Tōgō Heihachirō, assembled his admirals and captains prior to the battle to explain his plan and how to conduct the battle. The Russian commander, by contrast, did none of this or make any notable tactical plans; not even conferring with his second in command who complained he received no information on what to do in the upcoming battle.
For the battle, the Russians had 11 battleships (many of which were modern, but the three coastal battleships in particular were fairly weak), nine cruisers, and nine destroyers. Against this the Imperial Japanese Navy had five battleships (four modern), over 20 cruisers, 21 destroyers and 45 torpedo boats. Although apart from battleships the Japanese significantly outnumbered the Russians the battle would be decided by the guns of the battleships and cruisers of the Japanese fleet throughout the daylight hours while its destroyers and torpedoes waited to attack at night.
In the early morning of May 27, 1905, Tōgō’s scouting ships located the Russian fleet attempting to bypass the Japanese unnoticed to escape to Vladivostok. With the weather being unfavorable for torpedo attacks Tōgō ordered his destroyers and torpedo boats to temporarily fall back and launch night attacks while his battleships and cruisers hit the Russian fleet throughout the day. Hoping to use the classic crossing the T naval tactic where his ships would maneuver in a line in front of the Russian ships (thereby allowing the Japanese to use all of their guns while the Russians could only use their forward turrets) Tōgō had his ships turn in sequence which made them vulnerable for a few minutes as they slowly turned. Fortunately for them the Russians did not, or were unable to, take advantage of this although Tōgō’s own ship in the vanguard drew the brunt of enemy hits in the initial exchanges of fire. The maneuver paid off and before long the Japanese began dominating the battle.
Japanese shells began crashing down on Russian ships, causing devastation amongst their gun controls, and it has been suggested the Russian ships scored no hits against the Japanese after the first half hour of combat. Thus, like the Battle of Midway nearly forty years later the naval balance between both sides was irrevocably altered in a matter of minutes. Apparently the Japanese scored 3.2 hits per hundred shells fired versus 1.5 for the Russians, which seems disproportionate, but was probably better than expected for the latter given the numerous disadvantages suffered by Russian crews and their ships. Notably, the older Russians ships that Rozhestvensky had wanted to leave behind in Europe, and little was expected from, displayed impressive gunnery, forcing a few Japanese cruisers out of action. However, this was an exception as the Japanese navy thoroughly crushed the Russian fleet as a fighting force in probably the most decisive naval battle since Trafalgar a hundred years earlier.
All of the Russian fleet’s battleships were sank or captured and the majority of its cruisers and destroyers were also sank, with a handful being interned in neutral ports. A mere cruiser and two destroyers broke through the gauntlet of destruction to reach Vladivostok. Approximately 5000 Russians sailors were killed, several hundred were wounded, and 6000 were captured. With these losses, combined with the squadron it had lost at Port Arthur, Russia was demoted from being the third largest navy in 1904 to a tenuous sixth place by the end of the day. With its last fleet effectively imprisoned in the Black Sea via treaty, and infected by revolutionary sentiment, Russian naval power became an oxymoron. This was hardly the gift the Tsar expected for the 9th anniversary of his coronation! Japanese losses were three torpedo boats and 700 killed or wounded, including future Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku who lost two fingers. Whatever his flaws Rozhestvensky took complete responsibility for the disaster while Tōgō visited him in the hospital after the battle and showed kindness and respect.
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With Russia’s naval power broken, combined with the defeats at Port Arthur and Mukden, as well as increasing revolution at home, Russian political will to continue the war imploded. This was lucky for Japan as its manpower had maxed out, ammunition was running low, and its economy was close to buckling. By the end of the war the Russian army in Manchuria was also three times as large as the Japanese forces and it is clear had Russia continued the conflict Japan’s war effort may have collapsed. Indeed, Russian intelligence advised the Tsar of Japan’s difficulties while his wife and generals in Manchuria were in favor of fighting on.
However, the Tsar, more concerned with saving his regime from revolution at home than fighting Japan abroad, was ready for peace. As such American President Theodore Roosevelt provided mediation and the Treaty of Portsmouth was signed in September 1905. With it, Japan secured paramount influence in Manchuria (along with the former Russian railway concession in the south), regained Port Arthur, was ceded the southern part of Sakhalin Island, and effectively replaced Russia as the most influential power in Northeast Asia until 1945.
Yet the Japanese people were disappointed as they expected more benefits from the treaty, including a significant indemnity to pay for the war (which had cost Japan 8.5 times the amount as the First Sino-Japanese War), as well as more territory to justify the considerable blood they had spilt. Ignorant regarding the tenuous Japanese position at the end of the war, and thus unable to understand the necessary compromises made by Japan’s leaders to secure peace, the Japanese public were furious. Riots and demonstrations rocked Tokyo with mobs damaging police boxes and burning churches and newspaper offices. More than 1000 people were killed or injured and martial law had to be enacted to end the disturbances.
Regardless, if the Japanese populace were unrealistic in their expectations the human cost of the conflict was undeniably high. Whereas the preceding First Sino-Japanese War had resulted in relatively minimal casualties (at least regarding combat losses) the Japanese suffered roughly 80,000 dead in the Russo-Japanese War, which included at least 20,000 killed by disease. Russian casualties are harder to determine with confidence, although Japan captured approximately 80,000 prisoners, but Russia did not suffer the disproportionate casualties against Japan as China did ten years earlier. Notably, the Japanese suffered higher casualties than the Russians during several battles such as Nanshan and Liaoyang, as well as the siege of Port Arthur.
Unlike the First Sino-Japanese War and later conflicts against China and the western powers, Japan committed few atrocities or excesses during its war against Russia. Japan treated Russian prisoners correctly for which the International Red Cross commended it. The Japanese followed the Hague Convention regarding the Laws of War and even their treatment of local Chinese civilians was generally good, more so than the less disciplined Russians. Some of the motivation for this was to avoid alienating western opinion, and help dismantle the unfavorable treaty system imposed on Japan by the West. But to their credit the Japanese government, and generals in the field, made significant efforts to prevent war crimes and civilian casualties, and to win over Chinese and international favor.
Either way, despite significant losses and some disappointments Japan, in one decade, had defeated China and Russia, became the main player in Northeast Asia, and would vastly increase its power, influence, and territory in the next 40 years. In the case of Russia this was the first instance in modern times an Asian power defeated a European one.
However, in the midst of celebrating, the Japanese leadership failed to realize that just like the war against China a decade earlier Japan had defeated a relatively inept opponent. These two conflicts could have continued indefinitely and Japan was lucky its enemies came to terms relatively quickly. In the future, these conditions would not always repeat themselves and Japan’s shortcomings in matters such as staff planning, coordination, and once again logistics, were downplayed as much as Japanese fighting spirit and reliance on the offensive were overly glorified. When the Japanese went to war with China and later America decades later these factors would inevitably contribute towards Japan’s downfall.