The Korean War never officially ended. North and South Korea didn’t make peace while North Korea’s rogue regime, with nuclear weapons and a big army, often engages in unprovoked sabre-rattling. As volatile as things seems now it was far worse in 1950-1953 when civil war on the Korean Peninsula dragged in America and China, and could’ve unleashed nuclear war.
What was suppose to be a short war became America’s first big conflict of the Cold War. It saw dramatic advances and retreats, major victories and setbacks, and stalemate within one year. However, despite its forgotten status and controversial ending the Korean War produced more benefits for America than most of its 20th Century wars.
Context:
Korea is like the Poland of East Asia, being sandwiched between strong nations that have historically occupied it as a buffer zone, or launch pad, against rival states. The Mongolians tried to invade Japan from Korea, China and Japan went to war over Korea in 1894-1895, Japan and Russia did the same in 1904-1905, and Mao Zedong intervened in the Korean War when American forces approached the Chinese border. From 1910-1945 Korea was a colony of Japan that used it to support its occupation of Manchuria in 1931, its brutal war against China from 1937-1945, and skirmishes against the Soviet Union in 1938-1939.
Korea’s fate after World War 2 was decided at the Yalta Conference in 1945, where America offered the Soviet Union perks in East Asia to enter the War against Japan. America would continue its island-hopping campaign across the Pacific and intensify its firebombing campaign and naval blockade against Japan. Meanwhile, Russia would attack Japanese forces in Manchuria and invade Korea to increase pressure on Japan.
The Soviets invaded Manchuria and quickly crushed Japanese forces, but Japan surrendered unexpectedly after America dropped nuclear weapons on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. As Japanese forces surrendered Russia and America rushed to liberate Japan’s occupied territories, and it was agreed to split their occupational zones in Korea at the 38th parallel. Korea was divided between a communist regime in North Korea backed by the Soviets and a pro-west dictatorship supported by America in South Korea.
As the Cold War heated up in Europe, China, and Vietnam from 1945-49 Korea wasn’t destined to become a flashpoint between communism and the West. America and Russia were focused on Europe while the Chinese communists had just taken over China and wanted to consolidate their rule. Unfortunately, North Korea was obsessed with reunifying the Korean Peninsula and wanted approval from Russia and China to do so. This was given as America seemed unlikely to fight, as it had provided little military aid to South Korea, versus the strong forces Russia gave to North Korea. America’s public failure, by U.S. Secretary of State Dean Acheson in 1950, to include South Korea in its pacific defensive perimeter, reinforced this view. Thus, the Communist Bloc gambled North Korea would overrun South Korea without serious consequences from America and its allies.
The War Begins:
The Korean War began June 25, 1950 when North Korea invaded South Korea. North Korean forces advanced quickly as South Korea’s ill-equipped army retreated in disarray. Against Soviet expectations America entered the war to help South Korea, as it didn’t want to give the impression it would tolerate unprovoked communist aggression. However, the initial U.S. forces sent from Japan were defeated by the North Koreans and had to retreat. Soon North Korea conquered the whole country, except for a small bridgehead around the port of Pusan. Many expected a Dunkirk like situation where American forces would flee to Japan in disgrace.
However, many factors undermined North Korea. America had aerial supremacy which gave air support for allied forces and interdicted North Korean supplies. North Korea suffered logistical woes as its lines of communication became stretched after rapid advances. American and UN reinforcements arrived to prop up South Korea’s defenses. While the allied perimeter around Pusan almost collapsed from aggressive North Korean attacks, it ultimately held.
North Korea’s invasion was finally defeated by America’s daring amphibious assault at Inchon in September 1950. This was risky given the treacherous tides around Inchon, that Inchon was far behind enemy lines, and there was little intelligence regarding its defenses. However, General MacArthur’s gamble paid off as the operation went brilliantly and defeated the few local North Korean forces, as most were fighting near Pusan. MacArthur is a controversial historical character but he deserves credit in this case.
The immediate results were decisive as North Korea’s forces in the south were cut off and routed. Of 130,000 North Korean soldiers that crossed the 38th parallel to invade South Korea only 30,000 retreated to safety. At this point American and South Korean forces could have stopped at the 38th parallel and declared a ceasefire. However, the UN and the U.S. government gave MacArthur approval to cross the border to reunify North Korea with the south.
MacArthur is often blamed for China’s intervention and the expansion of the war, but this isn’t completely fair. While MacArthur did want to advance north his government didn’t discourage the push into North Korea. Unlike today in 1950 the 38th parallel was not an internationally recognized border and the Truman administration was tempted to unify Korea under a pro-American state and roll back communism. U.S. Defense Secretary George Marshall told MacArthur he was “unhampered” to move across the border, the UN set up a commission of re-unification and re-habilitation for Korea, and allied forces crossed the 38th parallel.
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Meanwhile, China was nervous as American forces advanced towards its border with Korea. Although MacArthur had been told to only deploy South Korean forces near the border, this was soon forgotten as American officials assumed Chinese warnings were bluffs. This would prove to be a grave miscalculation.
The CCP had recently taken over China in 1949 after decades of fighting the Chinese Civil War, and against Japan in World War 2. As already noted Japan used Korea to launch its illegal annexation of Manchuria in 1931 and support its war against China from 1937-45. It’s easy to see why Mao was afraid that a unified Korea, allied to America, could serve as a base for America to attack Communist China. Given previous American support of Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist regime against Mao in the Chinese Civil War this wasn’t just paranoia. However, despite MacArthur’s inclination to expand the war into China, President Truman was against this and the American people wouldn’t have supported it.
Mao and the Communist Bloc weren’t innocent bystanders either. Russia and China had given North Korea the material support and green light to invade South Korea. By contrast, America had dismissed South Korea’s wishes to reunify the peninsula and sent it few weapons. North Korea started the war and while Truman sent troops to South Korea’s there weren’t plans to expand the war into China. MacArthur was tempted to escalate the war, but this was very unlikely as the conflict was an unpleasant surprise to Americans, who wanted it stopped as quickly and cheaply as possible. Given America’s defense budget in 1950 was 10% of what it had been in 1945, it wouldn’t have been able to invade China even if it wanted to.
In some histories of the conflict MacArthur gets too much blame compared to his superiors and the UN, that underestimated the consequences of crossing the 38th parallel. Meanwhile, given China’s recent decades of bloody history most of Mao’s advisors were against entering the war. But Mao disagreed and gambled America wouldn’t significantly escalate the war if China intervened.
It’s possible if American and UN forces stopped at the 38th Parallel the Korean War could’ve ended in 1950. But Mao was tempted to intervene in Korea even before UN forces crossed the 38th parallel. He also made the decision to enter the war before these forces approached the Chinese border. Ultimately, America and China didn’t do their best to prevent the conflict from expanding. In The Art of War Sun Tzu suggests to “know the enemy and know yourself” but in 1950 America and China knew themselves but not each other.
China Enters the War:
Chinese forces, mobile and lightly-equipped, escaped American detection while mobilizing near the Yalu River in late 1950. This was a big failure by American intelligence, comparable to Pearl Harbor and 9/11. Once China entered the war it inflicted many reserves on American and allied units, and forced them to retreat from North Korea.
China occupied Seoul and overran much of South Korea. America’s mechanized forces, spread out and their lines of communication stretched, were at a disadvantage in difficult terrain against China’s foot-borne army. Chinese forces used their numerical superiority and mobility to exploit the terrain to surround and ambush American units.
However, while Chinese forces deserve credit for these victories against America’s better equipped and technologically superior army, the damage has been exaggerated. Battles like Chosin Reservoir show American forces (especially marines) often conducted their fighting retreat with skill. Chinese forces took disproportionate casualties during the campaign, the US Army wasn’t routed, and few American prisoners were taken.
Off the battlefield America suffered greater symbolic and political losses. Not for the first time a promise that American soldiers would be home by Christmas was rudely interrupted by military realities. China’s intervention in the war also shocked the American people, especially after the army’s unexpected retreat (the longest one in military history). At the time MacArthur failed as a leader. Besides failing to predict and prepare for China’s intervention, his conduct of the American retreat was not impressive, with him alternating between despair and arrogance.
Luckily for MacArthur President Truman didn’t sack him. Truman felt American soldiers in Korea and the American people would lose confidence if MacArthur, a military legend, was fired during an ongoing battle.
Instead of being grateful MacArthur committed a fatal sin generals sometimes do in wartime: Publicly criticize their political superiors’ policies. MacArthur was, by all accounts, an egotistical Prima donna used to getting his way and being publicly adored. He criticized Truman for not expanding the war against China and placing restrictions on his military operations. While many of MacArthur’s ideas would have made sense in an expanded war against China, Truman wanted to de-escalate the conflict.
But America and its allies weren’t keen on starting World War 3 over Korea and disagreed with MacArthur. MarArthur was sacked for criticizing political policy and replaced by General Matthew Ridgway. Ridgway was a distinguished commander of airborne forces in World War 2, had managed the retreat of American forces with considerable skill, and wouldn’t challenge civilian control of the military.
The dismissal of MacArthur, among the most popular generals in American history, was criticized heavily by the American people and many veterans. Truman’s approval rating fell to 23%, while MacArthur was championed and his speech to congress after returning to Washington saw countless standing ovations.
However, public opinion is fickle. As Alistair Horne put it in Hubris “was the American public-when it put on its thinking cap and put its emotions back in the box-really prepared to face a fresh major conflict in the Far East?” Horne continued that “in the end, few Americans would doubt that Truman, the elected president, had been obliged to strike MacArthur down.”
Historians overwhelmingly agree.
Stalemate:
In early 1951 things appeared bleak for South Korea and America as Chinese forces had taken Seoul and kept advancing south. But communist forces had logistical difficulties as their lines of communication became stretched, while America and its allies received more manpower and resources. If MacArthur defeated North Korea in 1950 by his maneuver at Inchon, Ridgway would stop China cold with firepower in 1951. Chinese forces had done well against dispersed American forces at the end of long supply lines in North Korea. But China’s large but lightly-equipped forces became cannon fodder against reorganized American forces with vast firepower delivered by tanks, artillery and airpower.
For the fourth time in the war an army was defeated and forced to retreat across the Korean Peninsula, which continued to see more misery, suffering and death. Ridgway, more methodical and sensible than MacArthur, moved carefully to liberate Seoul and advance to the 38th Parallel. There American and allied forces dug in and waited for an expected Chinese counteroffensive.
At this point China misread the situation like MacArthur had in late 1950 and went all-in. Unfortunately for Chinese forces their assaults were defeated by superior allied defenses and firepower. Even Chinese victories were expensive given their losses. One example was the rout of the Gloucestershire Regiment in the Battle of Imjin River. In a fatal case of British understatement the regiment’s general failed to communicate his need of reinforcements by telling his superior “things are a bit sticky, sir.”
Once China’s offensive failed it didn’t have the industry and technology to create a military to defeat modern American forces. However, America had these assets but not enough troops or political will to make these efforts to break the stalemate either. The situation is similar today regarding Russian and NATO capabilities in the war in Ukraine.
The only thing that might have broken the stalemate was Russia’s strong army, that had far more troops, artillery and tanks than America’s. But a Russian intervention risked American nukes falling on Moscow and Leningrad. Russia had only developed nuclear weapons in 1949 and America had a big advantage in this category, with more than 10 times the amount of nukes Russia had. Russia preferred a communist victory and had no qualms fighting to the last North Korean and Chinese, but Stalin refused to risk nuclear war over a conflict that didn’t threaten his direct interests.
Once China’s offensive failed both sides knew the war would likely end in stalemate. What’s really tragic is the war continued for two years despite this and peace was often by delayed by propaganda issues, like America’s insistence that POWs from both sides had the right to go home or resettle elsewhere. As was the case during the Cold War, when people from communist states had a chance to flee abroad, they usually took it.
Between stalemate and the ceasefire in 1953 there were skirmishes, America napalmed North Korean cities to ash, and both Korean regimes committed many war crimes. After Stalin died China and North Korea became serious about negotiating a peace. They conceded on a few points and despite America’s real or hollow threats of using nuclear weapons, it was glad to end the war. During prisoner exchanges over 20,000 communist prisoners refused to be repatriated, versus 300 South Koreans and only 20 Western soldiers. Perhaps this illustrates, even at this early point in the Cold War, that communism wasn’t particularly appealing.
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While the war lasted three years most of the crucial events and major combat occurred in the first 12 months. This period saw incredible advances and retreats up and down the Korean Peninsula. Like the war in North Africa in World War 2 territory switched hands often. First North Korea overran all of South Korea except the Pusan perimeter, only to be defeated at Inchon and lose all but a small corner of North Korea to allied forces. Then China attacked America’s overextended forces, pushed them out of North Korea, and advanced far into South Korea. After that American forces were reinforced, stopped the Chinese offensive, liberated Seoul again, and moved towards the 38th parallel. Finally, China launched strong attacks to regain the initiative and once it failed the war devolved into stalemate.
In less than a year the military advantage shifted many times, only to result in deadlock. Pyongyang was occupied by American forces then retaken by China, while Seoul changed hands four times! Most serious fighting and casualties occurred between mid-1950 to mid-1951. Forty percent of allied casualties occurred under MacArthur’s brief tenure, which didn’t include China’s offensive in the spring of 1951, or Ridgway’s counterattacks that pushed Chinese forces to the 38th Parallel. Meanwhile, North Korean forces had been decimated in the first year and China’s casualties declined after it adopted better tactics in the last years of the war.
Such a tumultuous first year of the war, with its dramatic advances and reverses, is rare in military history. In modern times it compares to the Ukraine War in 2022. After Russia’s failed attempt to take Kiev its forces fell back, only to overrun much territory in the east until Ukraine received considerable weapons from NATO. Then Ukraine launched its successful counteroffensives in the Kharkiv and Kherson regions, pushing Russian forces far back and guaranteeing the war wouldn’t end in 2022. Like the Korean War there were hopes the next year would see decisive victories, but instead Russia and Ukraine’s offensives faltered and only secured the ruins of Bakhmut, Robotyne and Adiivka.
Returning to Korea from mid-1951 to the end of the war in July 1953 the tempo of the conflict decreased and events in this period are often overlooked. Much like natural disasters and crime big events get headlines, while smaller ones are often ignored. Perhaps this is one reason the Korean War, sandwiched between America’s finest hour in World War 2 and its humiliating defeat in Vietnam, remains a mostly forgotten conflict.
Results:
What about the results of the war?
Unsurprisingly, everyone claimed victory. America claimed victory after failing to unify Korea and China claimed victory despite not conquering South Korea. South Korea claimed victory although much of its territory was overran four times. North Korea claimed victory even though its invasion failed, it had to be saved by China, and its cities were levelled by American bombs and napalm. Jan Halliday and Bruce Cumings’ view that “each side proclaims that it won, yet each actually seems to feel that it lost” has aged very well.
In a military sense the war resulted in stalemate and the final territorial changes were minor. Both sides generally occupied the same parts around the 38th Parallel they already held when the conflict started.
China presented the war as a victory to its people, claiming it saved North Korea from occupation and fought America to a standstill. It’s true North Korea remains a buffer zone between China and perceived adversaries like Japan, South Korea, and America. North Korea also has nuclear weapons, a big army, and continues to sabre-rattle. While its threats are hollow and North Korea’s corrupt and decaying state would be crushed in a war against America, it’s existence benefits Chinese interests.
Americans were less satisfied by the war’s outcome, being shocked by the stalemate, heavy casualties, and disappointing results so soon after World War 2. Indeed, Harry Truman’s approval rating fell as low as 22% during the war and was 32% when he left office. While opinion polls only matter on election day these statistics imply Americans didn’t think they won a major victory in Korea.
Truman’s approval ratings at the time are among the lowest of American Presidents in modern times. They were close to Richard Nixon, who had a 22% approval rate in January 1974 and 24% when he left office. George W. Bush did slightly better than both with an approval rating that never fell below 25%, even in the worst days of the Iraq War. Even the erratic Donald Trump’s worst ratings never fell below 34%. So far Joe Biden’s worst approval ratings haven’t fallen below 37%.
Even Lyndon Johnson, forever blamed (fairly or not) for America’s most divisive war in Vietnam, beat Truman’s worst approval ratings. But to be fair to Truman his legacy has been vindicated. Most historians support his major policies and decisions, and he’s usually ranked among the best American Presidents.
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Despite fickle opinion polls America and South Korea were the real winners of the conflict in the long term. The Korean War began as an attempt by North Korea, backed by Russia and China, to change the status quo in East Asia by force. By contrast American goals in the region were defensive and America had refused to arm South Korea before the war. The stalemate wasn’t ideal but it mostly benefited American and South Korean interests. Consider the historical context in 1950: Russia had just acquired nuclear weapons, Mao had recently won the Chinese Civil War, and communist insurgencies were popping in places like Vietnam, Malaysia, and the Philippines. The Korean War saw America draw a line in the sand in East Asia.
After the war America responded more strongly against communist actions including supporting Taiwan, helping nations against communist insurgencies, and tripling its defense budget. If the Communist Bloc hoped the Korean War would gain it an advantage in the Cold War it miscalculated. Given the Sino-Soviet Split, which began in Korea when Russia took advantage of China and made it to pay for weapons, and America’s victory in the Cold War, there’s little doubt who won in the end.
As for South Korea the war was terrible, tragic, and its territory was overrun four times. But at least it escaped the conflict as an independent state. Fast-forward seven decades and South Korea’s impoverished dictatorship has transformed into a prosperous, liberal democracy.
It’s ironic North Korea was the biggest loser of the war as it started the conflict. It failed to overrun South Korea, its cities were reduced to ruin, and it became a vassal state of Communist China. Add the embarrassment that many of its captured soldiers refused to return home and it’s safe to suggest North Korea’s results were less than satisfactory. As North Korea remains the last holdout of Stalinism and is associated with concentration camps, famine and oppression, no objective person would credit it with any short or longterm victory.
The Costs of the War:
The Vietnam War is famously seen as America’s most controversial and dirty conflict of the Cold War. But the Korean War was worse overall. The Vietnamese conflict saw 2-3 million casualties but the war in Korea saw at least 3-4 million. To be fair accurate casualty figures are hard to confirm and many sources suggest Vietnam saw more deaths. However, there’s no doubt the far shorter Korean War saw disproportionate casualties per year, especially the first. Meanwhile, more warcrimes were committed by both regimes across the 38th parallel, and America’s levelling of North Korean cities with napalm makes its incremental bombing in Vietnam looked restrained.
With respect to the combatants there’s little doubt North Korea and South Korea suffered the worst losses, followed by significant China casualties. American casualties were high but much lower, while its other allies suffered relatively minor losses.
Chinese casualties are estimated between 400,000-900,000 dead, wounded or captured. North Korea lost between 650,000-750,000 military casualties while South Korea likely suffered 600,000 military casualties (although some estimates suggest 900,000). Both Koreas had significant civilians casualties, perhaps 1 million for the South and as high as 1.5 million for the North. In the North most civilian casualties were caused by American bombing and privations, while in the South most were due to the fact the war was mainly fought on its soil. American casualties included 50,000 dead and 100,000 wounded.
Finally, it’s worthwhile comparing the Korean conflict to America’s other major wars of the 20th Century.
Regarding both World Wars, Vietnam and the Gulf War, only World War 2 benefited America as much as the Korean War. World War 1 boosted America economically and diplomatically, but it quickly withdrew into isolationism, the Great Depression set it back by a decade, and it had to fight the Axis 20 years later. The Vietnam War was not only a humiliating defeat for America, but it also undermined its confidence at home and has haunted its foreign policy and war efforts since.
Meanwhile, America’s quick, decisive, and low cost victory in the Gulf War didn’t result in the expected settlement of Middle Eastern issues (like Israel and Palestine). Instead it was followed by decades of terrorism, war and instability, which plagues the region to this day. Despite the nuclear-armed rogue state in Pyongyang, the legacy of the Korean War appears favorable to the previously mentioned outcomes. Indeed, the Far East has been relatively stable and grown more prosperous and democratic since.
The Korean War was America’s first major conflict of the Cold War and despite dramatic advances and retreats, triumphs and tragedies, disappointments and stalemate, America and South Korea can claim victory.
The Communist Bloc tried changing the status quo in East Asia by starting the war. By meeting the challenge and holding South Korea, America contained communism in the region and reassured its allies. The war was bloody and dirty, more so than in Vietnam, but since South Korea is now a prosperous, liberal democracy, while North Korea remains a Stalinist nightmare, it’s clear the South benefited more ultimately. Thus, despite being America’s forgotten war of the 20th Century, the conflict in Korea has a better legacy than Vietnam, the Gulf War and World War 1, whose long-term effects were more mixed and less favorable to American interests.
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