“Opportunities multiply as they are seized.” -Du Mu
Japan and the First World War
Japan’s next phase of imperial expansion occurred during World War 1. With the European powers distracted by the massive conflagration in Europe from 1914 onwards, and using its alliance with Britain, Japan took advantage of the situation to expand its imperial holdings and influence in Asia and the Pacific. Thus, Japan seized the German concession in China at Qingdao on the Shandong Peninsula in the latter months of 1914 in a siege that cost it 2000 casualties. The siege was notable as it involved one of the first instances of naval aviation in history via air raids against German positions launched from the Japanese seaplane carrier Wakamiya Maru (an early form of aircraft carrier). Japan would also seize several island chains that had previously been colonized by the Germans in the Pacific.
Japan also took advantage of the western powers focus on Europe to coerce China into an unfavorable agreement via the Twenty-One Demands sent to the Chinese government in early 1915 (aimed at making China a de facto Japanese vassal state). However, America and Britain pressured Japan to water down these demands and ultimately Japan alienated these countries considerably while gaining few concessions from China. Despite this miscalculation Japan benefited economically, industrially, and diplomatically during the war due to its considerable efforts which aided the Entente war effort in many regards.
Notably, Japanese naval operations during the conflict were impressive. One work on Japan’s involvement in World War 1 noted “Japanese naval forces spanned an even larger portion of the globe” than during World War 2. In World War 1, especially after the unrestricted submarine campaign launched by Germany in early 1917, Japanese ships were deployed in far flung Allied positions including Cape Town, Malta, off the American West Coast, and Mexico. Ironically enough given the events of 1941-1942 Japanese ships were also deployed from Singapore and Hawaii! These naval forces were invaluable regarding escort duties and anti-submarine operations as Entente naval assets were stretched thin across the seas.
Interestingly, while Japan accumulated anti-submarine technology and techniques from the British and received many German submarines after the war to study, the Imperial Japanese Navy did not internalize the impact of German submarines upon merchant shipping which nearly knocked Britain out of World War 1. Instead, Japan focused its efforts on creating submarines to attack enemy warships (which made little impact during the Pacific War), while neglecting anti-submarine warfare which eventually allowed American submarines to strangle Japan’s war effort. More damning to the Western Allies in the long term were considerable British efforts from 1921-1923 to help Japan’s nascent aircraft carrier program. As Mark Stille has noted “all aspects of naval aviation were advanced, from training and design details for the first Japanese carrier to design and construction of naval aircraft.” This would prove disastrous to British and American forces across the Pacific and Indian Oceans in the 6 months after Pearl Harbor.
On the surface of things Japan, unlike most major powers, benefitted from World War 1 thanks to increasing its territory while gaining significant economic and diplomatic clout at relatively little cost; perhaps less than 5000 dead versus millions lost by the European powers. In the Treaty of Versailles Japanese gains in the war, including Qingdao, were recognized and Japan was seen as one of the five main victors of the conflict. Japan also used the Russian Revolution in 1917 and widespread fear of Communism to justify temporary expansion into the Russian Far East by occupying considerable territory in Siberia including the Trans-Siberian Railway up to Lake Baikal. Japanese intervention in Siberia lasted well into 1922, was supported by 70,000 soldiers, but was doomed to fail due to political infighting in Japan, American misgivings, and the Bolsheviks winning the Russian Civil War.
The most long-term damaging consequence of Japan’s participation in World War 1 for the western powers would be the annexation of German Pacific island chains by Japan. These included the Carolines, Marshalls, Marianas, and Palau, and Japan would significantly garrison and fortify them. These island chains were ideal to intercept American reinforcements for the Philippines, and provided Japan forward bases to attack Guam and Wake Island in a potential war against America. Indeed, this occurred two decades later, and American forces had to advance through them in bloody fashion to get to Japan in the last years of World War 2.
However, after 1918 Japanese fortunes soured and the path towards militant governance and hyper expansion, which preordained World War 2 in Asia, was set. Although Japan emerged as one of the principal victors of World War 1 afterwards it experienced notable diplomatic setbacks. Firstly, Japan’s Racial Equality Proposal for the conference was blocked by some western powers. Secondly, Chinese outrage due to unfavorable clauses in the Versailles Treaty, such as giving former German colonial territory on the Shandong Peninsula to Japan, led to heightened Chinese Nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment. This began the May Fourth Movement (May 4, 1919) which solidified Chinese opposition to Japan’s imperial and economic designs regarding China. Thirdly, under American mediation Japan gave back the German concession at Qingdao to China a few years later which displeased many Japanese officials. Finally, although Japan’s industry and economy benefited during World War 1 by helping the Entente cause, afterwards it experienced a recession as its erstwhile allies were eager to recoup their economic interests in the region.
Japan’s Decoupling from the International Order
“In the battle between democracy and totalitarianism the latter adversary will without question win and will control the world. The era of democracy is finished and the democratic system bankrupt. There is not room in the world for two different systems or for two different economies.” -Matsuoka Yōsuke
As the 1920s continued Japan experienced more disappointments. During the Washington Naval Conference of 1921-1922 Japan felt cheated as it reluctantly agreed to a 5:5:3 tonnage ratio regarding battleships and aircraft carriers that favored Britain and America. The Americans and British argued they needed bigger fleets due to their worldwide commitments including the Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific while Japan could focus on the Pacific. Japanese leaders felt humiliated by the West and believed their navy was being unnecessarily constrained. However, the agreement did leave Japan the dominant naval power in the Pacific, allowed it more naval tonnage than other great powers like France and Italy, while the London Naval Treaty of 1930 revised the tonnage figures in Japan’s favor to 10:10:7 in a few categories such as destroyers and cruisers.
Japan later abrogated these naval agreements in 1934 and constructed a strong fleet of battleships, including the massive Yamato, that had little appreciable effect during World War 2 anyway. Even some Japanese naval officers realized the folly of investing so much in battleships with Commander Genda Minoru declaring “such ships are the Chinese Wall of the Japanese Navy.” Rather than making the super battleships Yamato and Musashi Japan could have built 20 destroyers instead which would have been far more useful in the Pacific War.
Lost in many histories of the period sympathetic to Japan is that Britain, and especially America, had significantly superior shipbuilding capabilities. This suggests it was wiser for Japan to have accepted such deals than risk being disproportionately outproduced in warships during the 1920s-1930s. Indeed, the lopsided naval production between Japan and America from Pearl Harbor to the end of the war shows what could have been the result of Japan engaging in a naval race directly after World War 1 against Britain and America. According to Military History Visualized from December 1941 to August 1945 this included 8 battleships, 102 carriers of all types, 47 cruisers, 203 submarines and 344 destroyers produced by America versus 2 battleships, 12 carriers of all types, 7 cruisers, 114 submarines and 31 destroyers produced by Japan.
More damaging from a diplomatic perspective was the formal ending of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1923 due to mutual distrust between both nations and Britain wanting to appease America after World War 1 to forestall a naval race between them. Thus began, in the interwar period, the slow route from allies to enemies between Japan and the western powers.
However, what really began Japan’s subsequent phase of hyper expansion was the rise of a more nationalistic, unified China (or more accurately Japan’s reactions against this) as well as the effects of the Great Depression. The latter brought equivalent levels of unemployment, poverty, domestic turmoil, and potential political disillusionment to Japan as in America, Germany, and elsewhere. This economic crisis was more damaging than the previous recession that affected Japan after World War 1 and further undermined its nascent, limited democracy set up during the Meiji period. These economic crises, Japan’s diplomatic rebuffs, supposedly unfair naval limitations, and the rise of Communism resulted in Japan’s estrangement from the western liberal dominant international status quo. It also led Japan to actively challenge the international system and eventual clashing with China and the western powers.
Indeed, during the 1930s the effects of the Great Depression, the rise of communism, and the failure of the major western powers to produce a stable world order after World War 1 led to widespread disillusionment of liberal democracy and capitalism not only in the democratic west, but across the globe. With hindsight, it is easy to see the follies of fascism, communism and autarky that influenced political thinking in this period but at the time they seemed to offer solutions to the failings of the international status quo.
Many societies and a disproportionate number of intellectuals praised communism and fascism, as well as the initial successes of Mussolini’s fascists in Italy and Hitler’s Nazi party in Germany, that saw increased order and economic stability in nations that had been racked by chaos. While the democratic West seemed unable to recover from the Great Depression, communism and fascism seemed to point towards the future. The ultimate triumph of a resurgent western, liberal democratic order after World War 2, and again later at the end of the subsequent Cold War, may seem inevitable with hindsight, but few would have bet on this outcome in the 1930s and early 1940s.
Certainly, Japan’s fragile democracy, overshadowed by military factions, was easy prey to these developments and already leaned towards the trends of nationalism, autarky, imperial expansion, and militarism that fascism promoted. It would be wrong to suggest Japan was a fascist state in the mould of Germany and Italy, but it did share many of their trappings and cynical ambitions.
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Adding to this already complicated mix was the rise of a more unified and nationalist China in the middle to late 1920s. Many factors contributed to this, not least of all China’s Century of Humiliation at the hands of the western powers and Japan. The main catalyst occurred in 1926 when Chiang Kai-shek’s KMT (Chinese Nationalist Party) forces, allied temporary with the CCP (Chinese Communist Party), launched the Northern Expedition from Guangdong in South China to defeat the various warlord forces controlling the nation to reunify China. Between 1926-1928 Chiang defeated, and/or co-opted warlord forces and took city after city including Changsha, Wuhan, Shanghai, Nanjing and eventually Beijing. On paper this reunified China under KMT leadership and ended the warlord period, but in practice the situation was far more fragile and complex.
Firstly, Chiang Kai-shek broke the united front with the CCP because he correctly suspected they were planning to turn on him eventually. This also led to a break with the Soviet Union that had supported the KMT with money, training, and weapons but also planned to betray Chiang with the help of the CCP. Referring to Chiang and his forces Stalin once said after they served their purpose they would be “squeezed out like a lemon, and then thrown away.” Breaking the united front would lead to the on and off civil war between the KMT and the CCP which lasted from 1927-1949. Secondly, although Chiang’s co-option of many warlords made it easier to complete the Northern Expedition it also resulted in a loose coalition between warlord factions and the KMT which alternatively collaborated, schemed, and fought with each other over the next decade. Far from unifying China Chiang’s civil war with the CCP, and uneasy relationships with regional warlords, would result in considerable warfare, instability, and misery for the Chinese nation.
Finally, Chiang Kai-shek’s advance north and attempts at reunification were seen by the Japanese as a threat to their interests in Manchuria and North China. These interests were not limited to forestalling Soviet encroachment in Northeast Asia, but also involved economic factors such as Japan’s significant trade and investments in China. With Japan transforming into a rich, industrialized country during the Meiji period it naturally looked for markets to invest in and sell its goods. China was the primary target given its sheer size and massive population.
Japanese interests in the country were as much about economic development as national security. Having followed the western example of imposing unfavorable treaties and gaining concessions in China, Japan had an interest in keeping China weak and divided in order to maximize its monetary returns and use North China as a potential springboard to attack or defend against the Soviet Union. As such Japan had created the Kwangtung Army to defend its interests in Manchuria, stationed troops in other areas of interest in China, and supported pliable Chinese warlords who cared more for Japanese money and weapons than loyalty to their fellow people.
As Chiang Kai-shek’s forces took cities, defeated warlords, and advanced north the Japanese worried their delicate system in North China was under threat. Things came to a head at Jinan, capital of Shandong province, in May 1928 when KMT troops arrived to take the city from warlord forces, but quickly came into conflict with Japanese soldiers sent there to protect Japanese interests and nationals. In what would become commonplace over the next decade local Japanese officers ignored orders from Tokyo, acted on their own initiative, and escalated the situation. They launched violent attacks against Chinese soldiers and civilians in Jinan, killing several thousand while apparently losing less than 50 soldiers themselves.
In a notably gruesome incident, Cai Gongshi, a KMT diplomat in Jinan at the time, was savagely beaten, his tongue cut out, and finally shot. The KMT were kicked out of Jinan, Japan occupied the city for several months, and with hindsight the countdown to war between China and Japan had begun. In the aftermath of the Jinan Incident, Chiang began writing one “way to kill the Japanese” every day in his diary and realized Japan was not destined to be a friend of China.
The potential unification of China under KMT tutelage, as well as the Great Depression, created conditions that saw Japan seize Manchuria in 1931, then bite off pieces of China throughout subsequent years, and eventually led to all out war between China and Japan in July 1937. However, these actions often did not originate with the civilian government in Tokyo but rogue military factions in Japan, or others stationed in Manchuria and North China. These factions were decisive in creating Japan’s hyper expansion in the 1930s, the outbreak and escalation of the Second Sino-Japanese War, and the fatal decision to attack America at Pearl Harbor in 1941.
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To suggest Japanese politics from the 1920s to the end of World War 2 were complicated and dysfunctional would be an understatement. An excellent book detailing the subject is Edward Drea’s Japan’s Imperial Army: It’s Rise and Fall, 1853-1945. In theory the prime minister and civilian leadership should have controlled foreign policy and defense matters but in practice, especially after Japan’s disillusionment with the western dominated order during the 1920s, military factions eventually dominated due to backing by the emperor and violent acts such as political assassination.
According to the constitution written during the Meiji period (notably by soldiers) the military was not bound, in many areas, by the civilian government in Tokyo but only answered to the Emperor. Emperor Hirohito, whose title of Showa ironically roughly translates as “Enlightened Peace,” has been described on one extreme from being a mere puppet of the military and supposedly favored peace, to a monarch who actually wielded considerable power and influence and actively pushed for imperial expansion. What is not debatable is his position allowed the military to escape the restraints of civilian leadership that is a cardinal rule of democratic governance.
Further complicating this arrangement the military was not unified itself but composed of many factions, and rivalries, which meant policy making during peacetime and war was often conducted in a confusing, ad-hoc manner. Firstly, there were the Control and Imperial Way factions that fought each other to control Japan’s government and policy in the 1920s-1930s. Secondly, there was a generally unbridgeable divide between the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy which usually meant fighting over defense budget allocations, disconnected war planning, a lack of effective coordination in military operations, and different priorities regarding which potential enemy Japan should focus on.
Unsurprisingly, the Japanese army saw the Soviet Union as the main enemy due to the threat of Communism and sheer manpower and resources it could deploy against Japan. The Japanese navy, for its part, naturally feared the industrial and naval power of America which could potentially build a significantly larger fleet than Japan and threaten its commerce and sea lines of communication. The divided, near failed state that was China at the time was not seen as a major threat to Japan although ironically it would become the main target of Japanese aggression.
Thirdly, relatively low military officials, even colonels stationed abroad, often had considerable freedom of action and made important decisions that should have been the purview of the civilian or military leadership. This was even the case with junior officers with General Arthur Edward Grasett noting they had a “tendency to ignore orders they did not agree with.” Not only was this a recipe for unnecessary escalations or hostilities, but it often contradicted Japanese policy set in Tokyo.
To give a few examples, the Japanese commander during the Jinan Incident in mid-1928 decided on his own to make an example of the KMT troops in the city which led to significant bloodshed. The Mukden Incident, Japan’s false flag operation used to justify the annexation of Manchuria, was started by local officers such as Lt. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji and later rubber stamped by the Japanese government. The Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937 was initiated by Japanese forces stationed near Beijing acting without orders, and went against Tokyo’s desire to refrain from clashes against China at that time. Finally, during the early part of the Second Sino-Japanese War, in a classic example of mission creep, Japanese field commanders expanded the conflict after the Battle of Shanghai despite their leaders at home hoping to limit hostilities.
To top it off Japanese military officers engaged in assassination, targeting high level officials (even prime ministers), and made several coup attempts. In 1939 many feared that Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku, Japan’s celebrated naval leader, would be at risk if he stayed ashore for any length of time. Edward Drea has summarized the dysfunctional nature of Japan’s military leadership:
Between 1930 and 1935, there were twenty major domestic terrorist incidents, four political assassinations, five planned assassinations, and four attempted coups; the March and October incidents of 1931, the May 15 Incident of 1932, and the great military mutiny of February, 1936.
These are the men who made, or perhaps more accurately bludgeoned along, defense and foreign policy in Japan at the time. Divided, paranoid, aggressive, insubordinate, and even cannibalistic against each other they often substituted wishful thinking for grand strategy, fighting spirit for materials and economic factors, and fanaticism for common sense. Despite propaganda such as the Why We Fight series by Frank Capra, and the sensationalism of some western histories of World War 2, Japan never had well thought out plans of conquering the world, let alone China. The oddity that was the Japanese political and military establishment during the 1930s-1940s was simply incapable of producing such grand strategy.
Most aggressive moves were conducted ad-hoc and usually motivated by opportunism. The Japanese militarists might have seen themselves as great warriors but many of them were sad successors to the likes of Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, let alone the wiser Meiji generation that preceded them whom better understood the vital links between war and politics, means and ends, as well as rational policy making.
The Mukden Incident and Lead up to the Second Sino-Japanese War
“In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy’s country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good.” -Sun Tzu
Such was the context in 1931 when the Mukden Incident arguably challenged and transformed the global order and preordained the Second Sino-Japanese War and World War 2. As previously mentioned the underlying reasons leading to the Mukden Incident included the state of the Japanese economy after the 1929 Wall Street Crash, the increasing strength of the Soviets in the Far East, and diverging interests between China and Japan after the conclusion of the Northern Expedition. After a decade of economic fluctuations following World War 1, followed by economic free fall after 1929, the Japanese increasingly saw Manchuria as vital for their markets, a source of food and resources, as well as a place of colonization.
In the aftermath of the Great Depression and increasingly isolationist trade policies by nations such as America, Japan believed Manchuria was necessary for the new autarkic system it felt necessary for its survival. After Japan’s victory in the Russo-Japanese War it had taken over the South Manchurian Railway, created considerable infrastructure in the area and grown its investments in Manchuria significantly. Therefore, Japan saw control of Manchuria as necessary for its interests.
Fears of a revived Russian threat also grew after the quick, decisive Soviet victory in the 1929 Sino-Russian conflict in Manchuria. This not only highlighted the potential fighting strength of the Red Army but also exposed the weakness of Chinese forces which the Japanese military could not have failed to notice. Therefore the Japanese had an interest in preventing further Soviet encroachment in the region but also saw an opportunity to overrun Manchuria given the poor state of the Chinese forces stationed there.
Additionally, as relations worsened between Chiang Kai-shek’s government and Japan after 1928 major disagreements between them led to heightened tensions and divergent interests and aims. On one hand, Japan had generally been heavy handed towards China since 1894, had treated its sphere of influence in Manchuria as a de facto colony, and usually undermined attempts at Chinese unification. On the other hand, the Chinese had not helped their cause by increasingly undermining a militarily superior Japan’s interests in the region. This included boycotts of Japanese goods, the eviction of Japanese citizens from certain Chinese territories, and infringement of treaties signed by previous Chinese governments with Japan.
However, such treaties had been negotiated with the Qing dynasty, or a host of warlord governments in Beijing, not Chiang’s KMT government. Furthermore, these treaties and agreements had often been imposed by Japan via force, or coercion, so it is unsurprising Chiang refused to honor them. Yet despite unjust treaties, or unpleasant Japanese behavior, it was risky for the Chinese to launch boycotts against Japan and ignore Japanese interests in China considering Japan’s military was far superior to China’s unified armed forces. The occasional oppression of Japanese nationals in Chinese territory, and the KMT’s refusal to restrain it, likewise did not help Chinese prospects.
Besides the Soviet threat and worsening relations with China the decision of Zhang Xueliang, the Chinese warlord who controlled Manchuria in the late 1920s, to align with Chiang Kai-shek motivated Japanese officers in the area to act. Zhang Xueliang’s father, Zhang Zuolin, had been backed by the Japanese in order to protect their interests in Manchuria and hopefully stop Chiang from unifying China during the Northern Expedition. When the KMT defeated Zhang Zuolin’s forces in 1928 the Japanese blew him up in his train car and hoped his inexperienced, womanizing, and opium addicted son would prove to be a more pliable candidate. However, this backfired when he instead supported Chiang in unifying China and sent forces to help the KMT against warlord factions during the Central Plains War of 1929-1930. Thereupon Chiang and Zhang Xueliang collaborated to unite China and limit Japanese influence in North China and Manchuria.
Losing its main ally in Manchuria was a blow to Japan and especially the Kwangtung Army stationed there. The final factor contributing to the Mukden Incident was the decision by the Japanese War Minister in 1931 to send a general to Manchuria to reign in the insubordination and fanaticism of the Kwangtung Army. Forewarned by this development Lt. Colonel Ishiwara Kanji and Colonel Itagaki Seishirō, who had made plans to launch a false flag operation, initiated the Mukden Incident before the general arrived.
On September 18, 1931, a Japanese unit detonated a bomb on a railway line close to Mukden (modern day Shenyang in Liaoning Province). Although the attempt was somewhat botched as the damage was limited the Kwangtung Army blamed the incident on Chinese bandits and began overrunning Manchuria. While the army’s General Staff back in Tokyo initially attempted to prevent escalation Ishiwara and his colleagues manufactured other provocations to justify further advances. The invasion of Manchuria proved to be very popular amongst the Japanese people which made it difficult for politicians to challenge it. Emperor Hirohito even issued an imperial rescript “that praised the Kwangtung Army for having fought courageously in “self-defense” against Chinese “bandits” and for having “strengthened the authority of the emperor’s army” according to Ezra Vogel.
The Mukden Incident came as a surprise not only to Japan’s government but also Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang. Chiang was busy launching one of his encirclement campaigns against the CCP while Zhang had stationed at least half of his forces south of the Great Wall to increase his influence in North China. Neither Chiang nor Zhang actively opposed the Japanese conquest of Manchuria but put their faith, mistakenly as it would turn out, in efforts to convince the international community to pressure Japan to withdraw. By early 1932 Japan completed its occupation of Manchuria though its forces would be plagued for a time by guerrilla fighters and bandits.
Japan then spent more than a decade creating a profitable colony in Manchuria, building infrastructure, industry, and perfecting the notorious Unit 731 located in Harbin. This secretive organization specialized in biological and chemical warfare and conducted human experiments as vile and murderous as those conducted by Nazi Germany. Gambling establishments and brothels also prospered in Manchuria, with an estimated 70,000 Japanese prostitutes and nearly as many Koreans. In a vain attempt to establish some legitimacy of what would become known as Manchukuo the Japanese installed the last Emperor of China, Puyi, as the titular leader over an ostensibly benign state where the many races of Manchuria lived in peace and luxury. In reality, the Japanese settlers, which would eventually number over 1 million, received all the perks while other races were neglected and subservient.
Meanwhile Puyi, a spoiled, cruel, and thoroughly mediocre individual, was nothing more than a naive puppet of Japan. He would be captured by the Soviets in 1945, spend years in detention in Russia, and later Communist China, as a war criminal. Along with the more capable Wang Jingwei, Puyi would become known as one the greatest traitors in 20th Century Chinese history. His former luxurious residence in Manchuria, now called the Palace of the False Emperor, remains undisturbed in Changchun, a constant reminder of his infamy.
There has been debate as to whether Chiang Kai-shek and Zhang Xueliang should, or could have, resisted the Japanese invasion of Manchuria. Critics cite the fact Zhang’s forces alone severely outnumbered the Japanese so on paper they should have been able to overwhelm the latter’s forces. Indeed, the Chinese had 160,000 soldiers in Manchuria versus Japan’s 30,000 strong Kwangtung Army in the area.
However, this ignores many considerations such as most of Zhang and Chiang’s forces not being in Manchuria at the time, that Japan could easily have reinforced its small army from nearby Korea (by then a Japanese colony), and that Japanese forces were superior to the Chinese forces in most categories of military effectiveness. Chiang’s National Revolutionary Army, at the time, was mostly an infantry force with a small amount of artillery, tanks, and warplanes while Japan had a significant amount of military hardware and firepower. Chiang also had to constantly deal with the CCP and Chinese warlord factions, the latter of which he had just fought the Central Plains War against (total casualties for the war were as high as 250,000-300,000).
Additionally, it should be noted throughout the upcoming Second Sino-Japanese War Japan’s forces routinely defeated, sometimes with ease, considerably larger Chinese forces. Moreover, these Chinese forces had six years to improve their capabilities and training after the conquest of Manchuria, so it is very doubtful China could have successfully resisted the Japanese in 1931. More likely the Japanese would have reacted in a violent and disproportionate manner, such as during the Jinan Incident in 1928, to any significant resistance and kill a disproportionate number of Chinese. Tellingly, Japan’s occupation of Mukden itself resulted in the death of 500 Chinese but only two Japanese soldiers while Zhang’s air force was destroyed in a single day!
Japan’s seizure of Manchuria outraged not only the Chinese but the League of Nations (the precursor of the United Nations set up after World War 1). Partly due to Chinese lobbying the League sent a commission to Manchuria to investigate the incident in early 1932 and in October reported its findings, called the Lytton Report. While it did acknowledge Japanese economic interests in Manchuria and did not directly blame Japan for instigating the Mukden Incident, it accused Japan of being the aggressor, stated Japan’s puppet state in Manchuria should not be recognized, and suggested Japan should withdraw from Manchuria. America, which had not joined the League of Nations, likewise refused to recognize Japanese actions in Manchuria.
After facing condemnation, the Japanese merely left the League of Nations while the latter showed its weakness by refusing to back its words with any significant means to pressure Japan. Not without merit the Japanese felt it was hypocritical for the western powers to have previously used questionable methods to secure their own colonial possessions but then condemned Japan for doing the same. However, Japan’s flouting of the league set a dark precedent which Italy, and especially Germany, would later exploit to challenge international norms and agreements, eventually culminating in the outbreak of World War 2.
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Meanwhile, the Japanese army had not been idle but provoked a major battle in Shanghai in early 1932. This was in response to a Chinese boycott of Japanese businesses and goods in the aftermath of the Mukden Incident. The boycott, which saw Japanese exports to China fall 40% in the last months of 1931 and 90% during 1932, was effective and detrimental for Japan’s economy that was struggling in lieu of the Great Depression.
In response, rogue Japanese officers used agent provocateurs to incite anti-Japanese demonstrations in Shanghai, and attacked Japanese Buddhist monks, to give Japan an excuse to intervene in the city, distract attention from events in Manchuria, and pressure China to end the boycott. Clashes escalated between local Chinese and Japanese residents and the Imperial Japanese Navy sent reinforcements which included a large contingent of 23 ships. As Ezra Vogel has wittily remarked “this was an incredibly large force to send in response to the death of a single Buddhist Priest.”
The battle lasted over a month, resulted in 14,000 Chinese and 6000 Japanese military casualties, perhaps over 10,000 civilian deaths, and widespread devastation of the city. Japan would benefit from a ceasefire agreement that guaranteed the demilitarization of Shanghai and forbade Chinese forces being deployed in the area. The Chinese also ended the boycott against Japan. However, western perception became ever more critical of Japan while Chinese nationalism and outrage against Japan only increased.
Soon after the battle the Japanese Prime Minister, Inukai Tsuyoshi, was assassinated by junior naval officers who were unhappy about the London Naval treaty and felt Inukai was too moderate. They had also wanted to assassinate Charlie Chaplin, apparently to provoke a war with America, but he had skipped a meeting with the Prime Minister to watch a sumo wrestling match instead! While the conspirators failed in their wider goals, they were given lenient sentences and the power of the Japanese armed forces continued to rise while civilian leadership of the country declined, inevitably leading to disastrous consequences for Japan and East Asia.
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Due to the events of 1931-1932, and subsequent ones over the next few years, Chiang Kai-shek was forced from focusing on modernizing China, managing the warlords, and fighting the CCP, towards taking more active measures to oppose Japanese encroachment. Careful reading of Chiang’s diaries, as well as his efforts to build up a strong army and military infrastructure, clearly discredits the myth he never planned to confront Japan. Rather it was a question of timing and means.
In terms of timing, Chiang initially focused on internal pacification (especially the CCP) and fostering Chinese unity before having to face Japanese aggression. This was not as foolish as many scholars have suggested considering Chiang nearly quashed the CCP during the Nanjing Decade (particularly during the Long March), and arguably would have if Japanese encroachment and the Xi’an Incident not forced his hand.
Likewise, Chiang’s regime significantly expanded its influence and marginalized many Chinese warlords in the same period, made considerable reforms, as well as strengthening the state. Significant progress was being made towards pacification and unity and had it been allowed to continue China would arguably have been in a far better position to fight Japan later on. It is hardly a flawed strategy for a nation to get its house in order before dealing with foreign threats and this principle has in fact been part of Chinese states-craft throughout history according to a paper written by Shao-Kang Chu in 1999.
Regarding means, it is also apparent why Chiang emphasized quashing domestic foes before confronting Japanese aggression. Put bluntly, throughout Chiang’s reign during the Nanjing Decade of 1927-1937 he had the means to limit Chinese warlords, and crush the CCP, but never to seriously challenge Japanese military power directly. The fact that even after consolidating much power and control in China, enacting many reforms, creating impressive economic growth, and building up significant military power by 1937 that Japan’s army still defeated Chinese forces with relative speed undermines the idea Chiang could have focused on Japan first.
Essentially, Chiang Kai-shek was in a bind. By focusing on internal enemies first to create the unity, stability, and strength needed to stand up to Japan this laid him open to domestic criticism and allowed Japan to take advantage by biting off pieces of North China while Chiang was distracted elsewhere. On the other hand, whenever he fought the Japanese, he gained praise and prestige but inevitably it weakened the KMT regime, his internal enemies gained reprieves, and Japan tended to win the battles and gain additional territory anyway. China simply had too many issues to fix and Chiang had little means, too many enemies, and limited time to address them effectively, let alone simultaneously.
In 1933 things only deteriorated for China as Japan continued to nibble away at Chinese territory. Even if Chiang Kai-shek was correct to focus on internal enemies Japan was going nowhere and did not halt its expansionist plans for China after taking Manchuria and winning compromises at Shanghai. Unsatisfied by their gains throughout 1931-1932 Japanese forces, which may have launched a false flag bombing attack in the city of Shanhaiguan near the Great Wall, moved southwest from Manchuria to invade Rehe province in January 1933. The objectives were to seize more territory and pressure the KMT regime to accept Japan’s puppet regime in Manchuria (now named Manchukuo).
The invasion was swift as Tang Yulin, the local warlord, fled without serious resistance but not before ensuring a fleet of 200 trucks evacuated his considerable personal wealth and possessions. Unsurprisingly, Tang’s forces were not motivated to fight either and many tried selling their weapons to advancing Japanese soldiers! Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek was again distracted by internal issues and too weak to confront Japan, so by March 1933 Japan had conquered Rehe province.
Things got worse for China when the Japanese managed to push the Chinese south of the Great Wall in Hebei province and Beijing and Tianjin suddenly appeared vulnerable. Being let down by diplomacy and the League of Nations once more Chiang Kai-shek reluctantly accepted an unfavorable agreement, the Tanggu Truce, with Japan in May 1933. This gave Japan more influence in North China and humiliated Chiang’s regime which accepted the de facto, if not de jure, recognition of Manchukuo. It also created a demilitarized zone in North China of 115,000 square miles, along with 6 million inhabitants, that both sides were supposed to honor but Japan abused with impunity.
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Ironically after the violent, politically charged years between Japan and China from 1928-1933 relations became more relaxed, if not friendly, after the Tanggu Truce. This was partially because the Japanese government and Emperor Hirohito wanted to prevent mission creep via potential expansion south of the Great Wall. Considering Japan had clearly secured Manchuria, and defanged the KMT north of the Great Wall, perhaps cooler heads in Tokyo felt it was time to step back and focus on consolidating their gains. After all expansion south of the Great Wall risked all out war with China and potential overextension for gains which were arguably negligible given what would be needed to safeguard them.
Chiang Kai-shek may have bristled privately in his diary about Japanese expansion in the north, but his power base was in China’s central and southern provinces, and the loss of North China did not overly affect his regime’s capabilities. However, if the Japanese moved south of the Great Wall this threatened Shanghai, Nanjing, and the KMT heartland so it is doubtful Chiang would tolerate such intrusions as he had in Manchuria and elsewhere. Likewise, Japanese investments and interests in China were mostly based in Manchuria and North China thus after consolidating these there appeared no overriding imperative to risk escalation by continuing south of the Great Wall. Additionally, it merits mentioning again that Japan in this period saw the Soviet Union as its main enemy so unnecessary expansion in China seemed foolhardy as it could bog Japan down there while the Red Army became stronger in the Far East. Finally, the Japanese government may have been glad to clamp down on rogue military elements that had frustrated it often from 1928-1931.
Either way the next few years saw improved relations between China and Japan. Instead, both nations focused on their domestic affairs. Chiang, as noted above, concentrated on his internal enemies, expanding KMT influence at the expense of the warlords in general and trying to eliminate the CCP in particular. In fact, as the KMT got the upper hand with the warlords and gained breathing room from Japan, Chiang came close to crushing the CCP in the mid-1930s. In his Fifth Encirclement Campaign Chiang’s forces wore down the Communist enclave in Jiangxi, forced the CCP on the crippling Long March of nearly 6000 miles to remote Shaanxi Province, and could have driven the communists into the Soviet Union afterwards had the Xi’an Incident not occurred.
Japan was likewise distracted at home by various matters. After securing Manchuria, and most of China north of the Great Wall, there was debate whether to continue encroachment southwards or consolidate Japanese holdings to prepare for a potential war with the Soviet Union. Related to this were the continuous budget wars between the Imperial Japanese Army and Imperial Japanese Navy, the infighting between the Control and Imperial Way factions, and heightened political violence and assassinations that rocked Japan. The 1936 attempted coup by junior officers in Tokyo in particular highlighted the fragility of Japanese politics at the time.
However, relatively peaceful relations between China and Japan inevitably declined. While Japan halted overt expansion in North China after the Tanggu Truce that did not mean it stopped increasing its influence via proxies. One of these was the Mongolian Prince Demchugdongrub who held power in Inner Mongolia. Chiang Kai-shek had alienated him by being inflexible regarding regional governance and as such the Prince turned to Japan for assistance. However, this time the Japanese failed, as the KMT with help from warlord allies, managed to defeat and push back the prince’s forces in 1936 which set back covert Japanese expansion in the area.
Perhaps more seriously anti-Japanese sentiment in China only grew after 1933 and reached a high point three years later. While Chiang and more conservative elements in China saw the CCP as the more dangerous, or at least immediate threat, other parts of society, and even some of Chiang’s allies, were more worried by the Japanese. Understandably the latter wondered why fellow Chinese were engaged in merciless warfare with each other while Japan swallowed Chinese territories one by one.
Things came to a head in late 1936 as Chiang arrived in Xi’an, in Shaanxi province, to promote what he hoped would be the final campaign to crush the CCP. After colluding with the CCP, and gaining approval by Stalin, Chiang’s ally Zhang Xueliang conspired with another warlord named Yang Hucheng to kidnap Chiang and convince him to enter into a Second United Front with the Communists to oppose Japan. Although some suggest Zhang was motivated by altruism it is worth mentioning Chiang was planning to demote the former, and move him away from the area, so there was probably a cynical element in Zhang’s calculations.
Either way, the kidnapping of Chiang Kai-shek and subsequent Xi’an Incident, was a key turning point not only regarding relations between Japan and China, but the balance of power between the KMT and CCP in the long run. While Mao Zedong wanted Chiang to be executed Stalin, who invariably put Soviet interests above the CCP’s, vetoed this realizing Chiang was the only Chinese leader capable of holding the country together in case of war against Japan. Thus, Chiang was released and agreed to the Second United Front although he would seek revenge against his kidnappers.
The new unholy alliance between the KMT and CCP quickly gained widespread approval across China which meant Chiang no longer had the option to refuse fighting Japan in the future. Stalin, who was decisive in guaranteeing the Second United Front, used it to distract Japanese attention away from the Soviet Far East which allowed him focus on the looming threat from Nazi Germany. Finally, the CCP was saved from almost certain annihilation, or at least exile in the Soviet Union, and benefited from the subsequent war between China and Japan which smashed the KMT power base but allowed the communists to strengthen their own.