February 21, 2024
“There is nothing as likely to succeed as what the enemy believes you cannot attempt.” -Niccolo Machiavelli
Unlike the campaigns of the Second Sino-Japanese War the opening campaigns of the Asia-Pacific War are thoroughly represented in western historiography. However, the military campaigns of the Second Sino-Japanese War are often easier to describe due to taking place in one country and usually between two combatants. By contrast, the opening campaigns of the Asia-Pacific War can be difficult to cover due to countless battles conducted simultaneously across vast distances, and territories, between Japanese and various allied contingents. As such, rather than describing them in chronological order it’s easier to analyze them in isolation. This will be done in the following order: Pearl Harbor, Thailand, Malaya and Singapore, Hong Kong, the Third Battle of Changsha, Guam and Wake Island, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, Burma, Japan’s Indian Ocean Raid, and the British attack on Madagascar.
As a quick aside, upon the commencement of hostilities Japan overran the International Settlement in Shanghai, that had been isolated since the fighting between Chinese and Japanese forces in the city during 1937. American marines stationed in the Beijing and Tianjin concessions also surrendered rather than fight a suicidal battle. However, they were disappointed after realizing informal Japanese suggestions they would be repatriated if they surrendered turned out to be false.
Pearl Harbor
On December 7, 1941 Pearl Harbor was hit by a Japanese force including six carriers, roughly 400 aircraft including fighters, torpedo, dive and high level bombers, and a few midget submarines. The plan was to launch two aerial waves to hit America’s Pacific carriers, battleships and airfields located at Pearl Harbor. Luckily for America its carriers were not present but returning from delivering air contingents to other bases in the Pacific. In fact the carriers Enterprise and Lexington were supposed to have been at Pearl Harbor that morning but were delayed by bad weather.
Japan benefitted from intelligence obtained from their consul general in Hawaii and a small number of Japanese nationals there. To achieve surprise the carrier force sailed to Pearl Harbor via deserted shipping lanes in the North Pacific, maintained radio silence throughout the voyage, and created false radio chatter elsewhere suggesting the carriers were far away from Hawaii.
The Japanese were blessed by the lazy state of the American fleet on a Sunday, which was even being readied for an admiral’s inspection. There was also faulty intelligence suggesting Japan would strike elsewhere in Southeast Asia, and despite expectations war was imminent Hawaii was not placed on a war footing! As the Japanese strike force neared Oahu the Americans failed to take advantage of two instances that should have warned them of the attack. An American ship sank a Japanese submarine, and a radar station saw significant blips which represented Japanese planes, but the officer on duty mistook them for an expected flight of American bombers.
Without going into detail the Japanese achieved complete surprise and in two waves severely damaged the American Pacific Fleet at Pearl Harbor. They sank, or severely damaged, eight battleships (two of which were unsalvageable), damaged three cruisers and three destroyers, and destroyed or damaged around 350 aircraft (mostly caught on the ground and not dispersed due to fears of sabotage). Perhaps 3500 American military personnel and civilians were killed or wounded, while Japan only lost 29 planes (though more than 70 were damaged), and five midget submarines which performed poorly. These were smaller losses than the Japanese pilots, who were told half of them would be shot down before dropping their bombs, expected.
It has been suggested Japan missed an opportunity to strike a decisive blow by launching a third wave to hit American naval and fuel facilities, but this has been challenged by modern historians. The Japanese had already accomplished their main objectives and their aircraft would have suffered significant casualties given the second wave had already suffered worse casualties than the first. The Americans would have had more time to prepare for a third wave and by launching another one Japanese planes would have had to land in the dark; which made such an operation unfeasible. Finally, the Japanese were worried about a potential counterattack by the missing American carriers, and recent research has indicated any damage inflicted by a third wave would not have been as detrimental to American capabilities as previous accounts have suggested.
Nevertheless, the raid on Pearl Harbor inflicted a significant material and psychological blow on the American Pacific Fleet, temporarily put it on the defensive, and made it unable to interfere with Japan’s operations to conquer western possessions in the Pacific and Southeast Asia. While the raid failed to neutralize the American carriers in the Pacific these were still significantly outnumbered by Japan’s carrier force and likewise unable to stop Japanese conquests. However, their survival would come back to haunt Japan later via the Doolittle Raid, the Battle of the Coral Sea, and especially the Battle of Midway.
In contrast to Japan’s operational successes at Pearl Harbor the strategic results (not withstanding those mentioned above) were less beneficial. Certainly it did not dent America’s giant industrial advantage that would prove decisive. At the time America had 15 battleships, 11 carriers, 54 cruisers, 193 destroyers and 73 submarines under construction, and the week after Pearl Harbor alone 22 warships and merchant ships were built.
Additionally, hopes that the raid would demoralize the American people, and along with subsequent defeats convince them to come to terms, would fail as it enraged America and guaranteed eventual revenge against Japan. Not even Hitler’s unnecessary declaration of war against America a few days later, and the American policy of defeating Germany first, undermined this sentiment. Thus, as other Japanese leaders rejoiced over Pearl Harbor, Admiral Yamamoto, who planned the attack, was more prescient by suggesting “I fear all we have done is to awaken a sleeping giant and fill him with a terrible resolve.”
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In the months after Pearl Harbor a combination of racism, fear, and shock from the attack led the American and Canadian governments to intern approximately 140,000 people of Japanese descent in detention camps. The majority of them were American and Canadian citizens and the justification to intern them has been throughly discredited since the war. Indeed, American officials at the time found little evidence they engaged in sabotage or espionage, while the Canadian armed forces, and R.C.M.P, claimed they posed no real threat either.
Regardless the paranoid atmosphere after Pearl Harbor, combined with a few instances of Japanese submarines attacking coastal targets in North America, was enough justification for politicians and much of the American and Canadian public, to sanction the internment of citizens of Japanese descent. This included entire families who lost jobs and had property and personal possessions confiscated. Ironically, despite the considerable population of Japanese-Americans in Hawaii, perhaps 160,000, the majority escaped custody (unlike on the mainland) with perhaps only a few thousand interned during the war.
Although conditions in the detention camps were not violent or murderous like Nazi concentration camps, or Imperial Japan’s prisoner of war camps, they were far from pleasant and provided a poignant example of allied hypocrisy regarding supposedly fighting for justice and equality. It would not be until 1988 the American and Canadian governments apologized for the detentions and award survivors reparations.
Thailand Surrenders to Japan
Thailand, the only country in Southeast Asia at the time free of western and Japanese imperialism, had traditionally survived as a independent state by playing the British and French off each other. The military junta governing Thailand shared sympathy with Japanese attempts to rollback western colonialism and had benefited from Japanese mediation to end the Franco-Thai War (1940-1941), which regained territory previously ceded to French Indochina. However, in December 1941 Thailand was committed to a policy of neutrality and hoped its old policy of playing foreign powers off each other, in this case Britain and America against Japan, would keep it out of the war.
This was doomed given Britain was weak, America was far away, and Thailand’s strategic use for Japan regarding its upcoming offensives in Malaya and Burma. Richard B. Frank has quoted the leader of the Thai military junta, Plaek Phibunsongkhram, who recognized Thailand’s vulnerabilities. Uttering one of the most cynical statements by a politician in history, he told his cabinet in early December “if they resisted Japanese occupation, Thailand might survive the war, but their personal survival was unlikely.”
On December 7, 1941 Japan demanded entry into Thailand to facilitate its campaigns against Malaya and Burma. When the Thai government refused to respond Japan invaded the next day and after five hours of fighting Thailand acceded to Japanese demands. Thailand became a de facto ally of Japan, even declaring war against Britain and America in January 1942. Realistically, Thailand’s regime had little chance of resisting Japan, or getting western aid in December 1941, and probably hoped to survive long enough to back the eventual winner in the ever-expanding conflict.
On the other hand, Thailand was not completely innocent given its army would conduct some offensives against the Allies, while the country also gained considerable territory from Malaya, Burma, Cambodia and Laos due to the successes of Japanese arms. In fact, unlike the usual heavy-handed manner Japan used to dominate other territories, Thailand was treated better and allowed to control its army and internal affairs. Either way, Thailand’s swift accommodation with Japan would severely compromise allied defensive efforts regarding Malaya, Singapore, and Burma.
The Fall of Malaya and Singapore
One hour before Pearl Harbor was bombed Japanese forces attacked Malaya by landings at three beaches; two on the Kra Peninsula in Thailand and another at Kota Bharu in North Malaya. The Japanese landed unopposed in Thailand because the British were reluctant to invade neutral Thailand to preempt the landings, due to diplomatic considerations. This was unfortunate because this could have delayed, or at least weakened, the Japanese landing parties. For example, Indian troops did this to an appreciable degree at Kota Bharu, where the defenses were relatively impressive with artillery and machine gun fire, that initially kept Japanese forces pinned down on the beach. However, the British, Indian, and Australian forces in Malaya were not deployed in strength in North Malaya, being dispersed instead across the Malayan peninsula or guarding airfields. This meant Japanese forces eventually secured the beachhead, built up strength, and quickly moved south to keep the allied forces off balance.
Leading the Japanese force of 3 divisions in the campaign was Lt. General Yamashita Tomoyuki, a bold, energetic and ruthless commander. Under him were among the best soldiers in the Imperial Japanese Army, including some skilled in light infantry attacks in challenging terrain, and others in amphibious assaults. They were well led, trained, and generally had plenty of experience fighting in China. They were backed by approximately 200 light tanks (which the British foolishly believed would not be suitable in Malaya), more than 550 warplanes of good quality, as well as considerable naval forces in the region which were superior to the few British ships stationed at Singapore.
The Japanese also benefited from a previous intelligence coup when the Germans gave them sensitive British documents captured from the merchant vessel SS Automedon. These detailed the strength and composition of British forces in the Far East, information on Singapore’s defenses, and the blunt assessment that Britain could not provide the necessary forces to safeguard Malaya and Singapore.
Yamashita’s plan was based on speed, boldness, and constantly taking the initiative. Japanese soldiers would defeat allied forces by outflanking them through the jungle, landing behind them via the sea, or if necessary smashing through with tanks or aggressive assaults, sometimes launched at night. One night attack was so successful the Japanese managed to infiltrate a brigade headquarters and kill every officer except the brigadier himself. Most of the fighting would occur in Western Malaya where the terrain was more favorable, the main British forces and strategic locations were located, and communications such as railways and roads were more prevalent.
The allied forces in Malaya and Singapore enjoyed the advantages of superior numbers of soldiers and artillery but little more. They had roughly 250 inferior planes (though 50 modern Hurricanes fighters later arrived), no tanks but some anti-tank weapons, a mere two capital ships and some destroyers, while most soldiers were second rate and green. Some forces had good doctrine for jungle fighting in Malaya, although many had been trained for desert warfare instead. Sometimes they inflicted local reverses on the Japanese but in general they were outmatched.
Leading them was Lt. General Arthur Percival, who has been unfairly accused of cowardice, but the general historical consensus is that he made a great staff officer but was an ineffective battlefield commander. At the lower level some British officers failed their men by absurd suggestions such as claiming the Japanese were shortsighted, not intelligent, or that their bullets were made out of rubber!
The British strategy for Malaya and Singapore was to hold out long enough for Britain to send sufficient forces to save the colonies. In the event, given its numerous reverses suffered in the Atlantic, Middle East, and Far East during the winter and spring of 1941-1942 Britain had to make hard choices regarding which regions to reinforce. Considering the three main British priorities at the time emphasized the Battle of the Atlantic, the Middle East, and sending aid to the Soviets, meant the Far East would not receive enough forces to save Singapore.
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Besides the failure to stop Japan from landing and quickly overrunning North Malaya, an ominous event occurred when Japanese aircraft sank the battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse off the coast of the colony. This was the result of underestimating Japanese pilots (often due to blatant racism), the failure to secure air cover for the ships, and the British admiral hoping cloudy weather and surprise would help shield his task force.
Thus, on December 10, 1941, more than 80 Japanese aircraft, equipped with torpedoes and bombs, attacked both ships in a series of strikes over a few hours. Despite the Prince of Wales alone having roughly 80 anti-aircraft weapons and machine guns the British only managed to destroy a handful of aircraft; providing further evidence capital ships without air cover were extremely vulnerable and nearing obsolescence. While both ships showed skill maneuvering to avoid many torpedoes and bombs, Japanese skill and numbers prevailed, both were sank, and over 800 British sailors died. Regarding the disaster Winston Churchill later wrote “in all the war I never received a more direct shock.”
The Malayan campaign and fall of Singapore lasted from December 7, 1941, to February 15, 1942, and consisted of a number of engagements including Jitra, Kampar, Slim River, Muar, the bombing of Penang, and the invasion of Singapore Island. With some exceptions, such as the Australian ambush at Gemencheh Bridge which mauled two Japanese companies, and the Battle of Kampar, where difficult terrain and British artillery delayed the enemy for four days, Japanese forces dominated these engagements via tanks, aggressive assaults, and outflanking maneuvers. The latter were facilitated by Japanese soldiers traveling light, using bicycles and locally seized shipping on the Malayan coast, and the allied forces being reliant on roads and slowed down by heavy equipment and supplies.
The bombing of Penang was notable for the shock and panic it produced upon the British colonial community, and the shameful abandonment of the indigenous peoples by their supposed European protectors. Such instances would become commonplace as the British would attempt to save themselves but leave locals in Southeast Asia to the mercy of the Japanese in Malaya, Singapore, Burma and elsewhere. With the retreat of the remaining allied forces to Singapore Island and the destruction of the causeway linking it to Malaya on January 31, the fight for Malaya was over but the battle for Singapore began. By then allied forces had lost 50,000 casualties, their main warships, and most of their airpower.
At this point the inadequate resources and leadership of the British in Southeast Asia were harshly exposed. Despite the reputation of being the strongest naval base in the region, there were few notable defenses on the north shore of Singapore Island and the fortresses’ naval guns had insufficient high explosive shells to decimate Japanese infantry. Winston Churchill was so astonished by the poor defenses on the north coast he wrote a memorandum to his military Chiefs of Staff Committee, suggesting in minute details what defensive efforts should be used to fortify it. While Churchill has been accused of excessive micromanaging during the war in this case he was undoubtedly correct.
Even at this stage the British had more artillery and outnumbered the Japanese forces poised to invade the island by 85,000 soldiers to 35,000. However, not only were allied forces throughly demoralized but Percival deployed them poorly to confront the Japanese. A disproportionate amount was placed on the northeast shore where the terrain was suitable for a landing, a much smaller force was sent to defend the northwest shore, which had more difficult terrain to surmount, but only one brigade was held back as a reserve to counterattack Japanese landings.
Yamashita used deception and artillery barrages to convince Percival he would land in the northeast, but instead landed in strength in the northwest on the night of February 8. The limited Australian forces in the area put up a good fight, but gaps in their lines allowed the Japanese to bypass them and they were forced back. However, the Allies managed one last coup in the campaign when many Japanese soldiers landing closer to the former causeway linking Malaya to Singapore, suffered terribly when gasoline dumped in the water was set alight.
Three factors following the Japanese landings doomed the defense of Singapore. Firstly, Percival failed to mount an aggressive counterattack to dislodge Japanese forces before they amassed sizable forces on the island. Secondly, as the Allies fell back the Japanese took the island’s water reservoirs near Bukit Timah, which eroded the former’s chances to continue fighting. Finally, there was no longer any real fight left in Percival, his subordinate commanders who recommended surrendering, or many of the soldiers who became ill-disciplined and started looting.
A last ditch appeal by Winston Churchill imploring Percival and his officers to die fighting with their men in the ruins of Singapore, and forget about the cost to the civilian population, unsurprisingly failed to rally the defenders. Percival met Yamashita on February 15, 1942, and surrendered.
This came as a relief for Yamashita, whose forces were low on ammunition and still significantly outnumbered by allied forces. There have been suggestions if Percival had refused to surrender the garrison could have held out long enough to be adequately relieved. Yet this ignores the naval and air supremacy Japan had in the region, the nonexistent fighting spirit amongst the defenders, and that Churchill and the British military leadership had already written off Singapore to send its sparse military resources elsewhere. Perhaps Percival could have fought on longer and inflicted some casualties on the Japanese, but the likely result would have been the widespread slaughter of his forces, and local civilians, once Japan reinforced Yamashita with reinforcements and supplies.
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The fall of Malaya and Singapore was unequivocally the worst defeat in British military history. Not only did it capture Britain’s main naval base in the region, which could have threatened Japan’s operations and maritime shipping in Southeast Asia, but it also opened the Indian Ocean to Japanese naval power. It also allowed Japan to concentrate on the conquest of the Dutch East Indies, along with its oil reserves. Symbolically, it damaged the reputation of British forces among its allies, and undermined British prestige among indigenous subjects which suddenly realized that supposed British racial superiority, along with similar justifications to rule over them, were a sham.
However, the idea this debacle was decisive regarding the end of the British Empire is questionable given previous signs of decline, and that Britain retained significant colonial holdings well into the late 1960s. That said, the fall of Singapore is arguably the most poignant symbol in the process of British decolonization. General Alan Brooke, arguably Britain’s finest strategist of the war, wrote in his diary a few days before the disaster “I have during the last ten years had an unpleasant feeling that the British Empire was decaying and that we were on a slippery slope. I wonder if I was right?”
Besides the loss of two capital ships and almost all their aircraft, the British led forces lost up to 135,000 (50,000 in Malaya and 85,000 in Singapore) casualties, the vast majority captured. Japanese casualties were close to 10,000 and over 300 aircraft, although only about a third of the latter were lost in combat. Given the well known brutality Japanese soldiers imposed upon POWs it’s unsurprising three times as many allied prisoners died in Japanese captivity versus soldiers lost in the campaign. Although the usual excesses against non-combatants by Japanese soldiers occurred during and after the fighting, such as the bayoneting of 300 patients and staff at the Alexandria Barracks Hospital, it’s notable Yamashita ordered his forces before the campaign to refrain from warcrimes.
Apparently this did not apply to the local Chinese population, which generally supported China’s resistance against Japan. As such, Yamashita gave orders to seek out potential hostile elements amongst the local populations in Malaya and Singapore. Whether or not he intended this to result in mass slaughter perhaps 6000 to 25,000 people, mostly Chinese, were stabbed, shot, bludgeoned, or murdered in various ways in what became known as “Sook Ching,” or “purification by elimination.” Such atrocities would be repeated across Southeast Asia as the Japanese kicked out racist, exploitive European colonial regimes, but rather than act as liberators they would, in many cases, inflict worse miseries and excesses on the locals than their former European overlords.
The Battle of Hong Kong
As noted before Hong Kong was among the few remaining supply arteries for foreign assistance to China after the ending of Soviet support in 1941, the occupation of North French Indochina in 1940, and the loss of most of the Chinese coast in the early years of the war. After a century of British rule, since seizing it from China after the First Opium War, Hong Kong was a beacon of Britain’s supposedly civilized and prosperous rule across the seas. The European settlers and many local Chinese inhabitants enjoyed a good standard of living, but there were the usual racist policies and segregation between rulers and ruled, that were staples of European colonialism in Asia. Partly due to refugees fleeing the war in China there were 1.6 million people in the colony by December 1941.
Hong Kong included territory on the mainland, approximately 400 square miles with ridges and rugged hills. A partially built defensive line, amusingly named the Gin Drinkers Line, had been constructed in the mid-1930s and was manned by some of the local British and allied forces, but most of the garrison was deployed to Hong Kong Island. Hong Kong Island was composed of 29 square miles, consisted of steep ridges, and had Victoria Harbour located on its northwest shore.
Despite Hong Kong’s strategic use to China, and symbolic value to Britain, by late 1941 there was no realistic prospect of repulsing a Japanese assault, or holding out until relieved. Tellingly, the United States Military Academy’s History Manual notes “Japanese control of Canton, Hainan Island, French Indochina, and Formosa virtually sealed the fate of Hong Kong well before the firing of the first shot.” Surrounded by Japanese controlled territory and military might the garrison seemed doom. There remained the prospect of Chinese help, with Chiang Kai-shek having offered 200,000 soldiers for defense, but the British refused any aid before the war commenced. Unsurprisingly, the British were weary over Chiang’s desire to retake Hong Kong for China, but it’s more astonishing many British officials privately stated they preferred to lose the colony to Japan than have it regained by China!
Aware that stationing significant forces in Hong Kong would only increase how many soldiers fell into Japanese captivity, British military leaders committed only token naval forces and a division sized garrison. The original troops stationed at Hong Kong were used to a soft existence, with considerable food and beer, while the best officers had been sent to fight in Europe. With some exceptions the British did not enlist many locals. However, in the summer of 1941 Britain decided to reinforce the colony with two battalions to maintain Chinese morale and deter Japan from going to war; which failed as it was seen as a provocation by Japan. These battalions were provided by Canada, which unlike India, Australia, and New Zealand had not so far participated in any significant ground campaigns in World War 2. The Canadian government agreed to send the battalions although it could have easily refused to do so (much as Australia often resisted British requests during the conflict).
The British, Indian, Canadian, and other troops in the colony were keen, decent soldiers but had no combat experience, little firepower and limited equipment to back them up. Hong Kong’s security had also been compromised by the presence of a Major Ohira during British military maneuvers in 1937, which gave the Japanese a good understanding how Britain planned to defend it. Apparently, a previous invitation to the officer was not canceled as the ever polite British did not want to offend the Imperial Japanese Army! A final disadvantage for the garrison was the reluctance of civil authorities to build defenses, or make notable preparations for war; living in a dream world where they thought they could avoid the gathering storm.
Against this Japan deployed its 38th Division which roughly matched the size of the defending garrison. However, unlike allied forces, it was a battle-hardened force with aggressive officers and soldiers who constantly took the initiative and benefited from superior artillery. It was backed by considerable air and naval power and the Japanese also benefited from good intelligence via a fifth column in Hong Kong (including triad gangs). This undermined British defenses by sabotage, sniping, and other subversive activities. The Japanese would take over Hong Kong’s mainland territory first, give the island a chance to surrender, and failing that land on it to overwhelm the garrison. To his credit the Japanese commander told his soldiers to treat prisoners well but this would often not be the case.
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The same day Pearl Harbor and Malaya were attacked Japan also hit Hong Kong, closing in on the Gin Drinkers Line and destroying three out of the five British aircraft in the colony. The key to the Gin Drinkers line was the Shing Mun Redoubt, which despite its importance was severely undermanned. Japan secured it by December 10 due to the initiative of a Japanese officer, Colonel Doi Teishichi, who was rewarded by a military inquisition for attacking it when it had been slated for capture by another unit!
The next day Hong Kong’s commander recognized the mainland could not be held, evacuated the forces stationed there, and blew up the bridges connecting it to the island. Two days later the Japanese asked the British to surrender, and after this was refused the island was subjected to artillery and aerial bombardment. While the Japanese initially tried to hit military targets only inevitably it spilled over to civilian areas and fires spread quickly.
On the night of December 18-19 Japanese forces landed on the northeast shore, which was lightly defended as the British were worried about potential landings elsewhere, and defeated the Indian battalion stationed there. Disorganized counterattacks failed to dislodge the Japanese force and allied defensive arrangements were dealt a fatal blow when a British withdrawal opened a gap in the lines, which the Japanese exploited. The latter planned to split the island and garrison in two, defeat them in detail, and force their surrender.
In theory, this should have been difficult due to a single road bisecting the island, while the rest of the north-south paths were narrow (and should have favored the defense). However, the Japanese were aided by local guides who showed them ways around British defensive positions. By then the game was up, with Richard B. Frank noting “from roughly this point onward, the study of Hong Kong’s defenders is a long litany of Company-or smaller size-elements, often intermixed with sailors and volunteers, being overwhelmed by tactically skilled Japanese forces enjoying advantages in numbers and usually firepower.”
However, the fighting was not easy for Japan as isolated detachments often fought valiantly. For example, the West Brigade’s Commander, Brigadier John K. Lawson, was cut down fighting Japanese forces that had surrounded his headquarters; becoming the highest Canadian servicemen killed in combat during World War 2. Out of respect, Japanese soldiers gave Lawson a proper temporary burial after finding his body. The British also delayed the inevitable by bribing triad members to change sides, and enlisted the help of local KMT agents, both of whom launched a counter-terror campaign against the island’s fifth column (undoubtedly killing many innocent people as well). During the battle, Chiang Kai-shek also ordered Chinese forces to relieve Hong Kong. These got relatively close to the colony but were checked by a force of two Japanese divisions and a brigade.
Bowing to the inevitable Hong Kong surrendered Christmas Night, 1941. Britain lost another colony and China lost its last maritime supply link. Japanese casualties were approximately 2700 vs. 4400 British and allied killed and wounded, along with roughly 8000-10,000 taken prisoner.
While some historians have disparaged the military conduct of the colony’s garrison it should be pointed out that compared to the depressing performance of its equivalent in Malaya and Singapore it performed better. The latter enjoyed strong naval forces (initially), considerably more air power, had artillery superiority over the Japanese, and received significant reinforcements during the campaign. Hong Kong enjoyed none of these advantages but inflicted proportionately heavier losses on the Japanese invaders. Therefore, if the garrison at Hong Kong potentially took up to six times the losses (including those captured) the Japanese suffered, the fall of Malaya and Singapore, that saw the Allies suffer more than 13 times the number of casualties as the Japanese, appears even less impressive. As Franco David Macri has suggested “many problems contributed to the defeat of the Hong Kong garrison, but a lack of courage was certainly not one of them.”
The aftermath of the fall of Hong Kong witnessed considerable Japanese war crimes against prisoners and civilians. Despite the Japanese commander’s initial order to treat captives well, along with directives from officials in Tokyo to refrain from excesses, Japanese soldiers engaged in looting, rape, mistreatment of POWs, and murder. Hundreds of civilians were killed, up to 10,000 women (mostly local Chinese ) were raped, medical staff and wounded soldiers were sometimes burned alive, bayoneted or beheaded, and a disproportionate amount of POWs eventually died due to mistreatment or neglect. The latter included over 250 Canadian prisoners, nearly as many as the number of Canadian soldiers that died during the battle. On the other hand the Japanese army apparently executed some of its soldiers that had committed atrocities against patients at a makeshift hospital at St. Stephens College.
The Third Battle of Changsha
As the fighting was ending in Hong Kong Japanese forces in China made a third effort to conquer the city of Changsha. Ostensibly, Japan initiated this offensive to prevent Chinese forces from reinforcing Burma or Hong Kong, but arguably the main reason was to avenge the wounded pride of General Anami Korechika, who had led the failed attempt to take the city during the Second Battle of Changsha. Indeed, Hong Kong fell the day after this offensive was launched and Anami disregarded orders from Imperial Headquarters, and changed the line of advance to converge on Changsha. Japan deployed 120,000 soldiers, supported by 600 artillery guns and 200 aircraft. China had 300,000 soldiers from nine armies and was led by General Xue Yue, the competent commander who had beaten off the previous attacks against Changsha.
The Third Battle of Changsha began December 24, 1941, and Japan enjoyed initial success by breaking through the left front, routing the Chinese 99th Army, and headed towards the city from the east. From January 1-4, 1942, a desperate urban battle, which saw the widespread use of flamethrowers, was fought inside Changsha. The Chinese initially repulsed attacks from the Japanese 1st Division, which was then reinforced by the 6th Division that had been tasked to secure the area east of the city. While the Japanese managed to conquer most of the city by January 4, it became clear their forces in Changsha were in danger of encirclement and they withdrew later that day. Throughout, the Japanese suffered considerably from Chinese artillery, which in a rare instance had superiority over its counterpart and enjoyed relative security being deployed to the west of Changsha, and in the Tamoshan heights north of the city.
Just like the Second Battle of Changsha General Xue Yue kept much of his forces back to trap the Japanese after they extended their lines of communication and exhausted themselves after heaving fighting. As such two Chinese armies closed off the Japanese line of retreat while Chinese guerrillas raided enemy supply lines. Peter Harmsen noted this had considerable affect on the Japanese as many soldiers had as little as 10-15 bullets left, and some platoons only a few grenades, which meant their forces were often reduced to fighting hand to hand with bayonets and swords. The situation became so bad supplies had to be dropped by air to prevent a disaster.
With some understatement a Japanese account written after the war suggested “the withdrawal was carried out under considerable hardship” as soldiers had to constantly fight off attacks from large forces while evacuating many of their wounded. Indeed, Japanese troops retreated north through several Chinese armies, and across four rivers in muddy and icy conditions. The official Chinese history of the war suggests without air superiority the retreating forces may have been wiped out completely. While the Japanese managed to retreat back to their starting point and claimed they had succeeded in their distraction, this appears dubious.
Hong Kong had fallen a day after the Changsha offensive began and it is difficult to believe having their army’s lines of communication cut, and subjected to an arduous, desperate retreat had been part of the plan (let alone represented a glorious Japanese victory). More likely as Richard B. Frank has pointed out “the whole operation reflected haste and ill-planning” and “the Japanese severely underestimated both the number and the determination of the Chinese they might encounter.” Given Changsha’s significantly strategic value and that General Anami was clearly trying to erase his previous failure to take the city, it is very unlikely the Japanese were not hoping to seize and hold it.
In that sense the Third Battle of Changsha was a strategic victory for China and until the Battle of the Coral Sea in May 1942, the only instance where one of the Allies resisted a major Japanese offensive in the six months after Pearl Harbor. On the operational level the Japanese could claim a superior loss exchange ratio by incurring far less casualties, but since they were now fighting several powers besides China the use of such bloody exchanges were now even more questionable for Japan. Official Japanese casualties ranged from 6000-6800, along with 1760 horses (illustrating not only how limited Japanese logistics in China were but also the tragic affects war has on innocent animals). As often casualties for the Chinese are hard to confirm but 30,000 has been cited by many sources. These losses, which included one Chinese regiment reduced to 58 survivors after several days of combat, suggests the battle was hardly an easy victory for China.
Japan takes Guam and Wake Island
Guam Island, approximately 228 square miles with 20,000 inhabitants at the time, had been taken by America during the Spanish-American War in 1898. In December 1941 it had under 700 military personnel but no major warships, warplanes, coastal batteries or significant defenses. It was too far away from America to be defended, especially given the proximity of Japanese island chains including the Marianas, Carolines, and Marshalls. The island was initially bombed Dec 8-9 while a considerable Japanese naval contingent including four heavy cruisers, and four destroyers, arrived December 10 with a landing force of over 5000 troops. They landed in the early morning and after a brief fight the American garrison, equipped only with small arms, surrendered mostly to prevent the slaughter of the local civilian population. The prisoners were treated well at first, however this changed after being sent to Japan.
Wake Island, which had an airfield and was also a important communications center, was a three island volcanic atoll covering 2.5 square miles. Although closer to Hawaii than Guam it was still far closer to the Japanese Marshall Islands. Despite having a similar sized garrison as Guam, in this case over 500 soldiers (mostly marines), along with perhaps 1200 civilian contractors, the island’s defenses were more formidable. This included 12 Wildcat Fighters, 50 machine guns, and notably six 5.5-inch coastal batteries that offered a respectable punch against certain Japanese ships.
On the morning of December 8, 1941, dozens of Japanese bombers hit Wake Island and managed to destroy 2/3rds of the Wildcats on the ground thanks to the lack of American radar detection, along with weather masking the attacking force. But Japan enjoyed less success on December 11 when its naval forces, including three light cruisers, six destroyers and landing craft, approached the island. As they bombarded the shoreline the American commander, Major James Devereux, ordered the 5.5.-inch guns silent until the Japanese naval force came within effective range. The guns succeeded in sinking a Japanese destroyer, the Hayate, while the remaining Wildcats sank the destroyer Kisaragi. The Japanese force then withdrew to lick its wounds giving Wake Island a temporary reprieve from invasion.
However, Japan continued to bomb Wake Island and returned with the same naval contingent, reinforced by two destroyers, four heavy cruisers, and two aircraft carriers, almost two weeks later. Japanese planes neutralized the remaining Wildcats and after a strong bombardment an invasion force, including 2000 soldiers in the first waves, landed on the volcanic atoll. Even with the additional firepower Japanese force suffered significant casualties, especially a feint assault where the attackers were cut to pieces. However, the Japanese seized the airfield, communications began breaking down, and the garrison quickly realized they were surrounded by overwhelming naval forces. With little prospect of relief, and thinking much of his force was overrun, Major Devereux surrendered the garrison on December 23, 1941.
Although an American task force including the aircraft carrier Saratoga had been on the way to relieve Wake Island, it was ordered to withdraw when it discovered the presence of the Japanese carriers and what they mistakenly believed were two battleships. American sailors were angry and demoralized by this development but it was a wise military decision as Japan’s naval airmen were perhaps the best in the world at the time, and the Saratoga was too far away from America’s other Pacific carriers (Lexington and Enterprise) to receive their support. Most likely the Saratoga would have been lost and this would have widened the already unfavorable naval odds between America and Japan in the Pacific at the time.
While Japan secured Wake Island it was arguably a pyrrhic victory as it lost two destroyers, 30 aircraft, as well as at least 550 Japanese dead while American losses were 12 planes, around 120 dead and the rest captured. The treatment of the captives reflected alternative bouts of good treatment and cruelty. Apparently the arrival of a Japanese admiral to witness the end of the fighting thwarted a plan by Japanese soldiers, angered over heavy losses, to execute captured Americans.
Most prisoners taken on the island survived (although a few were beheaded during the journey to Japan) but a worse fate befell those left behind. Many died from slave labor and the rest were murdered by the Japanese after an American carrier raid against Wake Island in October 1943. In one grim incident an American who escaped the initial slaughter was brought before the new garrison commander, Sakaibara Shigematsu, who personally killed him with his sword. This belies the occasional insinuation Japanese war crimes were simply committed by disobedient soldiers on the ground rather than higher echelons that supposedly favored humane treatment, and Shigematsu Sakaibara was executed as a war criminal in 1947.
Japan invades Indonesia to take its Oil
Japan’s campaign to take the Dutch East Indies (modern day Indonesia) is often detailed briefly, if at all, in many western histories of the war. This is ironic as seizing its rich oil fields was arguably the key territorial objective for Japanese operations in Southeast Asia from late 1941 to the spring of 1942. Japan’s official history of the conflict even suggested “it is no exaggeration to say that the Greater East Asian War was launched for the oil in Palembang.” Some excellent, detailed accounts of the campaign have been written by Richard B. Frank in his celebrated Tower of Skulls, as well as a short history by Marc Lohnstein, both of which much of the following narrative is based upon.
To take the Dutch East Indies Japan deployed its 16th Army with approximately 100,000 men in three divisions, one brigade and six special naval forces (which contained paratroopers). Most of these forces were among the best in the Japanese Army and many were skilled in amphibious assaults, used to the swampy terrain of South China, and were motorized. The 16th Army was led by Lt. General Imamura Hitoshi, who had commanded a regiment and later a division in China, and was known to be brave, willing to take considerable risks, and a skilled organizer. He also had considerable experience with the West thanks to serving as a military attaché in Britain and India.
The 16th Army was backed by strong naval forces including several battleships, at least a dozen heavy cruisers, many light cruisers and destroyers, and eventually the carrier fleet that attacked Pearl Harbor. For airpower there was 500-600 aircraft (not including those from the carrier fleet). The Allies were outnumbered and outgunned in ships, and mostly the same in the air, but had numerical superiority on the ground. However, much of the allied forces were indigenous troops who unsurprisingly not only had little love for their colonial overlords, but often gave up Dutch positions to the Japanese after they were taken prisoner.
Another disadvantage for the Allies was that their forces came from four main contingents (American, British, Dutch, and Australian) with different weaponry, doctrine, and interests regarding the upcoming campaign. While the Dutch were naturally concerned for their major overseas colony, the British, Americans and Australians saw the Dutch East Indies as ultimately expendable and unnecessary for the war against Japan. This illustrates a general truism in warfare: That it’s usually beneficial to fight a war with allies than without, but that it’s often easier for a single nation, in this case Japan, to fight and win battles against disorganized allied forces. Finally, the Allies had another disadvantage thanks to the geography of the Dutch East Indies. Given the colony’s many isolated islands it was difficult to coordinate defensive efforts, whereas Japanese naval and air superiority meant they could attack where they wanted and dictate the pace of military operations.
Despite the huge geography confronting the Japanese (the Dutch East Indies comprised 750,000 square miles, with 18,000 islands and 70,000,000 inhabitants) this campaign, along with the conquest of Malaya and Singapore, was arguably the greatest performance of Japanese arms in its imperial history. Japan’s main objectives were Sumatra, with the colony’s primary oilfields, as well as Java, the most populous island with the political and military centers of gravity for the local Dutch regime. Japan also targeted islands such as Borneo, Celebes, Timor, Ambon, and Bali (among others) that held important assets such as oilfields, airfields to facilitate additional advances, and other objectives.
After initial landings in Borneo, and seizing Singapore and the Philippine island of Mindanao, Japan planned to converge on Java from three directions (taking vital points as it advanced). It would then crush allied resistance on the island and complete the occupation of the Dutch East Indies. Most of the allied contingents were deployed in, or around, Sumatra and Java, while islands as big as Borneo held as little as under 5000 troops.
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Japan invaded Borneo, which included British and Dutch territory, in mid-December 1941 and subjugated it by the end of the fighting in Java (although local Dutch forces fought on until October 1942). Other islands such as Celebes and Ambon were invaded in January 1942, and Timor was invaded in late February.
Timor was an interesting case being divided between a Dutch colony in the southwest and a Portuguese colony in the northeast. Ironically, given Imperial Japan’s tendency to flout international law, it had not planned to invade the Portuguese portion unless the Allies violated its neutrality first. This occurred when Australian troops crossed into the Portuguese colony in December 1941. The Japanese landed on Timor the night of February 19/20, 1942, and dropped paratroops to cut off a potential Australian retreat. The Australians managed to evade the trap but most conventional fighting ceased by February 23 when allied forces (a third of whom suffered from disease), low on ammunition and supplies, and having no prospects of being reinforced, surrendered. However, many escaped and continued the struggle via guerrilla warfare with the aid of local inhabitants (who would suffer grievously at the hands of the Japanese) which lasted until February 1943.
Elsewhere Japan attacked Sumatra in mid-February 1942. The main target was Palembang which was accessible via the Musi River 50 miles from the coast. The primary objectives were the oilfields and refineries in the area around the city. Japan had already failed to take other oil refineries before they were sabotaged, such as at Tarakan and Celebes, and hoped to take those at Palembang intact by a surprise paratrooper assault while other forces landed on the coast. Besides these objectives Japan planned to seize an airfield near Palembang to facilitate operations in the region (Japanese intelligence missed the existence of a second airfield). To support their offensive on South Sumatra the Japanese launched an air offensive in early February to gain air superiority, but despite optimistic reports most allied planes survived.
Similar to other airborne operations in World War 2 such as the German seizure of Crete in 1941, and Operation Market Garden in 1944, the paratrooper assault proved to be chaotic and unfolded far from planned. Despite aerial attacks against the defending airfield some Japanese paratroopers were strangled by their strings while hanging from trees, and other parachutes did not open resulting in many falling to their deaths. By chance the paradrop coincided with the return of allied planes which resulted in dog fights, and the Japanese paratroopers were unable to secure dropped containers, which held most of their weapons.
Despite being equipped with mostly light weapons such as grenades and pistols, the Japanese paratroopers took take the airfield after the defenders withdrew in the evening. Soon afterwards they secured most of the refineries at Pladjoe intact, but the majority of those at Soenji were destroyed. Other Japanese forces arrived by sea to support the paratroopers and by early March 1942 the rest of Sumatra had fallen.
Moving southwest from Celebes in mid-February the Japanese invaded Bali to flank Java from the east (securing Sumatra did so from the west) and secure an important airfield. The defense of Bali was comprised when the battalion sized garrison, comprised mostly of local Indonesians, fell apart due to widespread desertions, and the airfield was seized almost intact. Soon afterwards Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi‘s carrier fleet, the same one that attacked Pearl Harbor, bombed the port of Darwin in North Australia, to prevent allied interference with Japan’s operations against Timor and Java.
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The bombing of Darwin on February 19, 1942, arguably had a disproportionate impact on Australia’s psyche regarding World War 2. Coming on the heels of the British disaster at Singapore, and back to back allied defeats in the Dutch East Indies, the aerial bombardment of the Australian mainland by the carrier fleet that temporarily stymied the American fleet at Pearl Harbor shook many Australians. Although there were concerns at the time this was a prelude for an invasion of Australia, the Japanese never developed serious plans for this potentiality. Yet however much Australians blamed the British, often with justification, for lax preparations and poor military conduct in campaigns from Singapore to Hong Kong, the Australians themselves must bear some responsibility for Darwin’s inadequate defenses when Japan struck.
At this point, more then two months after Pearl Harbor, Darwin was defended by few anti-aircraft guns and no operational fighter planes despite the threat of bombing being appreciated enough to warrant the evacuation of most of the local population. In two waves over 240 Japanese planes hit the port’s shipping, surrounding airfields, nearby oil tanks and the city itself. At least ten ships were sunk, including an American destroyer and 7 merchant ships, almost 20 warplanes were destroyed (mostly on the ground), and up to 300 military personnel and civilians were killed. As planned, the raid temporarily neutralized Darwin as an effective base to contest Japan’s conquest of the Dutch East Indies.
It also triggered a temporary exodus of people southbound which has been laconically described as the “Adelaide Stakes;” Adelaide being the most south, central, remote part of Australia. However, whatever disgust some Aussies may have felt by this often panicked flight it should be stressed this was no different than similar instances of panic involving allied civilian populations from Western Europe, China to the Soviet Union. While the aerial assault on Darwin would be the most destructive one to hit Australia during the war, Japan would eventually bomb the country close to 100 times.
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In order to invade Java, Japan had to neutralize the considerable allied naval forces guarding the island. From late February through early March 1942 Japan engaged these forces in the Java Sea, the Sunda Strait, the Bali Strait, and then south of Java itself. The main engagement, the Battle of the Java Sea, the largest surface fleet engagement since Jutland in 1916, occurred February 27, lasting from approximately 1600 hours to nearly midnight.
Numerically the Japanese and allied naval forces in the battle were not lopsided with the former having 4 cruisers and 14 destroyers, and the latter 5 cruisers and 9 destroyers. However, not only were the Allies at a disadvantage due to their 4 different contingents, which led to difficulties with communication (already tenuous given Japanese attempts to jam allied radios), but the Japanese force also had superior capabilities. This included not only firepower via heavier guns overall but a significant superiority in the quality and range of torpedoes, as well as the capacity to launch them at a far higher rate. Japanese naval gunfire was also more accurate at this point in the war and they were better at night fighting.
In a long, confusing, perhaps exhausting battle, Japan won mostly with some lucky hits by shells and torpedoes. Of the roughly 1600 shells and 150 torpedoes used by the Japanese in the battle, only a handful of the former, and three of the latter, hit allied ships. The allied force had even less luck and lost two cruisers, three destroyers and perhaps 2300 deaths versus limited damage to a few ships, and less than 40 dead, for Japan.
The Battle of the Java Sea established Japanese naval superiority in the area while additional engagements over subsequent days would turn this into naval supremacy. However, the Allies achieved something of a redeeming result in the Sunda Strait during the night of February 28 to March 1 when a force of two cruisers, the USS Houston and HMAS Perth, and one destroyer, stumbled into the midst of a Japanese convoy. In an engagement more confusing than Java Sea these ships, along with Japanese ones that mistakenly hit some of their shipping, sank, or beached, five naval craft and damaged up to four Japanese warships. Despite this operational achievement all allied warships were sunk and thus technically it was a Japanese victory, if perhaps a costly one.
During the Second Battle of the Java Sea on March 1 another allied force, including a heavy cruiser and two destroyers, was sighted in the early morning and sunk by early afternoon. One of the destroyers, the USS Pope, only scuttled itself after skillfully dodging 30 bombs but eventually sustained fatal damage. The only bright spot for the Allies occurred in the Bali Strait where four American destroyers survived an engagement with Japanese destroyers and escaped to Australia.
Total allied losses in these naval actions included five cruisers and six destroyers sunk while the Imperial Japanese Navy suffered damage to some warships but lost none. However, the painful ordeal for the Allies was not over as Japan later sank two more destroyers, and during its cruise south of Java sank or captured 23 merchant ships. Finally, during the entire campaign Japanese submarines outperformed their allied equivalents by sinking 42 merchant ships, while the Dutch scuttled 16 ships (including three submarines and two destroyers) at Tjilatjap on the south coast of Java on March 5.
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The battle for Java Island seemed hopeless after the neutralization of allied naval power and the withdrawal of most of the non-Dutch allied contingents to other locations such as Burma and Australia. However, the Dutch elected to fight on as Japan launched their main landings at Merak in the northwest, Kragan in the east, and a subsidiary landing at Eretan Wetan in between. Most Dutch forces were in West Java but they had the potential to overrun the smaller Japanese force at Eretan Wetan, which Japan knew would be vulnerable but hoped the dispersion of force this could cause the Dutch was worth the risk.
Both sides had roughly 50,000 soldiers but the Dutch lacked sufficient airpower while much of its contingent was composed of poorly trained soldiers. The Dutch suffered a setback when allied planes sent to reinforce the island at the end of February were destroyed with the sinking of the seaplane tender USS Langley. The allied forces on Java were at a disadvantage on the ground, including artillery and tanks with the Japanese having 90 medium and light tanks versus 40 light tanks for the Allies. Worst of all the indigenous forces lacked motivation to fight for their Dutch rulers and many hoped for a Japanese victory.
The Japanese invaders made swift progress with even the exposed force at Eretan Wetan not only withstanding counterattacks by superior forces, but eventually pushed forward once friendly airpower decisively broke the cohesion of Dutch forces. In fact this subsidiary Japanese force, under the aggressive leadership of Colonel Shōji Toshishige, landed trucks and tanks even before infantry to immediately push forward into the island’s interior. This allowed Shōji’s forces to quickly win the decisive engagement of the battle for Java at Tjiater Pass within two days by ignoring orders and showing initiative.
This, along with the loss of the southern port of Tjilatjap, and the realization that the hatred of the Dutch by the indigenous population made the option of guerrilla warfare impossible, convinced the former to surrender. The process of surrender began March 8, was finalized on March 12, and depending upon the source between 50,000 and 80,000 allied personnel, with nearly 1000 vehicles and 200 planes, were captured by Japan. Japanese casualties on Java may have been as low as 1000.
The fall of Java and the Dutch surrender effectively concluded Japan’s conquest of the Dutch East Indies. It also deprived Australia of its northern defensive buffer zone, with the exception of New Guinea, which the Japanese soon turned towards with consequences that will be discussed elsewhere. The conquest of the Dutch East Indies also freed up considerable Japanese forces, especially aircraft carriers, to operate elsewhere such as the Indian Ocean, Melanesia (which included islands that could help Japan interdict American communications with Australia) and eventually the Coral Sea. Perhaps most importantly for Japan it seized the oil fields it needed to continue the war, although eventually American submarines and aircraft would wreak havoc upon Japanese merchant shipping transporting oil from the Dutch East Indies.
Japanese rule would see many war crimes and atrocities inflicted upon the European settlers and Indonesian inhabitants. In one instance prisoners were put into baskets and thrown into shark-infested waters. In another case the Dutch population on Borneo were punished for destroying the island’s oil facilities, with many women being raped and most of the men decapitated or shot. Out of 42,000 European POWs taken 20% would die in captivity, as would 16,000 of 100,000 European civilians held by the Japanese in internment camps.
As usual, it was the indigenous inhabitants that received the majority of the new occupiers’ wrath. Despite hopes for better treatment from Japan, the Indonesians, apart from a minority including elites that had often collaborated with the Dutch as well, now faced an occupation that would see starvation, neglect, women coerced into sexual servitude, the forced slavery of millions, and the usual menagerie or arrests, torture, and murder.
Up to 4,000,000 Indonesians would die under Japanese rule, mostly due to famine and forced labor. If true Indonesia lost the fifth most people of any country during World War 2. Thus, more resistance in Southeast Asia against Japan was created and although the Indonesians did not exactly welcome the return of Dutch rule, they certainly realized the cruelty, and exploitation, by Japanese overlords that spouted cynical rhetoric regarding Pan-Asianism.