“How good bad music and bad reasons sound when we are marching into battle against an enemy.”
-Friedrich Wilhelm Nietzsche
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident (July 1937)
Despite the often Eurocentric historiography of World War 2 the conflict arguably started in Asia; specifically via the Marco Polo Bridge Incident in July 1937. Certainly, major and sustained warfare during this period began in Asia in July 1937 and did not end until September 1945. Likewise, the war did not become a global conflict, which sucked in all of the world’s major powers, until Pearl Harbor in late 1941. In this vein it should be stressed it was Japan’s aggressive war in China, and expansion into Indochina, which led to the diplomatic deadlock between Japan and America which resulted in Pearl Harbor and thus American entry into the war. It was Japanese aggression in Asia that created these catalysts, not Hitler’s actions in Europe, although he quickly blundered after Pearl Harbor by unnecessarily declaring war on the United States.
The Marco Polo Bridge Incident shares similarities to the Jinan Incident in 1928 and Mukden Incident in 1931 in that local initiatives by Japanese officers on the ground unnecessarily escalated tensions between Chinese and Japanese forces, while their respective leaders neither expected, nor wanted, serious conflict. A brief description of the Marco Polo Bridge Incident is as follows:
Japanese forces near the the bridge decided to conduct live firing training exercises during the night of July 7-8, 1937. Despite the proximity of Chinese forces and clearly provocative actions the Japanese did not inform the Chinese prior to conducting these exercises. During the night firing began between Japanese and Chinese forces (it is unknown who shot first) which quickly led to confusion and heightened tensions. The Japanese soon realized one of their soldiers was missing but rather than wait for matters to calm down responded with haste and aggression. As such they demanded the local Chinese garrison allow them to search the town of Wanping to find their missing soldier and once this was refused the Japanese launched a violent assault against local Chinese forces.
News of these events quickly reached Japan, as well as the Chinese masses, and public opinion on both sides pressured their leaders not to back down. To add to this farce the missing Japanese soldier soon returned to his unit after apparently getting lost while taking a bathroom break. This merits repeating: The catalyst leading to World War 2 in Asia began with a Japanese soldier getting lost after relieving himself! Perhaps even Gavrilo Princip, the man whose assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand in 1914 provided the catalyst for World War 1, would have shaken his head in disgust.
Things escalated quickly as Japan issued unreasonable demands and expected the Chinese to fall in line. Based on previous instances it is easy to see why. During the First Sino-Japanese War the Chinese forces had been beaten relatively quickly and Japan had been able to dictate peace terms. In the Russo-Japanese War the Chinese had been unable to prevent Japanese forces from overrunning Chinese territory in Manchuria or the Liaodong Peninsula. From 1928-1933, from the Jinan Incident to the Tanggu Truce, the Japanese inevitably won the military contests and watched China backdown and give into their demands.
Thus, the Japanese were used to the Chinese folding and expected the same would happen again. China was not even seen as a major threat to Japan as the Imperial Japanese Army was obsessed with the Soviet Union whereas the Imperial Japanese Navy naturally eyed American and British naval might. At the time Japanese armed forces were even restructuring and upgrading for a potential war against the Soviets and any fighting against China was expected to be brief and decisive so Japan could continue these efforts.
However, in this case Japan’s leaders tragically miscalculated. Although their intelligence efforts were generally effective at analyzing the strength and structure of Chinese armies, they were woefully inadequate in gauging the will of the Chinese masses, as well as the political calculations of China’s leadership. It is hardly surprising the Japanese government and military missed this. The former was a de facto hostage of the military, the latter focused almost exclusively on military considerations, while both tended to work on a temporary, ad hoc basis given the instability and factionalism that dominated Japanese policy making. Unsurprisingly, this led to intelligence efforts that focused on beating foreign armies at the expense of analyzing supposedly boring details regarding Chinese public opinion.
As such the Japanese political and military elite missed the significance of the Xi’an Incident, the Second United Front between the KMT and CCP, Soviet efforts to prop up China to distract Japan, the rising nationalism and anti-Japanese sentiment amongst the Chinese people, or the fact Chiang Kai-shek no longer had the flexibility to appease Japan. Or, put another way, constant Japanese expansion and aggression since 1894 had coalesced so firmly and irretrievably by 1937 that an unlikely set of allies including the KMT, CCP, Chinese warlords and Stalin combined to draw a line in the Far East against Japan. In the event Japan not only failed to see the line, but flippantly crossed it and began a conflict that would kill 10s of millions, maim countless more, create close to 100 million Chinese refugees, and drastically redraw the map of Asia.
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Before getting to the first campaigns of the Second Sino-Japanese War it is worth noting the significant imbalances between Chinese and Japanese capabilities. While China was a far larger nation, with considerably more population and resources than Japan, it was also divided, ravaged by decades of war, and had relatively weak government institutions. Chinese industry was far less developed than Japan’s (hence China’s reliance on weapon imports) and could generally only produce small caliber weapons and ammunition. For example, during the entire war China was unable to produce one operational warplane compared to approximately 75,000 by Japan! Regarding operational aircraft, China was outnumbered at least three to one by Japan, it had no navy versus the Imperial Japanese Navy (the third biggest in the world), and compared to Japan’s professional army the Chinese had a lack of effective commanders and staff officers. Chiang Kai-shek understood such limitations, and knew it would take years to correct them, but public opinion and the Xi’an Incident meant in the summer of 1937 he could no longer refuse to fight Japan.
Regarding troops on the ground, it is necessary to compare Chinese and Japanese military divisions. Some scholars have pointed out that Japanese divisions had far more personnel, equipment, and heavy weapons, and Richard B. Frank produced an informative chart regarding this in his celebrated work Tower of Skulls which is shown below.
Nominal Japanese and Chinese Divisions:
Personnel: 24,400/28,200 vs. 10,923
Rifles: 9,586 vs. 3,821
Light Machine Guns: 292 vs. 274
Heavy Machine Guns: 96 vs. 54
Grenade Launchers: 304 vs. 243
Mountain/Field Guns: 48 vs. 16
Mortars: 56 vs. 30
Firstly, it must be stressed that the figures for the Chinese divisions only represented the best divisions China had; the German trained and equipped divisions in Chiang Kai-shek’s central army. This only amounted to 20 compared to perhaps more than 200 Chinese divisions which had significantly less personnel and firepower. Most of the Chinese forces were not under the direct command of Chiang but divided between warlord factions (some more loyal to Chiang than others) as well as the small communist forces who had little trust in the KMT regime. Secondly, even the elite Chinese divisions had significantly less personnel than their Japanese equivalents, being outnumbered nearly three to one.
Thirdly, Japanese divisions also outnumbered the Chinese in every form of firepower, especially rifles, field guns and mortars. Fourthly, Chiang Kai-shek’s elite forces would bear the brunt of the fighting during the Battle of Shanghai in 1937 and suffer severe losses that greatly reduced their capabilities. Finally, China did not have a modern, adequate military industrial base, and during the next few years Japan would slowly cut off China’s supply routes from the outside world. This meant as the war progressed Chinese divisions would, with notable exceptions like the American equipped Chinese divisions raised in India after 1942, become more poorly equipped and less combat effective over time.
Depending upon the Chinese forces they faced, the Japanese could wield three to twelve times the firepower during battles. It has been suggested Chiang Kai-shek eventually concluded the Chinese needed to outnumber the Japanese six or nine to one during engagements in order to guarantee success. While this was not always the case, it helps explain why the Chinese would lose most battles despite having considerably more soldiers throughout the war. Once Japan’s strong air force and significant advantages in logistics and mobility are added to the equation the continuous run of defeats for Chinese arms seems less surprising.
Additionally, Philip Jowett has shown that the combat effectiveness of Chinese forces would also be undermined by lack of food and adequate medical care. Due to a combination of Japanese conquests which captured 40% of China’s agriculture by 1939, as well as logistical issues and government corruption, eventually meant most Chinese soldiers would suffer from poor diet and insufficient calories. Inevitably sickness and disease would become rampant throughout the Chinese armies. For example, in 1938 there were 3000 soldiers treated for dysentery but just two years later this ballooned to 1,500,000.
Many soldiers became so undernourished that simple infections would kill them. This would be exacerbated by poor medical care as there may have been as few as 500 thoroughly trained doctors amongst the hundreds of Chinese divisions in the field. It has been alleged that perhaps 1,500,000 Chinese soldiers died of illness and starvation before even reaching their units!
The Second Sino-Japanese War (1937 Campaign)
“No one starts a war, or rather, no one in his sense ought to do so, without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by the war and how he intends to conduct it.” -Carl Von Clausewitz
As negotiations faltered during July 1937 fighting spread quickly across China. Japan, ignoring Chinese sentiment and potential mission creep, quickly resorted to force in North China. Meanwhile, China united under Chiang Kai-shek’s leadership in theory, but in practice its war effort would prove to be as disjointed as Japan’s. Seeing Japan’s strength and quick advances in the north Chiang gambled on opening a new front in Shanghai closer to his power base where he hoped his best equipped forces, the urban terrain, and international presence would limit Japanese military effectiveness and gain China sympathy. Thus, during 1937 the main focus of fighting between China and Japan were in North China just south of the Great Wall, as well as Shanghai which became the greatest urban battle until Stalingrad.
With one exception, Japan’s campaign in North China during 1937 went very well. This was where Japan’s main interests were. It had strong forces stationed nearby in Korea, Manchuria, and Rehe province, and Chinese forces in the north were not as effective as the KMT armies or others such as the Guangxi Clique. Moreover, the terrain was relatively open which allowed Japanese forces to use their superior conventional and mobile capabilities to their advantage. North China also had most of the country’s industry, and best transportation infrastructure, whereas in South China the terrain was rougher and the transportation infrastructure far less developed.
The Japanese efforts in the north, after quickly overrunning Beijing and Tianjin, were focused on taking major cities, securing the two main north-south railways (Beijing-Wuhan and Tianjin-Nanjing), and destroying Chinese forces. The Japanese also used the westwardly railways in the north to move towards Baotou in Inner Mongolia and towards Taiyuan, the capital of Shanxi province.
While Beijing fell swiftly there was a massacre of over 200 Japanese civilians living in the Tongzhou district by Chinese puppet troops who mutinied against the local Japanese garrison. This incident outraged Japanese public opinion and was used to justify additional advances into China via the pretext of securing Japanese lives and property.
Throughout the latter half of 1937, and early part of 1938, Japanese forces in North China accomplished their objectives and were generally hampered more by logistical and manpower difficulties than Chinese forces. From an operational point of view Japanese advances in the north were not particularly novel as Japan systematically advanced south via the railways and usually used its firepower to smash Chinese forces, or mobility to outflank them, while Chinese resistance was rarely inspiring. Indeed, often Chinese forces deployed their formations in defensive lines, one behind the other for 100s of miles, instead of massing them which allowed the Japanese to use their conventional advantages to defeat them in detail.
One exception was the Battle of Pingxingguan in late September 1937. As Japanese forces moved south into Shanxi province aerial reconnaissance discovered Chinese forces stationed in the Pingxingguan pass that could threaten the rear of their advance. A regimental sized force was sent into the pass to defeat the Chinese forces and take control of both sides of the road. Without scouting the path ahead this force recklessly advanced on a single dirt road surrounded by steep mountainous terrain.
They were punished for their audacity by a combined force of central Chinese divisions, as well as the CCP’s 115th Division of the Eight Route Army commanded by Lin Biao (who would arguably become Mao Zedong’s best general). The Japanese force became stalled as Chiang’s central forces attacked them head on while Lin Biao’s troops set up an ambush which caught two supply convoys headed to reinforce the trapped Japanese troops. In a well executed guerrilla operation, the communists rained down grenades and shot up the convoy with small arms, managing to decimate the column of 150 trucks and wagons, and killing 200 out of 300 of their occupants. The fighting escalated as Japanese commanders sent three regiments to extricate the one sent into the pass and managed to rescue it and withdrew before being overrun.
While this appears as a clear Chinese victory, at best it was a local operational success which did not halt Japanese expansion in the north. In time the CCP would venerate this victory; downplaying, even ignoring, the KMT part in the battle, as well as exaggerating Japanese losses. Indeed, the CCP has claimed at different times the Japanese force ambushed was as big as a brigade, even a division, instead of a few supply columns with less than 500 men. On the other hand, the operation was a successful guerrilla action in its own right. It also highlighted the potential benefits of real coordination between KMT and CCP forces, and was a morale boost in a year of constant defeats for Chinese arms.
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As Japanese forces advanced in North China Chiang Kai-shek opened a new front in Shanghai in August 1937 to divide Japanese efforts, seek international sympathy, and use the topography of the area to fight Japan on better terms than in the north. However, the beginning of the battle was hardly encouraging as Chinese aircraft, attacking the local Japanese Flagship Izumo, accidentally dropped several bombs into Shanghai’s International Settlement. In what became known as “Bloody Saturday” as many as 3000 civilians were killed and wounded while the Izumo was never hit. The Chinese air force, which had already taken terrible losses before the Battle of Shanghai, was eventually worn down by Japan’s considerably stronger airpower throughout subsequent months. According to Håkan Gustavsson, on August 30, 1937 the strength of the Chinese air force was 145 aircraft and by November 11 it had a mere 31 planes left. During the ensuing years the Chinese would be dependent upon Soviet and later American aircraft, and volunteers to rebuild their air force.
The Battle of Shanghai would be a bitter disappointment to China and Japan, though for different reasons. ChiangKai-shek’s initial hope of kicking the Japanese into the sea and securing western intervention failed, whereas Japan’s wish to teach China a lesson at minimal cost proved elusive.
In reality, the battle was a meat grinder that showed little sophistication by either combatant. Both sides kept feeding in troops, ultimately 700,000 Chinese and 300,000 Japanese, launched many costly frontal assaults, and advanced slowly. Japan eventually won due to superior firepower, their better training which produced less casualties, and an amphibious landing late in the battle in Hangzhou Bay that outflanked Chiang’s troops which retreated in disarray. Considering Japan had done such a flanking movement in 1932 in Shanghai at the same location, waited three months during the current battle to do so again, and that the Chinese failed to anticipate it, suggests the leaders on both sides were were not at their best during the battle.
Afterwards Chiang Kai-shek admitted he should have retreated earlier in the battle which probably would have saved many of his forces. Chinese casualties were potentially between 187,000-250,000 versus perhaps 40,000 for Japan, setting a pattern of disproportionate casualties between both nations that would occur frequently throughout the war.
However, regardless of how messy the battle was Japan won while Chiang Kai-shek’s elite German trained forces, along with much of its heavy artillery, was severely eroded. It has also been suggested that over half of the officers under Chiang’s direct control became casualties. The road to Nanjing was now open.
Nanjing was the KMT capital and many Japanese officers in the field, in line with Clausewitzian theory, saw it as the political center of gravity in China whose capture could end the war. On the other hand, many politicians and generals in Tokyo wanted to end the fighting and prevent the conflict from expanding. Perhaps unsurprisingly rogue elements at the tip of the spear fighting in China got their way just as other ones in 1928, 1931 and 1937 did.
No matter how much Japan’s Army General Staff and politicians wanted to cool tensions, these rogue elements fell back upon another Clausewitzian prerogative, Auftragstaktik (often referred to as “mission-type tactics”) which gave significant initiative to commanders in the field. Ostensibly they exercised this to protect their troops but in reality it was used to justify further attacks and territorial expansion. Rapid Japanese advances and the disintegration of Chinese forces quickly motivated senior Japanese commanders such as the Sinophile General Matsui Iwane, who commanded the Shanghai front, to sanction an advance on Nanjing.
The Rape of Nanjing
“The nationalist not only does not disapprove of atrocities committed by his own side, but he has a remarkable capacity for not even hearing about them.” -George Orwell
Although war crimes and atrocities were hardly uncommon throughout Japan’s imperial history in general, and World War 2 in particular, the Rape of Nanjing holds a particularly infamous place regarding cruelty, ruthlessness and senseless deaths. It is to Japan’s imperial legacy what Auschwitz is to Nazi Germany’s. Along with Japan’s use of comfort women (essentially sex slaves), and Unit 731, which created biological and chemical weapons and performed exceedingly inhumane experiments on thousands of people, the Rape of Nanjing still shocks those who research it decades years later. It is hard for many to grasp how a civilized nation like Japan, with its emphasis on education and advanced technology, along with its polite and cultured populace, once produced such dark blights in human history.
In the weeks after the fall of Shanghai the Japanese army force marched roughly 200 miles towards Nanjing, looting and committing atrocities along the way. Although Chiang Kai-shek knew the capital could not be defended it was decided for political and symbolic reasons to mount a token defense. This was further complicated as he kept changing his mind between limited resistance and asking the garrison to fight to the death. This, along with the deprived, angry state of Japanese soldiers who reached the city, the violent training and racist indoctrination they received, as well as apathetic discipline on the part of their officers made the Rape of Nanjing all but inevitable.
After the Chinese garrison at Nanjing refused a demand to surrender, Japanese forces launched an aggressive assault that quickly seized the city, along with thousands of POWs. The garrison leader at Nanjing, General Tang Shengzhi, faced the unenviable choice of either continuing resistance which would have led to the slaughter of his whole force, or abandoning the city and being blamed for its capture. Faced with the inevitable fall of Nanjing Tang decided to retreat but this was not communicated effectively to his troops which resulted in widespread panic, disorder, and tragedy. While his position was understandable it was less excusable that he quickly fled and abandoned the soldiers and civilians in Nanjing. Indeed, in the chaotic conditions that ensued countless Chinese were crushed during stampedes (such as at the Xiaguan Gate) or drowned in the Yangtze River while trying to escape. As horrible as this was it was only the beginning of the hell the people of Nanjing would experience.
While some Japanese soldiers and officers showed mercy and compassion they were in the minority. The first wave of atrocities was directed towards Chinese prisoners of war. This was facilitated not only by an order made in the name of Prince Asaka Yasuhiko, the Emperor’s Uncle, to kill all POWs, but also Emperor Hirohito himself having ratified a proposal by his army to remove constraints of international law regarding the treatment of Chinese prisoners. The next few days saw thousands of Chinese POWs murdered via gunfire, bayonet training, decapitation via swords, drownings, etc. Japanese forces also looted businesses and homes, partly due to their lack of supplies, but also burned countless of them down afterwards.
Other atrocities soon spread across the city and spared neither young or old, women or children. These crimes were notable not only for the sheer number of victims but also the variety of sick means employed. Plenty of excellent accounts of these crimes exist, particularly The Rape of Nanking by Iris Chang, but for the sake of brevity a few details will be produced here. This included burying people alive or attacking them with army dogs, again decapitation via sword or death by bayonet training, machine gunning and burning people alive, forcing others into frozen ponds to die via exposure, etc.
Arguably it was the widespread rape of females from children to the elderly that has shocked people who have studied the Rape of Nanjing the most. Perhaps tens of 1000s were violated, pregnant women were not spared, and apparently one woman was raped 37 times. Sadly, this was similar to the experiences of countless comfort women Japan enslaved across Asia who were raped repeatedly in brothels set up by the Japanese army.
The few protests against such crimes made by Japanese officials, such as General Matsui Iwane, were mostly ignored or even mocked by the perpetrators. Ironically, Matsui would be executed for the atrocities committed by his soldiers in Nanjing after the war.
As for cold statistics, the death toll in theory ranges from 0 if you believe ultranationalist, far right Japanese entities that ignore overwhelming evidence, to well over 300,000 if you accept figures produced by the Chinese Communist Party without question. Sensible historians, western and Japanese alike, generally suggest more realistic figures between 40,000-200,000 but most likely above 70,000. Either way, the Rape of Nanjing comprised cruel, wanton, and unnecessary war crimes that more than anything else proved Japan was not interested in freeing Asia for the Asians, but would tolerate nothing less than the total subjugation of all races under its imperial jackboot.
Whether the Rape of Nanjing was premeditated to cow Chinese resistance or simply the culminating point of Japanese aggression is debatable. What is not debatable are the short and long-term results which followed. In the short term the sheer horrors at Nanjing convinced the Chinese that Japan’s objectives and conduct in China were anything but noble, and helped unify most Chinese (whether KMT, CCP, warlord or the average person) under the simple goal of resisting Japan to the bitter end. It also convinced the western powers that China was the victim in the war and that Japanese Imperialism was far from pleasant. Events such as this, and Japan’s unprovoked attacks on the USS Panay and HMS Ladybird in late 1937, showed the outside world sooner or later Japan would probably have to be confronted.
The long-term effects would prove to be more controversial as America, Japan, and Mao Zedong’s Communist China chose to downplay, or ignore, the Rape of Nanjing due to realpolitikal considerations after World War 2. It was only after the end of the Cold War and the publication of books highlighting the Rape of Nanjing, that this sad episode was exposed more fully to the world. Despite this, the legacy of Nanjing continues to poison relations between China and Japan.
Some of this is due to the actions of the CCP, which in the past cynically downplayed Nanjing to improve relations with Japan, but changed its tack in modern times to occasionally whip up anti-Japanese sentiment among the Chinese people. However, Japan’s tendency to often minimize the Rape of Nanjing, as well as more nationalist, right wing elements of Japanese society denying it outright, is perhaps more reprehensible. While such deniers often misinterpret facts, or conjure up falsehoods to further their aims, they tend to remain silent regarding the mountain of evidence regarding the Rape of Nanjing. These include Imperial Japan’s government and army reports, the diaries of individual Japanese soldiers, the considerable documentation by John Rabe and many foreigners in Nanjing at the time, and even Japanese contemporary newspapers that corroborates the tragic events that engulfed Nanjing in darkness more then 80 years ago.
The Second Sino-Japanese War (1938 Campaign)
“What is essential in war is victory, not prolonged operations.” -Sun Tzu
Despite failing to crush Chinese resistance with a few decisive efforts in 1937 Japan pursued the same Clausewitzian model in 1938. In line with this, Japan sought out Chinese military, logistical, and economic centers of gravity to undermine China’s ability to wage war and/or crush the Chinese will to resist. These included China’s field armies, the railroad hub at Xuzhou, the Chinese center of resistance at Wuhan farther up the Yangtze River, and the port of Guangzhou in the south of the country.
At the beginning of the campaign season in 1938 Japan held considerable territory in North China and between the regions of Shanghai and Nanjing, but these were separated by Chinese territories and armies. The first priority was to connect Japan’s northern armies with their southern equivalents and the spring saw a major effort to do so. A key factor in this campaign, as in others, was the control of railways. Japan managed to take the major north/southbound rail links in North China from mid-1937 to early 1938, in part due to weaker Chinese forces stationed there that often performed poorly versus those who had fought at Shanghai. In fact, Chiang Kai-shek made an example (as Voltaire once said “pour encourager les autres”) of the warlord of Shandong Province, Han Fuju, who had deserted and ran away with the provincial treasury, via execution with a bullet to the head.
Despite these setbacks, Chiang, along with warlord factions such as those from Guangxi province under the competent leadership of Li Zongren and Bai Chongxi, tried stopping Japan from advancing farther into China. This led to the Xuzhou campaign in the spring of 1938 to seize the vital railway hub at Xuzhou and unify Japan’s armies in China. However, during this campaign the Japanese suffered a surprise rebuff at the Battle of Taierzhuang, a city roughly 13 miles northwest of Xuzhou.
The battle began in mid-March 1938 as two Japanese columns advanced on Taierzhuang from the north and east. The Japanese army had grown accustomed to defeating significantly larger Chinese forces, who were often passive, and probably expected the same would occur again. However, this time Chinese forces were well led, aggressive, and fought stubbornly. Part of this may have been threats from above against Chinese officers that they would suffer the same fate as Hans Fuju if they failed or retreated. Either way, crack Chinese troops defeated the Japanese columns one after the other and forced two divisions to retreat. This was aided by attacks on Japanese supply lines, but the battle was savage with night fighting, hand to hand combat, and Japanese tanks knocked out in the dozens.
In early April, the remaining Japanese, having run out of ammunition, retreated through a small corridor and left their heavy equipment and dead soldiers behind. Casualties ranged between 8000-20,000 for the Japanese and probably 20,000 for the Chinese, including nine dead generals. Summing up Taierzhuang, Edward Drea suggested “the battle illustrated the dangers of overextended smaller forces relying on aggressiveness and offensive spirit to defeat a larger, determined opponent.” Taierzhuang was the first time Japanese forces retreating during the war and was a major propaganda, and moral, coup for the Chinese who were in desperate need of a victory. It was also a humiliating experience for the Imperial Japanese Army that prided itself on refusing to retreat and fighting to the death rather than surrendering.
However, this victory was short lived as Japan reorganized and concentrated 200,000 soldiers to advance on Xuzhou. Falling back on its advantages in firepower and mobility the Japanese army planned to trap the approximately 300,000 Chinese soldiers in 50 odd divisions (often the size of western brigades) in the area. Throughout April 1938 the Japanese encircled vast Chinese forces and finally took Xuzhou, along with apparently only seven out its 20,000 original inhabitants. Despite its hopes of producing a battle of annihilation the Japanese army’s logistics broke down and it did not have enough troops to seal the encirclement. As such, 200,000 of 300,000 Chinese troops managed to escape, usually retreating at night and benefiting from a sandstorm and fog.
Having failed to stop Japan’s offensives in North China, along with the loss of Shanghai and Nanjing, and now the fall of Xuzhou that allowed the junction of Japan’s armies in China, things appeared grim for the Chinese cause. Besides losing many major cities and industrial and coastal areas, Chiang Kai-shek had also failed to motivate foreign powers to intervene in the war. After a year of stubborn resistance China kept fighting, but it was still fighting alone. However, for the Japanese victory seemed as elusive as ever and now saw Wuhan as the next obvious center of gravity for the Chinese war effort.
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After the defeat at Xuzhou, Chinese forces retreated to the city of Wuhan farther up the Yangtze River. Wuhan, the scene of the Wuchang Uprising in October 1911 that led to the fall of the Qing dynasty, and later became infamous as ground zero for the COVID-19 pandemic, was the de facto headquarters of Chinese resistance in 1938. Wuhan was a vital economic and logistical hub which crisscrossed important north/south, east/west railways and river communications in China. By taking Wuhan the Japanese could potentially split China in half. Chiang Kai-shek and his armies were keen to hold onto the city after the loss of most of the coast. However, after the Xuzhou campaign it seemed as though Japan was close to seizing another important railway junction at Zhengzhou to the north of Wuhan which offered a shortcut to the city.
Desperate to prevent this, in June 1938 Chiang Kai-shek ordered his soldiers to breech several dikes on the Yellow River to flood the area and stop the Japanese advance short of Zhengzhou. This was done quickly but tragically the KMT forces did not alert local populations in time so while the Japanese advance was halted it also resulted in horrendous civilian casualties; between 400,000-900,000 deaths and 3-5 million refugees according to various sources. The flood would also contribute to the Henan Famine later in the war that killed at least one million people.
Some scholars have argued Japan had not been planning to advance towards Wuhan from the north at the time, in which case the flood was pointless. Others suggest the flood merely delayed the fall of Wuhan for a few months and was not worth the terrible human cost. Either way, the breeching of the Yellow River dikes was initiated by Chiang Kai-shek and killed more Chinese civilians than the Rape of Nanjing. Ironically, even the Japanese regime, never reluctant to engage in bloodshedding, described the Yellow River flood as “ruthless contempt for human life” according to Peter Harmsen.
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The summer and fall of 1938 saw a long running battle between Japan and China over the city of Wuhan. This involved a series of engagements where the Japanese advanced along the Yangtze River valley, fighting the Chinese over forts and cities on the way to the city. The campaign was hard fought, often attritional, conducted in stifling hot weather, and saw significant instances of disease including dysentery, malaria, and cholera. The fighting generally consisted of desperate stands by Chinese forces who defended points along the Yangtze River and elsewhere. Despite the formers’ courage and occasional counterattacks the Japanese inevitably succeeded through flanking movements or superior firepower via artillery, airpower, and naval units once the tide of the Yangtze rose enough to allow access up the river.
Japanese ships were also instrumental in moving up forces and supplying their advances which eased Japan’s tenuous logistics considerably. The Japanese even resorted to gas, often referred to by the more innocent sounding “special smoke,” during the campaign. According to Yoshiaki Yoshimi and Seiya Matsuno, Emperor Hirohito sanctioned the use of chemical weapons nearly 400 times during the Wuhan campaign, belying the idea he was a powerless, innocent bystander in the conflict.
The campaign began in June 1938 with probably 400,000 Japanese troops against 800,000-1,000,000 Chinese and started off poorly for China with Anqing taken after a single day of fighting. The subsequent struggle at Madang was no more impressive as most of the Chinese officers were away at a banquet when Japan attacked, and the city fell after being surrounded and bombarded with gas. The considerable defenses constructed to protect Madang from a frontal assault played no part in the fight as the Japanese simply landed upstream from them.
Chinese resistance improved in early July when the defenders of Hukou held out for five days. Jiujiang, the last major river port before Wuhan, also fought on for five days in late July but despite determined resistance the Chinese leadership was disorganized and badly coordinated their forces. Perhaps worse, the abrupt retreat of Chinese forces left the local civilians defenseless and Japan perpetrated what has been called a “mini-Nanjing” by killing many of the males, raping many women, and burning villages and local urban areas.
For the next month Japan’s offensive was stalled in the vicinity of Ruichang thanks to improved Chinese resistance while disease ravaged both sides. The battle went back and forth with the Chinese making the enemy pay heavily in blood for each mile they advanced. Meanwhile, to the north of the Yangtze the Japanese were doing little better due to more impressive Chinese resistance, combined with rugged terrain. South of the river an offensive towards Nanchang stalled, so the Japanese there turned back to support the struggle at Ruichang after becoming overextended and running low on supplies.
In fact, Japanese logistics during the Wuhan campaign often broke down thanks to bad roads, rough terrain, and ever extending lines of communication. An effective Chinese counterattack forced the Japanese to bring in reinforcements from other regions which finally helped them take Ruichang and continue the advance. However, during September they were again bogged down at Tianjiazhen, the last major position on the Yangtze before Wuhan, by impressive defenses constructed by thousands of coolies. Tianjiazhen was only overcome by large quantities of gas at the end of the month. At the same time, Japanese forces in the north finally broke through and seized Xinyang on the Beijing-Wuhan Railway which greatly compromised the defense of Wuhan.
By mid-October it was clear Wuhan would fall and Chiang Kai-shek, who had flown into many battlefields throughout the campaign, left Wuhan just hours before its capture. He also sensibly ordered his forces to withdrew from the city rather than fighting a pointless battle as at Nanjing in 1937. The Japanese occupied Wuhan in late October 1938 and showed more discipline this time by preventing significant atrocities and quickly restoring order. Estimates regarding the losses suffered during the Wuhan campaign vary widely, with at least one author, Stephen R. MacKinnon, claiming the combined total could be as high as 1.2 million. Perhaps other figures suggesting approximately 140,000 casualties (a big proportion from illness and disease) for Japan and over half a million losses for China are more realistic.
Meanwhile, in mid-October Japanese forces also landed in South China near Guangzhou, one of China’s main cities and a major supply route of foreign aid for its war effort. Unfortunately for China most of the best Guangdong units had been deployed north to fight for Wuhan and the local leadership was generally ineffective and corrupt. For example, Governor Wu Tieh-cheng and others had stolen 40% of the funds set aside for munitions. Japan also bribed Chinese junior officers and local fishermen which compromised the defense of Guangzhou.
Unsurprisingly, this allowed the Japanese to advance quickly despite the considerable Chinese fortifications in the area and terrain that favored the defenders. Thus, the local Chinese forces fled, leaving their heavy weapons behind and abandoning Guangzhou which fell on October 21, 1938. The capture of Guangzhou was so easy for Japan it initially secured it with tanks without infantry support. Luckily for the inhabitants, the Japanese forces, under the command of Lt. General Andō Rikichi, treated civilians better than elsewhere in China and even made earnest efforts to avoid alienating western interests in the area.
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China suffered another calamity in November 1938 when the city of Changsha, the capital of Hunan province, was put to the torch on the orders of Chiang Kai-shek to prevent the Japanese gaining anything if they captured it. Tragically, this could have been avoided as intelligence suggesting Japanese troops were advancing on the city proved to be false. Perhaps two-thirds to 90% of Changsha’s buildings were scorched and between 10,000-30,000 people perished (including many wounded soldiers unable to flee) for no benefit to the Chinese cause. It proved to be a bitter endnote to a year that saw Chinese fortunes deteriorate and little indication the outside world would intervene on China’s behalf. In the aftermath of this folly, Chiang Kai-shek cynically had three local officials executed as scapegoats but protected Zhang Zhizhong, the general in command, who was a crony of his.
However, while Japanese victories gave them additional cities and strategic points and pushed the KMT’s influence from most of the coast, it did not result in the overall destruction of the Chinese forces or bring China to the negotiation table. In fact, the end of 1938 saw Japan’s efforts to use quick, decisive battles, and seizing vital objectives, to finish the war end in failure. Like many times before and afterwards Japan had won decisive military engagements, and seized important political, economic, and logistical objectives, but ultimate victory proved elusive.
Despite identifying many centers of gravity in accordance with Clausewitzian doctrine, Japan had failed to identify the key ones: Chinese political and domestic will to resist. In order to end the war Japan either had to force the KMT regime to come to terms (as Chiang Kai-shek and his forces were the de facto power base of Chinese resistance) or convince the Chinese masses to accept Japanese rule. Japan’s cruelty, such as the Rape of Nanjing, along with its inability to show charity or restraint towards the Chinese masses, effectively lost any chance to win over the Chinese people who arguably would have been happy just to be left alone.
Meanwhile, Japan’s outrageous conditions for peace, and foolish policy after 1938 of refusing to parley with Chiang Kai-shek, made a compromise peace all but impossible. Though 1937-1938 saw major campaigns and battles, countless territory taken and heavy casualties for both sides, the war was far from over. With hindsight it had only begun.
The Second Sino-Japanese War (1939 Campaign)
“There is no instance of a nation benefiting from prolonged warfare.” -Sun Tzu
The nature of the Second Sino-Japanese War changed considerably in 1939. Having failed to deliver a knockout blow, Japan pursued a multipronged strategy to end the war by more indirect means. This developed over subsequent years and eventually expanded the war across Asia and the Pacific, sealing Japan’s fate.
Firstly, Japan continued to pursue battlefield engagements, if only to degrade Chinese forces and seize important strategic points. In 1939 this included the conquest of Hainan Island, an offensive to take Nanchang (the capital of Jiangxi province), an attempt to take Changsha, and an operation in Guangxi province to limit foreign aid to China from French Indochina. Late in the year the Chinese would also go onto the offensive during the winter of 1939/1940.
Secondly, in 1939 Japan launched a strategic bombing campaign against Chongqing, China’s new provisional capital, and other cities to terrorize the Chinese into surrendering. Much like German efforts during the Blitz, or the Anglo-American bomber offensive against Germany, it caused significant destruction and loss of life, made the bombed population hate the attackers, but failed to cow China into submission. Japan’s bombing of Chinese cities in 1939 was the first major strategic bombing campaign in history designed to cripple domestic will to end a war.
Unlike bombed cities in Europe from Warsaw, Rotterdam, London, Coventry, Belgrade, Stalingrad, to Hamburg, Berlin and Dresden arguably few people, even historians, remember Chongqing or the Chinese cities devastated by Japanese bombers. Ironically, the American firebombing of Japanese cities such as Tokyo in March 1945, and the nuking of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945 are more remembered, criticized, and often taken out of context in relation to the war in China, Asia and the Pacific.
Thirdly, Japanese leaders also pursued political and diplomatic means to end the war or weaken China. As noted before, they discarded Chiang Kai-shek as a potential negotiation partner, failing to realize he was the only person strong enough to make peace with Japan. Instead, Japan cultivated the disillusioned Wang Jingwei, a high ranking KMT politician and Chiang’s long-standing rival, to lead a puppet regime in Nanjing as an alternative to Chiang’s government. Japan would create similar collaborating regimes across China, along with recruiting 100s of 1000s of Chinese puppet troops to help garrison occupied territories and offset Japan’s limited manpower. The Japanese would also use diplomatic means, often coercive, to cut China off from international and material support. All these initiatives will be discussed in detail later.
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The main military operations in China during 1939 included Japan’s seizure of Hainan Island, the Battle of Nanchang, the First Battle of Changsha, the Battle of South Guangxi, and the Chinese Winter offensive which overlapped into early 1940.
Despite occupying much of the Chinese coast and seizing Guangzhou in late 1938 Japan was unable to shut off all foreign aid to China via coastal routes due to gaps in its naval blockade. Japanese landings at other Chinese ports in 1938-1939 such as Xiamen, Fuzhou, and Shantou alleviated this some degree but not decisively. Thus, Japan decided to take Hainan Island south of the Chinese mainland to strengthen its blockade, and gain airfields to help future operations in South China.
As such, Japanese forces, roughly the size of two regiments and two tank companies, backed by significant naval forces including the aircraft carrier Kaga attacked the island in February 1939. They landed unopposed on the northern coast of Hainan Island on February 9, 1939, followed by landings at the capital Haikou on the 10th and Sanya at the southern tip of the island on the 11th. Few Chinese soldiers were deployed to the island and the local militia forces were quickly defeated by the Japanese invaders who secured their objectives within a week, built up naval and airbases and deployed 100 warplanes to aid their efforts in South China.
Despite these successes, the Japanese would be annoyed by an insurgency conducted by communists and local Hlai people on the island, while Japan’s blockade remained incomplete as considerable material aid continued flowing to China via Hong Kong and French Indochina. The seizure of Hainan Island created further tensions between Japan and the western powers which only motivated the latter to increase their support to China. The gunning down of roughly 150 civilians rounded up in the city of Wenchang also did not improve relations between the locals and the Japanese.
Chinese forces made a better account of themselves during the Battle of Nanchang. Nanchang was a vital rail junction, a supply center which linked several Chinese war zones, and offered Japan an airbase to further project airpower across China. The Chinese with 230,000 soldiers and guerrilla fighters significantly outnumbered the Japanese, but the latter had far more firepower including considerable airpower and artillery, over 100 tanks, and poison gas. The offensive began on March 20, 1939, with the largest artillery barrage of the entire Second Sino-Japanese War which helped Japanese forces cross the Xiu River north of the city and create bridges to deploy tanks and larger forces to the other side. By March 27 the Japanese took Nanchang after brutal house to house fighting and hundreds of thousands of Chinese refugees fled the area.
However, after some Japanese forces left to conduct operations elsewhere the Chinese believed they could retake Nanchang and throughout late April to early May they launched numerous attacks to do so. These enjoyed some success when they retook Nanchang airport on April 26, but the offensive soon stalled and as at Taierzhuang Chiang Kai-shekdemanded victory by declaring “if this goal is not accomplished, all commanders above the rank of brigadier will be punished.” Despite Japan bringing in reinforcements and hitting the Chinese with significant airpower and gas, the latter pushed forward despite heavy losses using human wave tactics.
By early May it appeared China would retake Nanchang but with the sudden death of a Chinese divisional commander, Chen Anbao, and another one wounded, Liu Yujing, the momentum collapsed, and a displeased Chiang ended the offensive. Despite coming close to victory the Chinese suffered disproportionate casualties, possibly 32,000 versus as little as 2200 for Japan.
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One major success for China’s military in 1939 was the First Battle of Changsha. Changsha was an important source of raw materials and rice, and guarded the entrance into Sichuan province where Chongqing was located. Perhaps more importantly it was one of the few remaining Chinese railway junctions under KMT control, vital for shipping foreign aid and weapons from the Burma Road, French Indochina, and Hong Kong to Chinese armies. Besides this, Japan sought a significant operational victory by targeting the 30 Chinese divisions in the area for destruction. Japanese leaders also hoped for an easy victory to restore the army’s morale after its defeat by the Soviets at Khalkhin Gol in the summer of 1939 (which will be discussed later) and would also coincide with the establishment of Wang Jingwei’s puppet regime at Nanjing to undermine Chiang Kai-shek.
The plan involved the Japanese 11th Army under Lt. General Okamura Yasuji, with 120,000 soldiers, advancing upon Changsha from three different directions during mid-September to crush the Chinese forces (who outnumbered the Japanese perhaps two or three to one) and take the city. However, in this case the Chinese commanders, Generals Chen Cheng and Xue Yue, devised a trap by avoiding a frontal assault, allowing the Japanese to approach Changsha, and then launching strong counterattacks. To facilitate this, three defensive lines were constructed on the approaches to the city manned by a delaying force, while other Chinese formations and guerrillas would attack the enemy’s lines of communication and hit the Japanese flanks. To further frustrate Japanese logistics, the Chinese also cleared the countryside to deny the former supplies and evacuated the local population.
The Japanese inflicted significant losses on the Chinese (but failed to encircle them) then continued their advance towards Changsha. As they approached the suburbs, the Chinese launched well timed counterattacks that hit the Japanese from all sides and cut off several of their divisions. These forces, suffering from considerable Chinese artillery fire from the Tamoshan heights, managed to break out of the encirclement, but took significant casualties and retreated to the starting points for the offensive. Highlighting the operation in Kangzhan, Leland Ness comments that “Chen Cheng had given a textbook demonstration of how to use a force superior in numbers but inferior in equipment and training to win a victory via mobility and aggressive action.”
The battle was the first instance of a major Chinese city resisting a Japanese attack and Changsha would witness three more battles during the war. A later account of the battle by Tobe Ryōichi, which is otherwise generally sound, suggested Japan could have taken the city but were prevented from doing this by limits placed by the Imperial General Headquarters. However, this appears dubious given the strong Chinese counterattacks that drove the attackers back, and many previous instances of Japanese commanders in the field ignoring orders from above.
As for casualties, these are difficult to confirm given wide discrepancies amongst sources although it is likely the Japanese did not suffer between 30,000-40,000 losses as sometimes cited. On the other hand, it is questionable if they suffered as little as 3300 casualties put forth by other accounts. Chinese casualties have been estimated between 20,000-48,000 with the higher figure seemingly more credible.
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Having previously taken Guangzhou and Hainan Island to consolidate its blockade of the Chinese coast Japan launched an operation in November 1939 to take Nanning, and the Kunlun Pass, in Guangxi province to cut the supply route into South China from French Indochina. Japanese intelligence believed 30% of foreign aid to China came through this area so on November 15, 1939, two Japanese divisions landed in Qinzhou Bay in South China. This offensive took China’s leadership, that was currently preparing its Winter Offensive, by surprise and Japan advanced over 100 miles in rough terrain and took Nanning (capital of Guangxi Province), and the Kunlun Pass in ten days.
In reaction, Chiang Kai-shek sent some of his best forces, including the fully mechanized 200th Division, the 1st Honor Division (named so due to being officered by men who had been wounded in battle), as well as a large number of tanks and modern German 105 MM howitzers. These were veteran forces, had spent a month training in combined operations, and their morale was high as they moved to retake Kunlun Pass from the Japanese. This would be one of the few times Japan did not have a major technological/firepower advantage over the Chinese, but the former had significantly fortified the pass and would not give up easily.
The battle for the Kunlun Pass began December 18, 1939, as two elite Chinese divisions attacked the pass head on while a third division moved south to cut off the line of retreat for the Japanese back to Nanning. While Chinese forces coordinated infantry, tanks, and artillery efficiently they had also brought along many anti-aircraft batteries that for once prevented Japanese airpower from influencing the fighting. The Chinese took the pass within hours, but the Japanese rallied and retook it the next day. As both sides brought in reinforcements the battle swayed back and forth, and over the next week the pass changed hands four times with the Chinese finally prevailing.
Losses were high, including an entire Japanese battalion wiped out, while the overall Japanese commander, Major General Nakamura Masao, was killed in action. Impressed by the Chinese conduct during the battle the general had noted in his diary that Chinese fighting skills were better here than Soviet forces had shown in Manchuria in 1939.
The fighting finally petered out in early January 1940 with China retaining the Kunlun Pass while the Japanese held onto Nanning. While the Battle of South Guangxi was thus an operational stalemate it was also a Chinese strategic victory as the supply route from French Indochina was not cut off and simply moved westward from its original position. On the other hand, by sending their best forces to Guangxi province the Chinese were unable to use them for the upcoming Winter Offensive which would water down its punch significantly. Either way, the battle highlighted the potential of modern Chinese forces if Chiang Kai-shek had been able to consolidate his rule over China and had more time to rearm against Japan. Casualties may have ranged between 14,000-15,600 for China versus approximately 10,000 for Japan, including a mere 102 captured.
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In mid-December 1939 the Chinese launched a Winter Offensive across several war zones. Encouraged by the victory at Changsha and the Soviet destruction of a significant Japanese force at Khalkhin Gol during the summer, Chiang Kai-shekhoped his armies would destroy potentially weakened Japanese forces and gain important strategic results. The most ambitious objectives were to retake important cities including Kaifeng, Jiujiang, and especially Wuhan, the last of which seemed vulnerable jutting forth in a salient. Failing that, the offensive would attempt to wear down Japanese forces, liberate Chinese territory, and show Japan and the world there was plenty of fight left in China.
Japanese forces in China were widely dispersed, had not adopted defense in depth, and had no strategic reserve. The Chinese hoped by launching attacks across the country Japan would not be able to transfer forces from quiet sectors to threatened areas as they had done so in the past. Additionally, Japanese forces were expected to encounter logistical issues due to Chinese efforts at cutting off railways and roads, as well as attempts to interdict supplies coming up the Yangtze River. On the other hand, the wisdom of launching such ambitious attacks has been questioned given that KMT forces had lost most of their heavy weapons in 1937-1939 and thus began operations with mostly infantry with light weaponry.
The offensive began in December 1939 when approximately 500,000 Chinese soldiers, from 70-80 divisions (often no larger than western sized brigades), attacked simultaneously across multiple war zones and continued until April1940. The first phase from mid-December to late January saw the Chinese on the offensive and initially they inflicted significant losses on the Japanese and retook some territory (although not Wuhan as hoped). The attacks, many of which utilized night fighting to close in on enemy positions, shocked the Japanese who did not believe Chinese forces had the capacity to launch such an offensive due to the beatings they had taken since 1937. As Lt. General Okamura reported “we have never seen the Chinese army undertake such a large-scale and determined attack.”
However, the momentum soon waned due to logistical and command issues on the Chinese side, inadequate coordination between Chinese war zones, and some forces showing less enthusiasm in sustaining operations than others. To be fair, many Chinese forces knew how costly it would be to attack Japanese forces who enjoyed superior training and weaponry. In North China, Yan Xishan, the warlord of Shanxi province, even attacked the CCP instead of the Japanese after he made an accommodation with the latter in late 1939. As noted earlier, the Japanese offensive in Guangxi province in late 1939 also deprived the Winter Offensive of some of China’s best units.
Richard B. Frank observed Chiang Kai-shek was disappointed by the performance of his forces with him issuing “harsh denunciations of several commanders who retreated at the approach of the Japanese or who had tendered a resignation rather than lead their troops into battle. He also condemned the pernicious effects on morale of widespread smuggling and gambling.” Hans Van de Ven has also pointed out the offensive occurred after a major part of the KMT forces were retrained and equipped with new weapons, and once the offensive failed it was unlikely Chiang’s forces would be able to be significantly built up again.
Indeed, the heavy casualties taken by Chiang Kai-shek’s forces since 1937, including the disastrous battles over Shanghai, Wuhan, and now the Winter Offensive, continuously weakened his armies. Chiang, as well as the Japanese, were hardly ignorant of this reality. In February 1940, Chiang noted the Winter Offensive had significantly lowered the morale of his soldiers and a Japanese intelligence report in 1941 suggested the fighting efficiency of Chinese soldiers had declined 30% from 1940. Over subsequent years, further battles, especially Japan’s Ichigo Offensive in 1944, would tilt the balance between Chiang Kai-shek’s forces, and that of the CCP’s. This would result in tragic consequences for the KMT regime on the Chinese mainland after the war.
Unsurprisingly, the second part of the campaign from late January to April 1940 saw the Japanese, having regrouped and survived the initial attacks, counterattack and retake most of the territory they lost. Ultimately, the Winter Offensive did not accomplish any notable strategic, or operational, results but did show Chinese determination and had a profound psychological affect on the Japanese who seemed no closer to ending the war in their favor. Again, another strategically inconclusive campaign in China had little to show but severe casualties, which arguably ranged between 70,000-150,000 losses for China compared to 20,000-50,000 for Japan.
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Japan first began a sustained strategic bombing campaign against China in the spring of 1939. It focused predominately upon the new center of Chinese resistance in Sichuan province, especially Chongqing, in an attempt to terrorize the civilian population and force Chiang Kai-shek’s regime to come to terms. Besides targeting cities such as Chongqing, Chengdu, Changsha, Kunming and Henyang the Japanese also tried interdicting foreign supplies by bombing the Soviet aid corridor through Gansu province and the Hanoi-Yunnan rail line. Much like American aerial efforts to cut the Ho Chi Minh Trail decades later during the Vietnam War this had limited effect.
However, the bombing of cities and towns often limited the operational maneuverability of Chinese forces which forced them to move soldiers and supplies by night. Between early 1939 to the fall of 1941, when Japan withdrew a disproportionate amount of its airpower from China to attack the western powers in Southeast Asia, Chongqing was bombed nearly 150 times. At least 10,000 Chinese were killed, much of the city was in ruins, and the population constantly sought shelter in bunkers underground or those cut into the surrounding rocky terrain.
Unlike strategic bombing campaigns in Europe during World War 2 where the British and Germans took a considerable toll on enemy bombers the Chinese had far less planes, anti-aircraft capabilities, and technology to significantly punish the Japanese raiders. On the one hand, Japan initially lost many bombers due to the lack of fighter escorts because of the limited range of Japanese fighters. Faulty armor protection for the bombers also saw many explode in flames when fuel tanks were hit. However, with the later addition of forward aerial bases, better bombers, and especially the introduction of the excellent Zero fighter that outmatched Chinese aircraft, meant it became increasingly difficult for China to contest Japanese air raids.
Indeed, apparently from 1938-1941 Chinese anti-aircraft guns only shot down 15 Japanese bombers and damaged 85 others. Likewise, after Japan introduced the Zero, which mauled scores of enemy fighters in aerial engagements, Chinese planes were temporarily swept from the skies so the latter adopted a more defensive posture and tended to wait for favorable conditions before confronting Japanese bombers. By the end of 1940 there were apparently only 65 Chinese fighters left in the country!
Despite this, Japanese efforts to bomb Chongqing were frustrated by weather conditions such as fog, a sophisticated (if not technologically advanced) early warning system created by the Chinese, by the construction of countless bomb shelters, and Japan having far less bombers than the British and Americans would later enjoy as the war continued. Thus, while Japan continuously mounted larger raids during bomber offensives such as Operation 101 in 1940 and Operation 102 in 1941, Japanese efforts were unsuccessful at interdicting foreign aid, cow the Chinese populace, or convince Chiang Kai-shek to negotiate. As such, the first long term attempt by a nation to win a war by strategic bombing failed, but this would not deter the British from trying the same in Europe, for America to do so in Vietnam, or Israel against Hezbollah on several occasions.
However, the human cost was not insignificant. During the first major attacks against Chongqing in 1939, coinciding with the 20th anniversary of China’s May Fourth Movement, 1000s of civilians were killed and much of the city burned due to most buildings being made of wood and bamboo (presaging the widespread destruction American incendiary bombs would inflict upon Japanese cities later in the war). During another air raid on Chongqing perhaps thousands died of suffocation and trampling in an overcrowded bomb shelter.
Japan also targeted Chiang Kai-shek, including a raid on his hometown of Xikou that killed his first wife, as well as an assassination attempt in late August 1941 by bombers targeting a military conference he was attending. While Chiang survived the assault, two of his guards were killed and he wrote in his diary that “he felt the immense shocks of the bombing and suffering of the people who experienced the torment not just day and night but over four years.”
In terms of actual bomb tonnage dropped, as well as the casualties and destruction this caused, Japan’s bombing of Chinese cities appears limited versus later British and American air raids in the war. Most infamously, a few killed up to 40,000 civilians in Hamburg, 30,000 in Dresden, and incredibly 90,000 in Tokyo (all modern estimates) during one day attacks. The strategic bombing of Britain, Germany and Japan has been documented far more than that of China and even an approximate number of casualties is hard to determine.
One notable author, Victor Davis Hanson, suggests over 100,000 Chinese died from bombing during the long running war with Japan. Yet, at the time, Japan’s strategic bombing campaigns in China were unprecedented, caused considerable outrage amongst the international community and further isolated Japan from the western powers. Thus, besides failing to terrorize the Chinese, or forcing Chiang Kai-shek to surrender, Japan inadvertently found another means to gain more international sympathy for the Chinese cause, as well as increasing foreign efforts to supply China with aid.