January 29, 2024

“Japan cannot conquer China with America in her rear, Soviet Russia on her right and England on her left – her most powerful enemies in the South Sea all flanking her.  It is this international situation that constitutes one of Japan’s great weaknesses.” -Chiang Kai-Shek

The International Situation in 1941 and the Path to Pearl Harbor:

The year 1941 would be significant as Germany invaded the Soviet Union, Japan attacked America, and with Germany then declaring war on America the regional wars in Europe and Asia became linked into a global conflict now known as World War 2.  However, to understand the road to Pearl Harbor it is not only necessary to look at key military and diplomatic events from 1937-1941 but analyze the relationship between America and Japan going back decades.

Americans often view World War 2 as the “Good War” believing their intentions were honorable and conduct laudable.  The struggle between an isolationist America that supposedly championed free trade and self-determination against the pariah state of Japan which had consistently defied the international community, and waged a dirty war in China, appears self-evident at first.  Yet the relationship between America and Japan was not always contentious, or hostile, and war was hardly inevitable.

It is true that it was America, under Commodore Matthew Perry in 1853, that had forced Japan to open up to the world for trade and motivated Japan to modernize, become an industrial power and build modern armed forces.  It is likewise true that America banned Japanese immigration in the 1920s due to racist sentiment.  America’s rejection of Japan’s attempt to include a Racial Equality Proposal for the Versailles Treaty, its pressuring of Japan to return the Qingdao concession (taken from Germany in World War 1) to China, and its efforts to limit Japanese warship production at naval conferences in the interwar years further cooled relations between the two countries.

However, the significance of these developments should not be exaggerated as Japan was usually more concerned with limiting Russian (and later Soviet) influence in Asia, safeguarding Japanese interests in China, and building up and consolidating its empire than focusing on American slights.  While American actions often displeased Japan they seldom interfered with the latter’s wars in Asia, machinations in China, or grandiose goals in the region until 1941.  As the decades passed America disapproved of Japan’s attempts to dismantle the former’s open door policy regarding China, and to build what it saw as another decadent empire, but besides a few protests backed by limited actions America more or less let Japan have its way in Asia until the 1940s.  Indeed Japanese actions including annexing Manchuria in 1931, invading China all out in 1937, the Rape of Nanjing or even the unprovoked attack on the USS Panay elicited no strong reaction from Washington.

Despite considerable cultural dissimilarities and occasionally contentious relations America and Japan had some mutually beneficial exchanges.  It was American President Theodore Roosevelt in 1905 that mediated an end to the Russo-Japanese War before the conflict bankrupted Japan.  More importantly while the Great Depression and subsequent American protectionism did much to undermine Japan’s economy in the late 1920s into the 1930s, before and afterwards American trade was important for the rise of Japan and ironically its efforts to wage war.  Besides a few restrictions after Japan’s invasion of China in 1937 American trade was invaluable in keeping Japan’s war effort afloat.

Economic statistics illustrate this clearly.  Before 1940 America was Japan’s most important trading partner, bought 40% of Japanese exports and provided 34% of Japan’s imports including 49% of its Iron and 75% of its oil.  As late as 1940 Japan’s markets were the third largest recipient of American exports.  Despite America’s Neutrality Acts of the 1930s, and stated policy of neutrality regarding Japan and China, the Americans continued to provide considerable resources and products to Japan in wartime.  This was facilitated by Japan’s leadership not declaring war on China, instead calling the struggle the “China Incident,” in part so they could exploit loopholes in America’s Neutrality Acts to continue accessing vital trade for its war effort.

The resources and products given to Japan by America during the period included:

• Essential war trade from the United States nearly increased by 125% and Japanese exports to America increased approximately 40% from 1936-1937.
• Big sums of iron, steel, zinc, copper and oil that fuelled Japanese industry and war machines.
• Aircraft, aerial parts and bombs until the summer of 1938 (including 76% of Japan’s aircraft that year).
• In 1937 America provided 90% of Japan’s automobiles and automobile parts, 60% of its oil and scrap iron, and nearly 50% of engines and machinery.
• In 1937 and 1938 up to 56% of Japan’s war materials to fight China were provided by America.

Besides this the next three powers supplying Japan’s economy and war effort included Britain, France and Holland (all of whom, like America, would be attacked by Japan).  Although America made limited attempts to decrease war materials to Japan in the years after 1937 and gave some loans to China, the fact remains between 1937-1941 America provided far more trade, supplies and resources to Japan than China.

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However, eventually American policy makers, especially President Franklin Roosevelt, realized German aggression in Europe, and Japanese aggression in Asia, presented a mortal threat to democracy, freedom of navigation, the right to self-determination, and free trade (all of which constituted to one degree or another long standing pillars of American foreign policy).  It became clear the regimes in Berlin and Tokyo despised these American principles.  Germany and Japan had long since dismissed democracy and free trade as failed ideologies and sought territory and resources at other countries’ expense in their quests for autarky.  Meanwhile the racist, warlike outlooks of both regimes could not allow for the self-determination of peoples whom they saw as expendable lower beings fit only to conquer and enslave.

While American governments often believed in these noble principles (although often failing to live up to them) it is also true in the long run a German dominated Europe, and Japanese dominated Asia, could have created empires which rivalled American economic and industrial power (not to mention monopolize important global resources such as oil, tin, rubber, etc).  This would have been detrimental to American geo-political goals while also allowing Germany and Japan to create massive air forces and navies to challenge American shipping lanes and perhaps project military power into the Western Hemisphere itself.  A potential invasion of North America was always fanciful due to logistical constraints alone but an Axis dominated world order would have made American economic prospects uncertain and require America to be armed indefinitely with huge fleets and air forces to guarantee survival.

Although Americans tended to favour non-interference in foreign conflicts, were critical of Britain and France’s imperial policies, and often disgusted by poor conditions in China, they certainly did not look upon Nazi Germany or Imperial Japan with much trust or warmth.  As war came to Europe and Asia the Americans maintained their preference to stay clear of foreign meddling but it did not take long for them to sympathize with Britain and China and slowly increase efforts to aid them indirectly.  Interestingly enough in early 1940, 88% of Americans were against joining the war in Europe, and after the fall of France only 35% favoured risking war to help Britain.  However, this increased to 52% in September, 1940 as the British gained the upper hand in the Battle of Britain and by April, 1941 68% of Americans favoured going to war with the Axis if that was what it took to defeat them.  Regarding American aid to Britain this included 50 destroyers for the Battle of the Atlantic in the latter part of 1940, sending progressively larger amounts of supplies and resources, and eventually helping to protect British convoys in the western part of the Atlantic despite not yet being at war with Germany.

As for the war in China a Gallup poll in August, 1937 may have seen 55% of Americans having no sympathy for either Japan or China but 43% did sympathize with China and a mere 2% did for Japan.  By early 1940 a staggering 76% had sympathy for China, 22% were indifferent and once more only 2% sympathized with Japan.  This was perhaps a result of Japan’s rogue state behaviour since 1931, its cruel conduct in the war against China, and that the Chinese administration was as skilled at propaganda, and diplomacy, as Japan was inept at it.  However, unlike the considerable aid given to Britain the Americans (as noted above) gave limited loans to China, provided far more trade and war materials to Japan, and besides a few verbal condemnations did little to oppose Japan’s aggression in China save a few limited trade restrictions.

This would change in 1941 as events finally led to confrontation between Japan and America.  The years 1939-1940 had seen Japan disappointed by its failures to defeat China via strategic bombing, limiting foreign aid to China, and inability to garner enough Chinese puppet troops, and public support, to delegitimize Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime.  The Chinese Winter Offensive and the 100 Regiments Offensive had also shocked Japan and showed China’s continued determination to prosecute the war.  Finally, the crushing defeat at Khalkhin Gol in 1939 had humiliated Japan and done much to deter it from launching a potential war against the Soviet Union.  Moving into 1941 Japan continued its ad-hoc approach to warfare but won a diplomatic victory by securing a neutrality pact with the Soviet Union in April.

This benefited both sides but would have grave repercussions for East Asia and America.  For Stalin it secured his eastern flank and allowed him to deploy more troops to the west as Germany became stronger in Europe after the fall of France, and expanded its influence in the Balkans and Eastern Europe.  Stalin also got guarantees from Japan to reduce pressure on the CCP and focus its efforts on Chiang’s forces.  Japan for its part was able to secure Manchuria from Soviet pressure and deploy forces stationed there for operations in China and South East Asia against western forces.

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Japan’s prospects improved drastically after Germany invaded the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941.  Not only was Stalin too preoccupied with Germany to interfere with Manchuria and China, and would soon end Soviet aid to China, but there was the chance German forces would take European Russia, and Moscow, to destroy the Bolshevik regime.  This tempted the Japanese to break the non-aggression pact with Stalin they had signed two months earlier.  Germany naturally egged Japan on hoping to either get the latter to attack the Soviet Far East, attack Britain’s colonies in Asia, or perhaps even both.  Japan, unsurprisingly given its dysfunctional, convoluted leadership, decided to hedge its bets initially by temporarily increasing forces to Manchuria while debating what to do next.

Soon after the German invasion of the Soviet Union the Japanese decided not to join the attack but throughout 1941-1942 Japan increased its troop strength in Manchuria from 300,000-1,000,000 in case the Red Army threatened to collapse. In the summer of 1942 Japan continued the build up, hoping to intervene in case of a German victory at Stalingrad but events would disappoint the Japanese leadership.  Factors discouraging Japan to attack the Soviets in 1941 probably included its decisive defeat at Khalkhin Gol in 1939, the fact the new neutrality pact was poised to cut off Soviet aid to China anyway, the ongoing quagmire in China, and increasing western loans and support to China.

While some historians suggest Japan missed a golden opportunity to attack the Soviet Union in 1941, or that it could have tilted the balance enough to allow a German victory at Moscow, this should be treated with caution.  Japan’s ground forces were mostly bogged down in China, their artillery and tanks were heavily outgunned and outnumbered by the Red Army, and the sheer size of Soviet territory in the Far East would have played havoc with Japanese logistics.  While a Japanese invasion of the Soviet Union would have distracted at least some Soviet reserves from being deployed against Germany historians such as David Glantz note presciently the Soviets had plenty of reserves and manpower left by December, 1941.  As such it is highly unlikely Stalin would have sacrificed more geopolitically important territory in Europe to hold onto less important territory in Siberia.

Indeed the Red Army had temporarily given up territory in the Far East during the Russian-Civil War to the Japanese a few decades earlier while it fought the White Russian forces in Europe.  It is likely that in response to a Japanese invasion of Siberia the Soviets would have fallen back and enacted scorched earth tactics (as they did against Hitler and the Chinese did against Japan).  This would have been easy given the only main railway was the narrow Trans-Siberian railway, along with a few subsidiary ones.  Soviet forces could have traded space for time and given up thousands of square miles to the Japanese who would have created another quagmire in the Soviet Union which their limited logistics, manpower and resources would have been unable to overcome.

Such a campaign could not have ended a continuation of Soviet aid to China but perhaps increase it via Xinjiang province, and would not have conquered the kind of resources Japan needed such as the rubber and tin of British Malaya or the oil of the Dutch East Indies (modern day Indonesia).  Either way the debate is academic because while Japan built up forces in Manchuria it had already planned to take over South Indochina to likewise give it the option of attacking the western colonies to the south it coveted.  Taking South Indochina also offered Japan bases to invade Thailand which could then allow it to invade neighbouring Burma to cut the Burma Road directly if it wished.

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The Japanese decision to invade South Indochina, like previous ones, was a typical exercise in escalation designed to scare America and Britain into accepting Japanese domination of China.  While there were voices suggesting it could backfire and lead to war with America most Japanese officials felt the risk was worth it.  To be fair the Western powers, while giving some loans and aid to China, had consistently backed down from direct confrontation with Japan from Manchuria and Shanghai in 1931-1932, the bombing of the USS Panay and HMS Ladybird in 1937, the Tianjin Incident in 1939, to the Japanese occupation of North Indochina in 1940.  With Britain struggling to survive in Europe and the Mediterranean, and the Soviets seemingly on the verge of collapse in the summer of 1941, Japan probably concluded the Western powers were too busy to care about it moving into South Indochina.

However, they tragically miscalculated as on August 1, 1941, a few days after Japan invaded South Indochina, President Roosevelt froze Japanese assets in America and placed an embargo on Japan; notably including oil exports!  Soon afterwards Britain and the Netherlands followed suit and suddenly Japan was deprived of the vast majority of its foreign supply of oil.  The Japanese estimated they had about 9,000,000 kilotons of oil in reserve, used up to 500,000 kilotons per month, and realized they had less than two years left of oil unless the embargo was lifted or Japan conquered the Dutch East Indies.  This reduced Japanese options to a binary choice:  Diplomacy or War.  While Japan spent the next four months trying to find a diplomatic solution the history of the Japanese Empire, peppered with escalations and violent overreactions, a political-military apparatus that would have confused the Byzantines, and a home-front that was bellicose and unwilling to seriously compromise, suggests war was probably inevitable.  On the other hand America seriously misunderstood the Japanese mindset and were naive to think the latter would back down without considerable concessions to save face.

America finally took a stand against Japan in the summer of 1941 for several reasons.  As mentioned above President Roosevelt and his acolytes eventually saw the threats of an Axis dominated world to American trade, power and foreign policy principles.  They also increasingly linked the Second Sino-Japanese War in Asia to Germany’s war in Europe and realized it was necessary to prop up China in the first case and Britain in the second one.  American anxieties increased significantly with the German invasion of the Soviet Union as the collapse of the latter threatened to make Germany invincible in Europe and could have drastically increased Japan’s capabilities to concentrate their forces against China and the Western powers in Asia.

Additionally, since September, 1940 American was often reading Japanese diplomatic messages thanks to breakthroughs via their cryptologists.  Thus America knew of Japan hedging its bets against Stalin by massing troops in Manchuria, as well as Japan’s forthcoming move into South Indochina to gain bases to potentially attack western colonies. As such America increased support to Britain and China via lend-lease, which replaced its cash and carry policy in early 1941, and also decided to provide it to the Soviets in late 1941 once predictions of the Red Army collapsing proved false.

However, most importantly Japan’s move into South Indochina and America’s embargo against Japan in August, 1941 provided the catalyst/excuse for America to confront Japan and hopefully deter it from either attacking the Soviets or the western colonies in South East Asia.  This was encouraged by Britain and China who likewise did not want to see the Soviet Union fall but also probably believed that if diplomacy failed at least it would get America into the war on their side.

Much ink has been spilt on the negotiations between America and Japan in the summer and fall of 1941, including whether or not a diplomatic solution was realistic, if America was hoping to provoke Japan into war, if Japan was backed into a corner and had no choice but to go to war, etc.  While these are legitimate, intriguing questions it is likely both sides misunderstood each others’ mindset, that diplomats and personnel on both sides bungled the negotiations on several occasions, and the interests and demands of both sides were simply too diametrically opposed to have produced a peaceful outcome.  While a case can be made the Americans were often naive and unrealistic as to what Japan would be willing to concede it is incorrect to state that they gave Japan any ultimatums (such as the misunderstood Hull Note) or that Japan could be considered an innocent bystander of American coercion that forced it into war.

America was far from a perfect country in 1941 given its previous brutal expansion against Native American tribes, its ongoing segregation against African-Americans in the South, as well as suspect conduct against nations in the Western Hemisphere justified by the Monroe Doctrine.  However, despite such faults American conduct could hardly be compared to the cruelties, aggressions and breaking of international norms of Japan in the first half of the 20th Century.  America could be cynical in China and the Pacific, including occupying the Philippines and sharing similar perks to other imperial powers in China.  However, America also planned to give the Philippines independence, Roosevelt constantly pressured the Western Europeans to dismantle their empires, and America also sought to end the unfavourable treaties previously imposed on China.  Meanwhile America, much unlike Japan, Britain or the Soviet Union, had a more enlightened (if often condescending) view of China and wished for it to become united, democratic and even Christian.

By contrast Japan had spent its time since modernizing building an Empire from Okinawa to Taiwan, Korea to former German island chains in the Pacific, to Manchuria and finally other parts of China. Japan did not plan to give ANY of these territories independence and treated much of their inhabitants indifferently at best, ruthlessly at worst.  If America wanted an united and democratic China the Japanese wanted it divided, weak, submissive to Japan, and host to territory for colonists and resource extraction.  America may not have always lived up to its foreign policy values such as self-determination and supporting democracy but its efforts in these regards were more honest, and well meaning, than Japan’s shallow platitudes including “Asia for the Asians” and the “Greater East Asian Co-Prosperity Sphere.”  It would be inaccurate to say America was completely isolationist and devoid of foreign policy adventurism during the period  but against Japan’s constant, big wars from 1894-1941 American actions (besides joining the Entente in World War 1) were small affairs in contrast.

Comparisons between Japan and America’s leadership and people are likewise telling.  Although there could be differences regarding policies and their implementation the civilian government in America controlled the military, the infighting among the armed forces was manageable, coordination of civil and military policy was generally good and there were no assassinations, attempted coups and other unpleasantries reminiscent of Japan’s volatile leadership.  Meanwhile the American people despised war, wanted nothing to do with foreign conflicts, had little warmth or nostalgia for their recent efforts from the Spanish-American War to World War 1, and feared the potential expansion of their military.  Tellingly even as late as the summer of 1941 only 51% of Americans favoured expanding the service term for draftees and the legislation to authorize this passed by a mere vote in the House of Representatives.

The majority of Japan’s populace by contrast glorified war, idolized the samurai code, were ready to die for the emperor, and felt little remorse for the millions of Chinese who suffered due to their direct, or indirect, efforts in China.  In fact one historian, David A. Titus, has suggested that thanks to the constant propaganda and harsh social conditioning of Japan’s militant society the Japanese people were arguably more jingoistic than their leadership.  This phenomenon is strikingly similar to the propaganda and manipulation of education in the Arab World that has made much of the Arab Street so venomous towards Israelis that it often limits the success of any Arab leader to potentially seek peace with Israel.

Put simply between 1919-1941 America made significant efforts to guarantee isolationism and avoid foreign conflicts.  Meanwhile Japan constantly subverted international norms, tried reconfiguring Asia for its own interests, brought war and death to millions of Asians, and showed less leniency to its conquered subjects (with notable exceptions) than the Western imperial powers during the period.  Thus whatever naive assumptions and mistakes America made in its negotiations with Japan in 1941 the historical context suggests overwhelmingly that Japan, not America, was the aggressor and rogue state, and did more than any other nation to bring World War 2 to Asia.

It must also be stressed without Japan’s move into South Indochina there would have been no American embargo of oil, acrimonious negotiations between Japan and America, or war between both by the end of 1941.  Britain, the Soviet Union, and America were more concerned with the war in Europe during the summer of 1941 as German successes reached their high water mark.  All were keen to avoid, or at least delay, war in the Pacific so that as much money, weapons and resources could be devoted to defeating Germany to prevent it from beating Britain or the Soviet Union in the short term.  Meanwhile Japan had no realistic chance of beating the Soviets or Britain, or even China in the short run, in the Far East but did have temporary local military superiority over the generally limited, outclassed western forces deployed to South East Asia.  Therefore Japan was seen as an Axis power that could not triumph in a major war but could do a lot of damage and distract considerable effort away from combatting a more dangerous Nazi Germany.

For the eventual allied powers Japan’s move into South Indochina was seen, correctly according to Japanese intentions, as provocative and potentially dangerous for the western held possessions in the region.  Japan’s foray into North Indochina could arguably have been justified as it cut off French aid to China but the Japanese occupation of the south threatened Thailand (and by extension Burma), the Dutch East Indies and especially British held Malaya and Singapore.  Indeed bases in South Indochina were decisive in projecting Japanese naval and airpower that doomed British forces in Malaya after war began.  Thus the American led embargo against the Japanese was initiated precisely because Japan’s occupation of South Indochina threatened western colonial interests and it was hoped a firm stand would deter Japan from continued expansion and going to war.

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The negotiations between America and Japan from August-December, 1941 have been detailed exhaustively in other accounts of the conflict.  While a case can be made Japan and America made diplomatic errors that contributed to the failure of negotiations it is most likely flawed assumptions, and irreconcilable interests, on both sides made a satisfactory agreement all but impossible.  While America did not set any ultimatums for Japan the former did suggest some conditions for settlement Japan felt were unbearable for a variety of reasons.  Regarding America’s request to withdraw from Indochina the Japanese agreed in principle but with the dubious caveat this would not occur until the war in China had concluded.

Another request to withdraw from China (though which parts of the country, and when, was unclear and it never mentioned Manchuria) was more offensive to Japan.  This was perhaps impossible to implement due to Japan’s belief these territories were vital for its empire, would have enraged domestic opinion, and been an unacceptable loss of face for the Japanese leadership given the 500,000 casualties the army had suffered in China thus far.  Besides this Japan felt further boxed in as British and American forces reinforced their holdings in Singapore, Hong Kong and the Philippines during this period.

Japan for its part demanded America end its aid to Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime, American help to pressure China into a one sided peace deal favourable to Japan, for America to continue providing it with oil, and the Western powers to freeze military deployments to the region.  America was working on counterproposals when intelligence got wind of Japanese war plans and movement of significant war convoys across South East Asia, including to South Indochina (not to reinforce the Japanese garrison but to prepare to move against western colonies).  This occurred in November, 1941 as Japan’s leadership, including the Emperor, had already approved the plan for Pearl Harbor.  In fact starting November 20 Japan began deploying scores of warships, aircraft and significant ground forces (including five divisions from occupied China) to advanced bases to be ready to attack the western possessions in South East Asia.

While Japan still allowed for a diplomatic solution at this late hour it was decided that if none occurred by late November it would strike.  Japanese war plans and most of these military deployments were made before the infamous Hull Note was delivered to Japan, which has been inaccurately called an ultimatum that supposedly gave Japan no choice but to go to war.  In reality the Hull Note was made in reaction to Japanese war plans and military deployments in a final attempt to deter Japan from commencing hostilities with America.  Unfortunately, as America’s then ambassador to Japan, Joseph Grew, presciently noted “Japanese sanity cannot be measured by American standards of logic” and that Japan could “rush headlong into a suicidal struggle with the United States.”  Japan’s leadership preferred to risk national suicide and ruin than lose face by making serious concessions.  In the event no diplomatic breakthrough materialized and on December 7, 1941 Japan attacked Pearl Harbor and other western possessions across the Pacific and South East Asia.

Japan’s Plans for Pearl Harbor, South East Asia and China, and Comparing Japanese and Allied Forces:

“Let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.”  -Sun Tzu

Japan’s objectives for Pearl Harbor, the Pacific and South East Asia were many and far ranging.  Initially, Japan sought to neutralize the main western military forces in the region, particularly their naval and air forces, and especially the American fleet at Pearl Harbor.  It was hoped this would give the Japanese temporary naval and air supremacy to conquer the territories they coveted.  This included the Dutch East Indies, American held Philippines, British held Malaya, Singapore, Hong Kong, New Guinea and Burma, as well as Thailand and important islands such as the Gilberts, Solomons, Guam and Wake Island.

The Dutch East Indies had the oil reserves Japan needed in the aftermath of the Western embargo implemented against it.  Malaya held important resources such as tin and rubber and was one of Britain’s most economically important colonies.  Singapore had the supposedly strongest naval base in South East Asia, and controlled the Malacca strait which controlled the primary access point between the Pacific and Indian Oceans.  Hong Kong remained the last foreign supply corridor for Chiang’s regime via the Chinese coast.  New Guinea offered a springboard for further expansion in the South Pacific and potentially allow Japan to threaten Australia with invasion.  Thailand would provide landing beaches to outflank British defences in North Malaya  as well as a route into Burma.  Seizing Burma would guarantee the left flank of Japan’s new territorial acquisitions and cut off China’s last remaining land route (the Burma Road) for foreign aid.

The Philippines laid astride Japan’s maritime communications with the Dutch East Indies, and other territories, so it was deemed necessary to conquer them to prevent America from interdicting these sea routes.  The Gilberts, Solomons, Wake Island and Guam were taken either to extend Japan’s defensive perimeter (which will be discussed shortly) or to serve as bases for further potential advances.  After these initial territories had been conquered Japan had the option to make subsequent advances towards India, Australia and elsewhere if the Western powers refused to come to terms.

Besides destroying the western military contingents in the region and seizing territory these new acquisitions would aid Japan’s efforts at autarky.  They would also provide a defensive perimeter the Allies, principally the Americans, would need to surmount in order to regain occupied territory and push back towards Japan.  It was hoped Germany would defeat Britain and the Soviets in Europe (thus eliminating them as threats to Japan) and that the shock of defeats across Asia and the Pacific would crush American political will to continue the war.  Failing that Japan believed American determination and morale would erode over time after bloody, attritional fighting advancing across the Pacific.  It was recognized by most of the Japanese leadership (whom whatever their flaws were not unintelligent) that Japan could never win a long term war against America due to the latter’s massive economic and industrial superiority.

For example S.C.M.Paine noted that “in 1941 the United States had a GNP twelve times that of Japan.  America produced 105 cars for each Japanese car made.  It could generate 1,000,000 kilowatts of electricity for every 5.5 kilowatts in Japan.”  Winston Churchill, in a letter to the Japanese Foreign Minister in the spring of 1941, reminded the latter Japan’s yearly steel production of 7 million tons was dwarfed by America’s 75 million tons.  American coal production was over 10 times that of Japan’s.  During the war itself America would produce well over 300,000 aircraft compared to 75,000 by Japan.  Besides this America had nearly twice the population of the Japanese home islands, over five times the Japanese Empire’s GDP, ten times the industrial production, and unlike Japan seemingly unlimited resources.

However, in what could be considered wishful thinking most of Japan’s leadership believed America was a degenerate, materialistic society that would not have the spiritual strength, or stomach, to fight a long war with heavy losses.  Such calculations regarding American staying-power would later be adopted by the Chinese in the Korean War, as well as the Vietminh, Saddam Hussein, and Al-Qaeda during other conflicts but only in the case of Vietnam did America give up the fight.  Japanese leaders would not prove to be as lucky as their later Vietminh equivalents.

After seizing these territories, assuming Germany defeated Britain and the Soviet Union, and hoping America came to terms, Japan would turn back to the war in China.  It was thought either Chiang Kai-Shek’s regime would finally sue for peace with the collapse of its remaining foreign allies and aid, or Japan would launch a decisive thrust towards Chongqing to end Chinese resistance.

On one hand Japan had good odds regarding its operational objectives of neutralizing the immediate western military contingents and overrunning the initial territory it wanted.  This was due to local Japanese military superiority in Asia and the Pacific, the often second rate western forces stationed there, the fact America and Britain were focused on the war in Europe, and the distances and logistical difficulties America would encounter as the war unfolded.  However, regarding Japan’s main strategic objectives of keeping its new territorial acquisitions, hoping its enemies would give up after a short fight, and ending Chinese resistance, Japan’s odds of success were far lower due to many considerations.

For the defeat of Britain and the Soviet Union the Japanese were completely reliant upon a German victory they could not tangibly influence.  As American lend-lease to the British and Soviets increased in the fall of 1941 it looked increasingly as though Germany would be unable to win the war Europe any time soon.  Indeed the Soviet counter-offensive that drove the Germans back from Moscow coincided almost simultaneously with Pearl Harbor.

Japanese prospects against America were perhaps even worse as the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor enraged rather than deterred it.  This along with American racism against the Japanese, and increasing Japanese atrocities guaranteed America’s war against Japan would be a very determined, vengeful, and seemingly existential affair.  Unlike many conflicts in modern American history the Pacific War was fought with unity and energy from the leadership, to the army, and finally the people.  As for the quagmire in China even total Japanese success against the former’s other enemies would not have guaranteed the Chinese would given up, let alone that Chongqing would have fallen easily.  Even China losing its temporary capital would not necessarily mean defeat given many other cities would have remained unoccupied, and the spirit of resistance motivating the Chinese to keep fighting was still potent at this point in the war.

Put simply the prospects of Japanese strategic victory relied on too many hopes and what ifs, many of which Japan could not influence to any appreciable degree.

Japan’s leadership knew how risky war against America was.  Japan’s ambassador to America was against it while even Tojo Hideki, Japan’s newest Prime Minister, and one of the more hawkish Generals, was visibly shaken by war games which confirmed the likelihood of Japanese defeat in a prolonged war with America.  The commander of the combined fleet, Admiral Yamamoto, perhaps Japan’s most impressive military leader, famously stated:  “In the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and Great Britain, I will run wild and win victory upon victory.  But then, if the war continues after that, I have no expectation of success.”

Unlike much of the insular Japanese leadership Yamamoto knew America well having studied at Harvard and serving as a naval attaché in Washington D.C.  However, despite his aversion to war with America, disagreeing with the war in China, and his professional competence Yamamoto had one fatal flaw.  He loved to gamble and it was thought that games of chance were more valuable to him than drink and food.  Ultimately his gambles would prove ruinous for Japan.

Perhaps the most vocal opponent of war was Okinori Kaya, the Japanese finance minister and one of the few officials who seriously questioned the optimistic figures and forecasts given by the militarists who ran the government.  Unsurprisingly he was ignored which suggests perhaps later bean-counts like Robert McNamara would not have gotten far in Imperial Japan’s governing structure.  In the end Japan’s leaders knew the risks but felt it was better to fight in late 1941 when they projected their military power, especially the Imperial Japanese navy, would be at its height compared to Britain and America.  If they failed to strike by then it was assumed ever increasing American production would soon overtake Japan’s ability to fight with a reasonable chance of success.  The only alternative, withdrawing from Indochina and at least some parts of China, was deemed unacceptable.

As for China, the main victim of Japanese aggression for decades, Chiang Kai-Shek was desperate and hopeful for western intervention in the war, but also realistic about the initial prospects of western forces in the region if Japan attacked them.  Having seen his armies being battered for years he assumed the relatively green, poorly equipped western forces in the region would suffer considerable losses against the battle hardened, ruthless Japanese forces that had cut their teeth in China.  Despite this he was convinced the Allies, especially America, would eventually rally and defeat Japan with overwhelming force.

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Regarding Japan’s operational war plans the main elements were to be the surprise attack at Pearl Harbor, and the conquest of the main western colonies and islands, by five Japanese armies compromising close to 12 divisions with 200,000 soldiers, along with almost half of the Japanese Army’s air squadrons. These would be backed by the Imperial Japanese Navy, third largest in the world, including 10 aircraft carriers with fine warplanes and the best naval aviators at the time.  It also included 10 Battleships, nearly 40 cruisers, and over 100 destroyers and 60 submarines.  By contrast while the American fleet was larger overall, especially regarding battleships, destroyers, and submarines, a significant portion of it was deployed far away in the Atlantic, or dangerously exposed in the Philippines.  This meant the Imperial Japanese Navy had a temporary edge over America’s Pacific Fleet.  Japan also had ten carriers compared to eight for America, had a similar number of total cruisers, and after the devastation of Pearl Harbour an overwhelming advantage of battleships in the Pacific.

Besides the aforementioned forces Japan would also deploy much of its limited tank force with considerable success.  The Imperial Japanese Navy also withdrew a big portion of their bombers from China which alleviated the bombing of Chinese cities to a significant degree.  Thus in 1942 bombing efforts in China declined by half and would continue to decrease throughout the rest of the war.  The relatively few ground divisions to conquer South East Asia may appear minuscule at first when compared to Japan’s major campaigns in China, the 100s of divisions that would be engulfed on the Eastern Front in Europe, or later fighting in Normandy and Western Europe.

Indeed, compared to the 200,000 troops Japan devoted to the campaigns against the western colonial possessions there were still 680,000 in China, not to mention the 100s of thousands that would be reinforced over the next year in Manchuria.  Which illustrates a key point often missing from western accounts of World War 2: That China was a major player in the conflict and would continue to bog down, and fight, disproportionate amounts of Japanese soldiers.  On the other hand much like the Battle of the Atlantic and other key battles involving the Western Allies, the fighting in South East Asia and the Pacific would suck in a disproportionate amount of Axis aircraft and warships which meant although these theatres were not always human resource intensive they could be very material resource intensive.

On paper at least the western forces in the Far East were often as good, sometimes superior, to their Japanese attackers.  In practice the Japanese inevitably had most of the advantages including combat experience after years of fighting in China, and its leadership was cunning and imaginative versus controversial allied leaders such as Lt. General Arthur Percival, Lt. General Joseph Stilwell and at least initially General Douglas MacArthur.  Meanwhile the Japanese at this stage usually had considerable numerical and qualitative advantages in ships and planes as the Allies had generally concentrated their better contingents in Europe, the Middle East, and the Atlantic.

That said some allied contingents in Asia and the Pacific were of impressive quality.  The Chinese in particular would provide bright spots for their conduct in Burma and the Third Battle of Changsha in a period of back to back allied defeats. Likewise American Marines and Australian troops were generally competent.  As for equipment the Allies had nothing in the region comparable to Japan’s massed carrier force or their excellent Zero fighters.  However, there were impressive P40 fighters, and American heavy bombers, and at least in Malaya the British had a significant advantage in artillery and manpower.

Finally, the Allies had a few other disadvantages as the Pacific War began.  They must have had some issues with communications and coordination by the sheer number of nationalities, and local indigenous forces; including not only British, Dutch, American, Australian and Chinese contingents, but Indian, Indonesian, Filipino and other forces as well.  The indigenous forces in particular presented an issue.  While some, including many Indian and Filipino units, performed exemplary unsurprising others lacked motivation given the racist behaviour of their western overlords, the unequal treatment they received versus European settler populations, and Japanese propaganda to free them from colonialism.  No doubt the differing strategic priorities of the respective allies also made coordination difficult.  The variety of weapons, ammunition, and supplies also likely constrained the Allies (especially in the Dutch East Indies campaign) due to the lack of standardization and probably created a logistical nightmare.

By contrast the standardized Japanese forces and equipment made such far flung campaigns less difficult.  More astonishingly during the upcoming offensives the Japanese Army and Navy coordinated their plans and actions effectively (although this would not continue throughout much of the rest of the war).  Finally, the Japanese benefited from surprise, constantly taking the initiative, and taking risks western forces would never consider.  Thus throughout the winter and spring of 1941-1942 Japan efficiently massed its forces against the Allies which were often far flung, outmatched and inevitably forced onto the back foot.