Chapter 4: The War Expands and China Remains Defiant (from “A Brief Military History of the Japanese Empire”)

January 5, 2024

“There is no avoiding war; it can only be postponed to the advantage of others.” -Niccolo Machiavelli

Political Developments in Asia and War comes to Europe (1939-1940)

Coinciding with the Imperial Japanese Army’s offensives on the ground in China, Japan’s leaders also tried political means to end the war.  Emulating practices in Manchuria and efforts propping up Chinese warlord and puppet states in North China, Japan created alternative governments to Chiang Kai-shek’s regime in occupied China, recruited puppet troops, and did its utmost to undermine the KMT regime.  Some military efforts, such as strategic bombing and the Battle of South Guangxi, were launched in part to support this, especially to undermine Chinese morale and cut China off from foreign aid.  Diplomatically, Japan also became more confrontational towards the western powers to end such aid, although ironically this would contribute to the lead up to Pearl Harbor which significantly expanded the war.

These means had some affects on Chinese resistance but did not swing the war decisively in Japan’s favor.  Puppet troops raised by Japan were usually seen as traitors, were poorly equipped and motivated, and became easy targets for KMT and CCP forces.  On the other hand, the estimated 700,000 to 1,000,000 troops (close to the number of soldiers Japan stationed in China) provided by Chinese collaborators did garrison considerable territory and freed up Japanese forces to launch operations elsewhere in China.  As stated above the strategic bombing campaign killed many people and caused considerable economic and infrastructural damage, but ultimately it increased rather than quashed Chinese determination to resist.  Japan’s sponsored regimes in China, including the one set up in Nanjing under the previously popular Wang Jingwei, had little legitimacy in or outside of China.  Notably, Wang’s regime was only recognized by Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and perhaps unsurprisingly Japan!

In the final sense these initiatives, along with considerable Japanese pressure, did not splinter, or collapse, Chiang Kai-shek’s regime which retained the support of the majority of Chinese people throughout the conflict.

***

Ironically, despite winning most battles, securing increasingly more territory, and slowly pushing the KMT regime into the relatively isolated Chinese hinterland, the war became more difficult for Japan while confrontations with foreign powers only increased.  At first this mostly involved foreign powers supplying China with diplomatic support and material aid.  This included Soviet, British, French, American, and even German aid for a time.  In the case of these nations except for Germany, which supported China mostly for economic reasons, they propped China up to safeguard their Asian possessions, and later to keep Japanese forces bogged down in China when war expanded in Europe and Asia from 1939-1941.  However, despite the often cynical calculations of these foreign powers many Chinese leaders were not innocent either as much of the aid received from abroad was stolen by corrupt officials.

The KMT regime’s main supplier of foreign support from the late 1920s to the late 1930s was Germany.  During the first sixteen months of the Second Sino-Japanese War 60% of weapons sent to China were provided by the Germans.  Although it was not a state sponsored mission as in later cases like the Soviet Union and America, Chiang Kai-shek hired experienced German officers and specialists to help develop China’s armament industry and military infrastructure, devise war plans, and train his central forces.  The cream of these divisions were arguably the best forces China had when war commenced in 1937 and were equipped with German arms and the iconic coal scuttle shaped helmets.

Germany also provided Chinese forces with small arms, munitions, light artillery, and other military assets worth approximately 150 million Reichsmarks (roughly $1.25 Billion USD today).  Although Chiang Kai-shek’s model divisions were disproportionately weakened during the Battle of Shanghai perhaps the most long-term benefit of German influence was their suggestion for China to adopt a protracted war strategy which eventually led to China’s main resistance against Japan being waged from Sichuan province (which began in earnest at the end of 1938).  However, German aid to China ended due to increasing diplomatic ties between Germany and Japan which led the former to believe aligning with Japan was preferable to China as it could tie down Soviet and western forces in Asia and the Pacific.  Once Nazi Germany recognized Japan’s puppet regime in Manchuria in early 1938 relations between Germany and China cooled and Hitler recalled the German advisors a few months later.

British and French aid to China, especially once Japan began overrunning the Chinese coast, was sent via French Indochina, Hong Hong, and the Burma Road which was completed in late 1938.  In the early years of the war perhaps 30% of Chinese imports came from French Indochina while Hong Kong provided China with 60,000 tons of aid a month until the fall of Guangzhou in October 1938, when this fell to 3000 tons that got through by more indirect means.  However, Hong Kong would be the most reliable supply route until December 1941 as the other ones from the Soviet Union, Indochina, and Burma road were either cut off sooner or had issues which limited their effectiveness. Meanwhile, the Burma Road gave China perhaps 3000 tons until it was overrun after Pearl Harbor. While Britain and France did not give as much military aid as Germany, the Soviet Union, or America they did provide important loans and supplies, and the Japanese would make significant efforts, diplomatic and military, to close their supply corridors to China.  America’s aid to China will be addressed later with its entry into the war after Pearl Harbor.

The Soviet Union would provide the most aid to China during the first half of the Second Sino-Japanese War.  Given Chiang Kai-shek’s hostility to Communism and the freeze in Sino-Russian relations in 1927 after he turned on the CCP, this may appear surprising, but the arrangement was a perfect example of realpolitik.  Stalin’s main interest in the Far East was not supporting the CCP, but deterring Japan from attacking Russian territories as it had done so after World War 1.  Japan’s army constantly eyed the Soviet Far East and had been reconfiguring its force structure before the Second Sino-Japanese War to fight a potential war against the Soviets.

Realizing his ideological allies, the CCP, were in no position to lead China, let alone confront Japan, Stalin threw his support behind Chiang Kai-shek.  This was arguably decisive in solving the Xi’an Incident in 1936 and creating the Second United Front between the KMT and CCP afterwards.  Although the Soviet Union seemed more powerful than Japan in the late 1930s it should be remembered Japan had beaten Russia in the Russo-Japanese War, that the Red Army was being purged by Stalin in this period, and Nazi Germany was increasingly seen as the main threat by the Soviets after it ignored the Versailles Treaty and began to rearm.

Ironically, despite the bad history between Chiang Kai-shek’s regime and Stalin, the Soviet mission to China generally worked harmoniously (especially compared to the diplomatic messes between America and China in the final years of the war).  The Soviets gave China loans worth over 250 million dollars and usually sold weapons at vastly reduced prices.  While numbers vary according to different sources from 1937-1941 the Soviets sent China approximately 900-1200 aircraft, 1200-1600 artillery pieces, 10,000-14,000 machine guns, 80 tanks, 1500 motor vehicles, 50,000 rifles, and large amounts of supplies, ammunition, and spare parts.  Such aid traveled through China’s large Xinjiang region, often on the backs of camels, at the rate of 2000-3000 tons a month.

The Soviets also sent a contingent of several thousand pilots, 200 of whom would die fighting the Japanese (presaging later aerial engagements between Soviets and Americans in Korea and Soviets and Israelis over Egypt).  In one notable instance Soviet bombers hit Japanese airfields around Nanjing on January 26, 1938, and destroyed many planes on the ground.  Along with pilots the Soviet mission was composed of 5000 advisors, engineers, experts, and included the later victor of Stalingrad, General Vasily Chuikov.  These advisors trained 10s of 1000s of Chinese soldiers, helped them operate advanced military technology, and were instrumental in planning and executing many Chinese military operations such as the Second Battle of Changsha.

Soviet aid to China benefited both countries in the early years of the war.  For Stalin, it kept Japan bogged down in China and unable to attack the Soviet Far East.  For China, it provided much needed support at a time when the Western Allies were unable, or unwilling, to give sufficient aid to China.  However, in a typically self-interested move, Stalin ended the arrangement when it no longer served him.  In April 1941 the Soviets concluded a non-aggression pact with Japan and after Germany invaded the Soviet Union in June 1941, Stalin focused on the mere survival of his regime.  With the loss of millions of soldiers and 10s of 1000s of aircraft, tanks and artillery pieces fighting Germany in the course of 1941, Stalin had little incentive, or capacity, to supply China and ended the Soviet mission later that year.

***

Despite increasing foreign aid and sympathy for Chinese resistance the overall strategic position of China continued to deteriorate during 1939-1940.  As war clouds gathered in Europe over Nazi rearmament, the failure of appeasement and unchecked German expansion, the attention of the major powers turned away from Asia and the war in China.  Unsurprisingly Japan took advantage of this.

Firstly, Japan blockaded the British concession at Tianjin from mid-June to late August 1939.  Ostensibly, the reason was Britain’s refusal to hand over four Chinese suspects to Japan regarding the assassination of a Chinese collaborator in Tianjin in April 1939.  However, the main motivation was to end British aid to China, including loans and efforts to stabilize the latter’s currency.  At first, the British held firm, especially after mounting public outrage over British nationals being strip searched by Japanese soldiers when entering and leaving the Tianjin concession.  In fact, there was a serious chance of war between Britain and Japan with Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain temporarily ordering the Royal Navy to give more priority in planning for a conflict with Japan versus Germany.

However, the looming German threat to Poland ultimately took precedence and sending the Royal Navy to the Far East meant it would be unable to deter Hitler from going to war, or to blockade Germany in case he did.  As such, the British compromised by loosely agreeing not to take actions against Japan’s war effort in China and handing over the four Chinese suspects to the Japanese, which later executed them despite promising not to. On the other hand, Japan failed to convince Britain to cut off its financial aid to China, the main objective of the Tianjin blockade, which suggests Japan gained little from the crisis other than further alienating the western powers.  Yet this was not enough for Chiang Kai-shek who called the agreement “the Far Eastern Munich,” comparing it to the ill-advised Munich conference in September 1938 which marked the high point of western appeasement towards Nazi Germany.

Secondly, an undeclared border conflict between the Soviets and Japanese developed which included the battles of Lake Khasan in 1938 and Khalkhin Gol in 1939.  While statistics vary, between 1931 and 1938 there may have been as many as 2800 border incidents between both sides and while few were lethal they eventually led to major clashes in the late 1930s.  By then tensions between the Soviet Union and Japan became heightened enough to lead to the aforementioned battles.  While Japan was stuck in a protracted war with China the Imperial Japanese Army still saw the Soviet Union as its main enemy.

Disputes over border areas, as well as Japan’s desire to end Soviet aid to China, motivated the Japanese army to provoke showdowns with the Red Army to solve these issues.  Despite the Soviets’ considerable advantages in manpower, resources, and ground forces Japan felt it could succeed due to a combination of Stalin’s purges of Red Army officers, Japanese fighting spirit, and racist assumptions denigrating Soviet capabilities.  No doubt the passive, incompetent conduct of Russian forces during the Russo-Japanese War influenced this as well.

Therefore, in July-August 1938 a skirmish began when Japan decided to expel a Soviet force from Zhanggufeng.  This was a 149 meter hill across the Tumen River in the border area around Korea, Manchukuo, and the Soviet Union in the Lake Khasan region.  Initially, much of the Japanese leadership, including Emperor Hirohito, urged caution but the local commander acted on his on initiative and led a successful night attack that took Zhanggufeng.  However, the Soviets reacted quickly by deploying three times as many troops as Japan, as well as a considerable number of tanks, artillery and airpower.  Indeed, throughout the next week Soviet planes flew 700 sorties against Japanese positions while the latter did not use their planes to avoid escalating the fighting.  Despite this, Soviet attacks were clumsy, ill-coordinated and the Japanese resisted stubbornly and knocked out dozens of tanks.

While the Japanese force was pushed back it held on long enough for a ceasefire to end hostilities and inflicted three times the number of casualties it took despite the overwhelming Soviet advantages in numbers and firepower.  For the Imperial Japanese Army, the battle seemingly justified its fighting doctrine, the steadfastness of its soldiers, and the contempt it felt for Soviet forces.  Unlike the Japanese, the Soviets thoroughly analyzed their mistakes and the next time the two sides met in battle the outcome would be far different.

***

Beginning in May 1939 Soviet and Japanese forces clashed again, once more at the initiative of local Japanese officers, who overreacted to a Mongolian Calvary force crossing the Khalkh River, in a region Japan and Mongolia both claimed.  Japanese forces pushed it back to the river and the situation escalated when Soviet forces were deployed to support their Mongolian allies.

A Japanese attack in early July on both sides of the river quickly broke down.  Their pontoon bridges could not support tanks and thus the attack across the river faltered without armor support.  However,  Japan took a considerable toll on Soviet vehicles due to the mismanagement of Soviet tanks and suicidal infantry attacks with explosive charges and incendiary bottles.  The assault on the east bank also failed with many Japanese tanks becoming immobilized by piano wire that became ensnarled in their tracks.  Finally, Soviet artillery, which outnumbered and outgunned its Japanese equivalent, soon halted the offensive.  Faced with this, the Japanese fell back on night attacks in an attempt to neutralize Soviet advantages in equipment and firepower.

Throughout the summer both sides increased their forces to the point the fighting involved 60,000-74,000 soldiers, 500 tanks, and 600 planes on the Soviet side versus a smaller force of perhaps 30,000-38,000 Japanese with roughly 100 tanks and 300 planes.  Part of the reason for the lopsided totals was Japan’s leadership refusal to provide significant reinforcements, once more highlighting the costs their fragmented military establishment with conflicting interests could produce.  Another factor was the nearest Soviet railway hub was nearly 500 miles away and the Japanese underestimated Soviet logistics which managed to sustain considerable forces in the area with a fleet of over 9000 supply trucks and tankers.  The Japanese were also wrong footed by a successful Soviet deception campaign that included camouflage and concealment, as well as equipment to simulate tank and airplane noises.

In the latter part of August 1939, in a battle similar to Cannae, the Soviets under General Georgy Zhukov, who would later lead the Red Army to victory against Nazi Germany, held Japanese forces in the center while massing armored forces on the flanks.  The terrain was relatively open, flat, and ideal for armored and mechanized formations, and the Japanese were at a severe disadvantage regarding tanks and anti-tank weaponry.  The Soviet offensive began with a massive aerial and artillery bombardment and the armored thrusts, backed by flame throwing tanks, executed “a double encirclement in almost as perfect a fashion as if it had been undertaken on the drill ground” according to Peter Harmsen.  Ironically, Japanese units were surrounded, then isolated, and finally destroyed in the sort of battle of annihilation they had always wanted, but failed to do, against Chinese forces.  By the end of August, the Japanese force had been decisively crushed and suffered between 17,000-23,000 casualties.  Soviet losses were also significant, and arguably surpassed the Japanese with between 20,000-27,000 casualties and twice as many planes.

Despite its crushing defeat Japan had lost more than just a battle.  As Edward Drea has written:

“The Nomonhan campaign was the culmination of more than thirty years of army preparations for war with Russia.  Decades had been invested in doctrine formulation, tactical innovation, weapons technology, and rigorous training to win the decisive first battle by rapid encirclement and annihilation of the enemy.”  And “everything from nighttime bayonet assaults to vaunted spiritual power had failed.  Rather than admit the full implications of the disaster, the high command blamed the troops of the recently activated 23rd Division (July 1938) and their incompetent officers for the debacle.  Subsequent army investigatory committees concluded that fighting spirit still retained its absolute priority in battle, although more firepower might be necessary in future engagements.”

Put more simply until Khalkhin Gol the Imperial Japanese Army had not been seriously tested by a modern army with significant firepower and air support, and the results of the battle were not exactly encouraging.  The defeat considerably shook the army and it predictably engaged in scapegoating by reassigning senior officers, accusing regimental officers of cowardice, and telling them to commit suicide.  Ironically, at the end of World War 2, with Japan’s unequivocal defeat, and unconditional surrender, few Japanese Generals committed suicide themselves.  Edward Drea noted that less than 1.5% of the Imperial Japanese Army’s Generals (22 out of 1501), who had sent so many young men to die, forbade them to surrender or retreat, and accused those who did so of cowardice, killed themselves to atone for their stupendous failures.  It would be interesting to know what Japanese ultranationalists who glorify the samurai tradition, and deny Imperial Japan’s warcrimes, would think of all of this.

While there was some talk of bringing up additional forces to avenge the defeat, the new head of the Kwangtung Army finally clamped down on its long running insubordination.  The lessons of Khalkhin Gol would be kept in mind during the summer of 1941 when Germany asked Japan to join its invasion of the Soviet Union.  However, in the short term, the Soviet Union and Japan signed a cease fire after the battle which disappointed China which had hoped the Soviets would enter the war in its favor.  Instead, fighting between Japan and the Soviet Union would not recommence for another six years as both sides became more concerned with other enemies.

***

Indeed, just as the fighting died down at Khalkhin Gol war finally came to Europe.  In late August 1939 Hitler was on the verge of invading Poland but decided to secure Stalin’s cooperation in case Britain and France honored their pledge to come to Poland’s aid if attacked.  Thus, at Hitler’s initiative, Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, representing two clashing ideologies, signed one of the most cynical diplomatic agreements in history:  The Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.  Not only did this secure Germany’s eastern flank after Poland was subdued but it also guaranteed Hitler would receive vital resources such as wheat and oil from the Soviet Union.  This bypassed the British blockade after the war in Europe started and helped Hitler’s armies keep fighting from 1939 until the invasion of the Soviet Union in 1941.  A secret clause also put the Baltic States, Finland, Eastern Poland and parts of Romania in Stalin’s sphere of influence, and he proceeded to take or absorb pieces of them in the next few years to create a buffer zone against Germany.

With the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact guaranteeing his eastern flank Hitler invaded Poland on Sept 1, 1939.  After Germany failed to comply with a French/British request to withdraw from Poland the latter two declared war on Germany on Sept 3, 1939, starting World War 2 in Europe.  From this point on Britain, France and the Soviet Union concentrated their focus on Europe and gave much less attention to Japanese aggression, and the war in China.

The pact between Hitler and Stalin temporarily shocked Japan, which had previously signed the Anti-Comintern Pact in 1936 with Germany to collaborate against Communism.  This led to the fall of the Japanese cabinet and temporary stained relations between Germany and Japan.  However, China did not benefit from this as the war in Europe made it all but impossible the western powers would intervene on its side in the war against Japan.

China’s international position diminished even more in 1940.  With the German conquest of France, the British were further distracted from Asia and focused on mere survival.  Meanwhile, although Americans were becoming more sympathetic to China, the fall of France, and Britain’s continued resistance, also preoccupied American attention.  Indeed, America’s primary concern was now to stiffen the British war effort with weapons and supplies, and transferring 50 U.S. destroyers to the Royal Navy to help fight German U-Boats in the Battle of the Atlantic.

However, it would be the diminished French position in Asia that hurt China the most in 1940.

As previously stated, the French colony of Indochina (modern day Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia) was one of the main supply arteries of foreign aid into China after Chiang Kai-shek’s regime lost most of the Chinese coast.  With France powerless after its defeat in June 1940 and the other major powers focused on Europe, Japan took advantage of French weakness to improve its strategic position in the Far East.  In mid-June the local French administration agreed to suspend all military shipments to China and by mid-July aid was effective shut off.  Yet this was not enough for Japan, which also wanted naval and airbases in Indochina, along with the right to station troops to facilitate additional operations against South China.

Throughout the summer, Japanese and French colonial officials tried negotiating an agreement.  The French were at a disadvantage having little power to oppose a Japanese invasion given its poorly armed garrison of 49,000 soldiers, 24 tanks and 82 aircraft, as well as the reluctance of Britain and America to help them.  Additional pressure was exercised by local Japanese forces, acting without orders comparable to the Mukden Incident, that violated the border of the French colony from bases in South China in early September.  Inevitably, the French administration relented and approved an agreement a mere seven hours before a Japanese ultimatum threatening invasion expired in late September.

However, Lt. General Nakamura Aketo’s 5th Division ignored orders to not initiate combat after it advanced into the colony and a pointless skirmish developed at Dong Dang which resulted in 30 deaths including the French battalion commander.  Despite this, the Japanese force did not withdraw as it was felt this would make the Japanese army look weak so the unnecessary advance continued.  At least in this case Tokyo punished such insubordination by sacking Nakamura and others.

Therefore, Japan gained de facto control of North Indochina while for the time being South Indochina was left alone since it was not needed for the war against China.  Perhaps a more subtle reason was to avoid antagonizing the British and Americans, who had nearby colonies in Malaya, Singapore, and the Philippines that could be threatened by Japanese bases in South Indochina.  As expected, the British and Americans did not respond forcefully to the Japanese takeover of North Indochina.  However, despite an earlier weak message to Japan suggesting the deployment of Japanese troops to Indochina would “have an unfortunate effect on American public opinion” the United States did implement a steel and scrap iron embargo against Japan, as well as giving a $25 million loan to China.  The following year America would react in a far more decisive manner when Japanese troops completed the occupation of the French colony, with ultimately dire consequences for Japan.

For a while it also looked as though China’s supply corridor from the Burma Road would be permanently shut down when Britain succumbed to Japanese diplomatic pressure to close it in the summer of 1940.  The British, now fighting both Germany and Italy after the latter entered the war in June 1940, temporarily appeased the Japanese by closing the road in July.  However, after their victory in the Battle of Britain they were sufficiently emboldened to reopen the road in October 1940, as well as giving a 10 million pound loan to China.  Thus, while China continued to receive supplies via Burma for the time being, these developments suggested another one of its supply corridors was far from secure.

The Second Sino-Japanese War (1940-1941 Campaigns)

“Move not unless you see an advantage; use not your troops unless there is something to be gained; fight not unless the position is critical.” -Sun Tzu

As the international situation became increasingly volatile Japan’s war in China continued.  However, unlike previous years, Japan launched fewer major offensives in 1940 and generally stuck to strategic bombing, propping up puppet regimes, and launching punitive raids against real, or perceived Chinese guerrilla activities.  By this time, Japan had given up on decisive military efforts to win the war outright and sought to box up the KMT regime in Sichuan province, and wear it down by limited offensives and cutting it off from foreign support.

Since the summer of 1939 Japan’s leadership had discussed reducing its forces in China (not including Japanese troops in Manchuria) from 850,000 to 400,000 soldiers over the next few years.  This coincided with plans to give Japan’s puppet forces in China more responsibility for the war in what could be described as an early form of Vietnamization.  This was partially due to the considerable costs in maintaining large forces in China and partly to prepare, and rearm the Imperial Japanese Army for a potential showdown with the Soviet Red Army.  Apparently being bogged down in the most populous country on earth did not deter Japanese leaders from seeking to eventually attack the largest country as well!  However, Japan’s forces in China, the China Expeditionary Army, strenuously objected and initially managed to guarantee keeping between 700,000-750,000 soldiers.  However, due to later developments significant troop withdrawals never occurred.

The main military operations in China during 1940 were the Battle of Zaoyang-Yichang and the CCP’s Hundred Regiments Offensive.

The Zaoyang-Yichang operations were a set of confusing engagements that occurred May-June 1940.  Originally, the objectives were ambitious including destroying significant Chinese forces, preempting a Chinese offensive towards Wuhan, and seizing advanced airfields at Yichang.  Yichang was also an important link between Chongqing and the 5th and 9th Chinese War Zones, as well as a transit point for rice needed to feed China’s provisional capital.  However, another spat between local and higher Japanese commanders saw the endeavor reduced to a two-month operation to take Yichang, degrade Chinese capabilities in the area, and withdraw.  Meanwhile, the Chinese planned to fall back to let Japanese forces become overextended, low on supplies, and then mount attacks against their flanks as at Changsha in 1939.

At first the Chinese had some success, but the Japanese divisions quickly concentrated superior firepower that turned the tide of battle.  The Chinese suffered a significant loss when General Zhang Zizhong refused to retreat, became surrounded, and was cut down by machine gunfire; becoming the highest-ranking Chinese officer killed in the war.  Out of respect, Zhang, a former student of the Japanese Military Academy, was given a proper burial by Japan.  Despite their success, the Japanese were unable to pursue and inflict a crushing defeat on Chinese forces due to being overextended and suffering logistical difficulties.  Instead, they occupied Yichang on June 12, 1940, and withdrew five days later as planned.

However, emboldened by the imminent collapse of France and Britain’s preoccupation with the Nazi threat, Japan’s leadership changed the plan again and ordered their forces to turn around to retake Yichang.  They wanted to permanently occupy Yichang to seize its advanced airfields, along with staging grounds for a potential advance towards Chongqing, and put pressure on Chiang Kai-shek to come to terms.  Therefore, Yichang was retaken and would benefit Japan by cutting flight times to bomb Chongqing by nearly half, while occupying most of Hubei province cut off the KMT from a major source of rice.  The occupation of Yichang also limited communications between Chongqing and several Chinese war zones, particularly Changsha, and was a bitter blow to Chiang’s regime.

Yet the fall of Yichang did not result in a breakthrough with ongoing negotiations between China and Japan to end the war, and thus did not produce decisive results.  Although the Yichang venture was an operational victory the changing aims throughout, and unnecessary back-and-forth advances by Japanese forces, once more illustrated the disjointed nature of Japan’s war machine.  As for casualties, these ranged between 6000-10,000 Japanese and 50,000-68,000 Chinese according to various sources.

***

During the summer and fall of 1940 the CCP launched its only major offensive (the Hundred Regiments Offensive) against Japan during the Second Sino-Japanese War.  Although it would be incorrect to suggest the CCP did little throughout the war to resist Japan, the previously accepted historiography, which claims the CCP did the lion’s share of the fighting, while the KMT sat on its hands, has been thoroughly discredited by modern scholarship.  It is true the CCP often used effective raids and guerrilla tactics against the Japanese.  It is also true that their efforts, along with KMT and other guerrilla fighters, made the countryside generally ungovernable for the Japanese.

However, damning to Mao’s Zedong’s legacy, it has been confirmed by Soviet and CCP records that the Chinese Communists’ main objectives during the war was to build up their strength and erode Chiang Kai-shek’s power base, while resisting Japan came last.  This is illustrated perfectly in Hans Van de Ven’s China at War which quotes Mao’s intentions clearly:  “The War of Resistance is a great opportunity for us to develop.  Our policy is to focus 70% on expansion, 20% on dealing with the KMT, and 10% on resisting Japan.”  According to Zhou Enlai, one of Mao’s most trusted subordinates, from July 1937 to the autumn of 1939 the CCP only lost 3% of perhaps 1.3 million casualties suffered by Chinese forces so far in the war.  Additionally, a CCP report in December 1944 suggested the Communists suffered a similar share of Chinese casualties throughout the proceeding years of the conflict.

Ming Chu-cheng and Flora Chang have also succinctly described the CCP’s involvement in the major battles of the War:

War histories from both Japan and the Republic of China clearly indicate the scale of the CCP’s “participation.”  From 1937 to 1945, there were 23 battles where both sides employed at least a regiment each.  The CCP was not a main force in any of these.  The only time it participated, it sent a mere 1,000 to 1,500 men, and then only as a security detachment on one of the flanks.  There were 1,117 significant engagements on a scale smaller than a regular battle, but the CCP fought in only one.  Of the approximately 40,000 skirmishes, just 200 were fought by the CCP, or 0.5 percent.

The CCP launched the Hundred Regiments Offensive in part due to perceptions they were not pulling their weight against Japan, to attack isolated Japanese and puppet garrisons in North China, and to disrupt Japanese communications including railways, roads, and bridges.  It was planned to be executed in three stages:  In the first phase the emphasis was on attacking Japanese communications, the second part would see all out attacks on Japanese and puppet garrisons, and the third would focus on defending against expected counterattacks.  The CCP was in a good position to undertake the offensive because while Japan focused its efforts on the KMT in the first years of the war the Chinese Communist Party membership had expanded from 40,000 to 800,000 while their military forces expanded from 40,000 to 500,000 fighters.  However, while the offensive, in theory, involved as many as 115 regiments in reality the regiments were usually under strength.  The Hundred Regiments Offensive was preceded by a month of effective reconnaissance by CCP agents, often disguised in civilian clothing, and commanded by Peng Dehuai, a competent general who later led Chinese forces in the Korean War.

The offensive began August 20, continued throughout the summer and fall and ended December 5, 1940.  In the initial phase the CCP, using simultaneous, well-coordinated attacks, achieved surprise and significantly damaged Japanese rail and road communications, as well as tunnels and mines.  For example, the Jingxing coal mines, a key fuel source for the Japanese army in China, were overwhelmed, flooded, and put out of commission for many months.

However, the second phase was less successful as the Japanese recovered from their initial shock and most Communist attacks were broken up by superior Japanese firepower, logistics, and equipment.  One communist general stated the Japanese still prevailed even when they were outnumbered seven to one (which was not uncommon in engagements between KMT forces and the Japanese either).  Historically, guerrilla fighters are usually effective in unconventional warfare, but their relative lack of heavy weapons and inferior conventional capabilities make them generally ill-equipped to engage in stand up battles against regular forces.  This would be as true for the Viet Cong in the Tet Offensive in 1968 and the CCP itself had experienced this during Chiang Kai-shek’s Fifth Encirclement Campaign in 1933-1934.  The final phase also went poorly for the CCP as the Japanese responded violently, regained the rail lines and launched numerous sweeps of the countryside.

Losses are hard to pin down due to drastically conflicting CCP, Japanese and western sources.  CCP casualties have been estimated as high as 20% of their entire forces, approximately 100,000 including desertions, while Japanese and Chinese collaborator losses are estimated between 12,000 to over 40,000 dead, wounded and captured (the majority lost by collaborating forces). Either way, the losses were prohibitive for the Communists due to their much smaller forces compared to the KMT and since they controlled far less population than Chiang Kai-shek’s regime.  In the aftermath of the drubbing they took, the CCP returned to smaller scale efforts which Peter Harmsen describes as “an emphasis on mining, booby-traps, and tunnels” much as the Viet Cong would do after the Tet Offensive nearly three decades later.

Unfortunately for the CCP in general and the people of North China in particular the Japanese army was far from content merely defeating the Hundred Regiments Offensive.  Abandoning their previously mostly defensive conduct against the CCP the Japanese adopted aggressive means to quash CCP capabilities and potential civilian support for it in the rural areas.  Starting in December 1940 Japanese forces launched significant raids into the countryside to plunder, destroy, terrorize and kill.

Originated by Tanaka Ryūkichi, the “Three Alls Policy” (kill all, burn all, loot all) saw Japanese soldiers burn down villages, massacre or relocate communities, and strip entire areas of food.  Males between the ages of 16-60 were commonly executed on suspicion of being guerrilla fighters.  Women, children, and livestock were killed indiscriminately and the Three Alls Policy, which had been approved by Emperor Hirohito, could almost be compared to genocide.  In the short term, this severely hurt the CCP by reducing the population under its control from 44 to 25 million; although it would recover and expand drastically later in the war.

Thus, whatever initial successes the CCP reaped from its Hundred Regiments Campaign the aftermath hurt its position in North China, and for the rest of the conflict Mao Zedong refrained from major offensives against Japan, and refocused efforts on building strength to confront the KMT after the war.  On the other hand, the surprise and scale of the offensive forced the Japanese army to deploy significantly more troops to North China to deal with the CCP which limited the former’s offensive capabilities elsewhere.  As usual, the main cost was absorbed by the Chinese people.  In hundreds of punitive efforts of various size from late January 1941 through March 1945 launched against the countryside, Japanese forces killed, directly or indirectly, up to 2.7 million Chinese civilians.

***

The beginning of 1941 witnessed significant fighting between the KMT and the CCP’s New Fourth Army.  This was the culmination of increased tensions between the KMT and CCP which resulted in the New Fourth Army Incident in January.  Although supposedly allies against Japan there had been considerable fighting between both factions throughout the conflict, especially between guerrilla bands.  To prevent such occurrences, Chiang Kai-shek, who had nominal authority over the CCP according to the Second United Front, ordered the New Fourth Army to abandon central China and cross the Yellow River to link up with the main communist forces in the north.

While perhaps there was a cynical element on Chiang’s part to prevent communist expansion beyond North China the New Fourth Army was hardly innocent itself having destroyed the largest KMT army behind enemy lines during 1940.  While the New Fourth Army initially complied and moved northwards it later changed directions, and fearing it would no longer obey orders, KMT forces were sent to confront it.  They pursued a column of 10,000 communists to the village of Shijing, surrounded it, took up positions in the hills, and reduced the New Fourth Army over the next few days.  Heavily outnumbered and realizing they could not hold out for long the communists attempted to break out of the trap but most were mowed down by machine gun fire.

As many as 9000 communists were lost and the New Fourth Army was effectively eliminated.  In theory the Second United Front remained, but in practice it all but died.  The KMT ended its financial subsidies to the CCP, cut off its supplies, and sealed off its base area in Shaanxi province.  However, despite this military victory against the CCP it was a public relations nightmare for Chiang Kai-shek, who was blamed for the incident, and accused of caring more about weakening the communists than fighting the Japanese.

Knowing the long term threat the CCP posed to his regime Chiang told a reporter afterward “the Japanese are a disease of the skin, the Communists are a disease of the heart.”  As the war continued, criticism, particularly American, of the KMT regime would increase, as would sympathy for the CCP, and this would cost Chiang dearly in the long term.  Either way, the New Fourth Army Incident was hardly a positive omen for China which had just entered its fifth year of fighting Japan alone.

***

Japan also entered 1941 as seemingly far away from victory as ever.  Despite further victories in 1940, more intensified strategic bombing, and tightening its blockade of China, the Japanese were still unable to defeat the Chinese or bring Chiang Kai-shek to the negotiation table.  Even the beginning of the war in Europe, the fall of France, and Britain distracted by Germany, failed to provide a sufficient enough advantage for Japan in the Far East.  If anything, the heightened hostilities in Europe and Asia caused increased tensions between Japan and the western powers.  While President Roosevelt was worried more about Hitler and the potential defeat of Britain, the Americans began associating events in Asia with Europe and eventually saw both as challenges to the liberal international order and attacks on democracy.  These tensions and worries escalated dramatically in 1941 and finally sucked America into the war which turned the conflict into a global struggle.

However, during the interlude China suffered another year of conflict and tragedy at the hands of the Japanese invaders.  Besides continuing strategic bombing efforts Japan launched amphibious assaults against coastal targets from Fujian province to Guangdong, taking ports such as Fuzhou and Ningbo to further decrease foreign aid for China.  Japan also launched mostly limited offensives to gain local advantages, preempt Chinese attacks, or hit massed enemy formations.

Meanwhile, the Chinese continued to hone their usual stratagem of withdrawing until the Japanese exhausted themselves and then trying to fall upon the latter’s flanks, rear, or cutting their lines of communication.  This was facilitated by the poor infrastructure of inner China that often lacked reliable roads and railways (often due to the Chinese enacting a harsh form of scorched earth).  This played havoc with Japanese logistics, hampering their advances.  The Chinese also tried to improve their chances by massing their forces behind mountainous terrain and rivers, and sometimes retreated if the odds seemed disproportionately against them.

***

Japan’s major offensives in China during 1941 included the Battle of Southern Henan, the Battle of Shanggao, the Battle of Southern Shanxi, and the Second Battle of Changsha.

Japan’s first offensive was the Battle of Southern Henan which began in late January and continued into early February.  The Japanese hoped to clear the Beijing-Wuhan railway and crush the Chinese 31st Army Group in the area.  They attacked north from Wuhan with 150,000 soldiers in three columns while the Chinese did not initially oppose the advance; once more waiting for Japanese forces to become over extended and run low on supplies.  Once this occurred the Chinese fell on the Japanese rear and having been outflanked the latter withdrew with heavy losses to their original positions.  Chinese casualties have been estimated at 16,000 versus 9000 Japanese which represents a significantly better loss exchange ratio for China than usual.  It has even been suggested Japanese casualties may have been higher than the Chinese in this case.

The Battle of Shanggao from mid-March to mid-April was even more detrimental for the Japanese.  Their objective was to destroy Chinese forces in the 9th War Zone in Jiangxi province, which were a threat to a potential continued Japanese advance up the Yangtze, and also blocked a potential advance upon Changsha from the east.  The Japanese advanced with slightly over three divisions, once more in three columns, and enjoyed initial success by breaking through three defensive lines (albeit with heavy losses on both sides) and entered Shanggao.

However, with the Japanese advancing in separate columns the Chinese defeated them in detail, again fell on their rear, and managed to surround a Japanese division in the city.  Japan sent another division from Wuhan to rescue it but having accomplished this both divisions became encircled in turn.  These divisions managed to break out of the trap and retreat but the Japanese had to leave behind many wounded and a considerable amount of weapons and supplies.  China suffered perhaps 20,500 losses compared to between 5500-15,000 or even 22,000 Japanese casualties, according to various sources.  Hans Van de Ven has even suggested the Chinese victory at Shanggao was “at least as impressive” as Taierzhuang but not as well known.

***

During May 1941 the Imperial Japanese Army gained the kind of Cannae like operational victory it constantly sought, during the Battle of South Shanxi.  The objective was to destroy the significant Chinese forces in the Zhongtiao mountains that threatened Japanese positions in North China, and protected the approaches to Xi’an in neighboring Shaanxi province.  These Chinese forces, approximately 180,000 in number, were generally used for guerrilla warfare, and relied upon considerable fortifications, and mountainous terrain, for defense.  The KMT often used conventional soldiers for guerrilla warfare and unlike the CCP they were not always effective at small scale operations, or composed of the dedicated individuals needed for unconventional operations.

Indeed, many KMT guerrilla units were filled with unsavory elements such as criminals, bandits, deserters, and violent individuals that alienated local populations.  Against this, Japan massed a strong force of nearly seven divisions, including a cavalry brigade, and attacked the Chinese from three directions.  Meanwhile, nearby CCP units, no doubt bitter due to the recent New Fourth Army Incident, refused to come to the aid of the KMT forces.

The Chinese forces were quickly routed thanks to faulty deployments on a very broad perimeter, using guerrillas to fight a pitched battle instead of focusing on mobile tactics, and an overreliance on fortifications and the mountains for defense.  Much like certain instances during the battles for Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou strong defenses, and broken terrain did not compensate for the aggression and superior conventional capabilities of the Japanese army.  The Chinese forces were expelled from the mountains and might have suffered as many as 77,000-100,000 casualties versus as little as 3000 losses for Japan (although figures as high as 20,000 have also been cited).

Despite such a brilliant operational success the Japanese withdrew afterwards and gained nothing useful other than a favorable loss exchange ratio.  Perhaps worse, the destruction of the KMT forces in the region undermined Chiang Kai-shek’s blockade of CCP areas which separated the main communist bases around Yan’an to other ones in North and Central China.  Considering one of Japan’s long term objectives was to prevent Communist expansion across China this can hardly be considered a positive development.  Unsurprisingly, Chiang Kai-shek would later describe this battle as “the greatest shame in the history of the War of Resistance Against Japan.”

***

In September-October 1941 Japan tried taking Changsha for a second time.  The commander of the Japanese 11th Army, General Anami Korechika, hoped a major victory would convince Chiang Kai-shek to surrender.  Whether or not that was realistic the loss of Changsha and capturing the important agricultural areas of Hunan and Hubei would have severely restricted the food supply, and foreign weapons shipments from the south necessary to maintain Chinese resistance.

In the Second Battle of Changsha, the Japanese advanced upon the city with 120,000 soldiers in three columns.  In the end they would be confronted by perhaps 300,000 Chinese soldiers from several armies.  The Japanese enjoyed early success due to massing armor, artillery, and airpower and quickly crushed the 74th Chinese Army, then entered Changsha.  However, bad weather soon limited the effectiveness of airpower while rain delayed Japanese tanks and artillery from keeping up with the infantry.  Inside Changsha itself the street fighting was fierce as General Xue Yue had ordered the defenders to fight to the last man.  Soon afterwards two Chinese counterattacks were launched, one against the Japanese left flank and another to disrupt Japanese communications from the north.

Eventually Chinese forces managed to cut off the 3rd Japanese Army while the latter’s forces inside the city ran out of food and ammunition.  As many times before, Japanese soldiers were forced to break out of an encirclement and retreat, but this time suffered greatly from surprise assaults, ambushes, and roadblocks.  Tobe Ryōichi has suggested the operation had originally been designed as a limited offensive, and that “higher military authorities did not permit it to occupy the city.”  However, this appears as a rationalization to justify Japan’s failure to hold Changsha, and downplays the encirclement and retreat of Japanese forces.  On the other hand, the Japanese did suffer far fewer casualties, roughly 7000 compared to at least several times this amount for the Chinese. Either way, most sources agree Japan gained little from the battle apart from yet another favorable loss exchange ratio.

Remarkably, Japan would launch the Third Battle of Changsha around Christmas 1941 but by then the war had changed considerably in lieu of Pearl Harbor and Japan’s attempts to conquer Southeast Asia from the western powers.  Japanese objectives and military efforts in 1940-1941 had generally mimicked those of 1939 with limited offensives to take strategically important points and/or degrade Chinese military capabilities.  They had also included ever increasing strategic bombing to damage Chinese morale and industry in inner China, and further isolate Chiang Kai-shek’s regime from outside aid.

In some cases, Japan gained limited strategic results and impressive operational victories, but in the end Japan’s primary goal of ending the war on its terms failed completely.  As 1941 ended, Japan’s hope of defeating the Chinese before heightened international tensions, as well as its brutal conduct in China, brought Japan into conflict with America evaporated.  This will be discussed shortly.

Summing up the First Half of the Second Sino-Japanese War:

“Another victory like that and we are done for.”  -Pyrrhus

What were the consequences of the first half of Japan’s war against China and what did the former gain from it?

The results for China included:

• Japan captured or blockaded most of China’s seaports and coast.
• Japan seized most of China’s major cities including Nanjing, Beijing, Tianjin, Shanghai, Guangzhou, Wuhan, Qingdao, Taiyuan, Nanchang, Nanning, etc.
• Japan took control of most of China’s main rail hubs and railways.
• Japan now occupied all of China’s main economic centers.  As noted by S.C.M. Paine these were Manchuria, the Beijing-Tianjin area, Shanghai, Wuhan and Guangzhou.
• The KMT regime lost the majority of its industrial base (including 85% of its productive capacity), especially with the occupation of Shanghai and surrounding areas.
• To put all of this in perspective it is worthwhile comparing the war in China versus Hitler’s war against the Soviet Union.  The capture of China’s main cities, economic/industrial areas and railways would have been the equivalent of Hitler’s armies occupying Moscow, Leningrad, Stalingrad and perhaps up to the Archangel-Astrakhan line the Germans wanted in 1941.
• The creation of as many as 80,000,000-95,000,000 temporary or long term Chinese war refugees.
• The destruction or mauling of many Chinese armies and severely degrading China’s military capabilities.  This included the severe losses of Chiang Kai-shek’s German trained forces in 1937, the Chinese armies defending Wuhan in 1938, and the re-equipped Chinese forces that launched the Winter Offensive of 1939-1940.
• Considerable damage inflicted upon cities like Chongqing and Chengdu, along with Free China’s industry and armaments production, due to Japanese strategic bombing.
• Massive destruction inflicted upon Shanghai, Nanjing, Taierzhuang, and Changsha (among other Chinese cities) due to urban warfare, fires, scorched earth measures, and atrocities.
• The severe curtailing of foreign aid to China due to the end of German, Soviet, and French support by the fall of 1941.
• The establishment of puppet regimes that controlled a big portion of Chinese territory and population, which freed up Japanese soldiers to attack Free Chinese forces elsewhere.
• General Japanese control of the Yangtze River up to the city of Yichang in Hubei province.
• Japanese conquests deprived Chiang Kai-shek’s regime of a disproportionate amount of customs duties, taxes, cigarettes, salt, and other assets which provided its prewar revenues.
• From 1937-39 the KMT’s revenues decreased by two-thirds while expenditures rose by one-third.
• Due to the loss of such revenues the KMT regime increased its production of opium (the CCP, Chinese warlords and Japanese also engaged in the opium trade).
• The further decline of China’s economy which resulted in inflation, lower wages, shortages, and subsequent increases in black market trading and corruption.  Apparently inflation rose as many as twenty times from 1937-1941 and would get much worse over time.
• The Yellow River flood of 1938, ordered by Chiang Kai-shek, resulting in 400,000-900,000 deaths and 3-5 million refugees.
• Japan occupied and pillaged much of China’s agricultural and rice lands, which led to food shortages and contributed to the Henan Famine of 1942-1943.
• The loss of most of China’s electrical producing capabilities.  Free China only managed to produce 4-8% of the country’s entire electrical power generation (Japan controlled the rest) after the first years of the war.
• Widespread Japanese warcrimes, raids, pillaging, the use of chemical/biological weapons, and countless other unpleasant actions inflicted upon the Chinese.
• Outbreaks of diseases such as Cholera, Typhus and Malaria thanks to the breakdown of an already inadequate health care system, millions of refugees, and overcrowded conditions in Free China.
• Millions of Chinese civilian and soldiers deaths.
• Japan killed the vast majority of Chinese soldiers they captured (China adopted the same practice towards Japanese POWs).  According to Herbert Bix at the end of the war the Japanese government claimed it only had 56 Chinese POWs in its custody!
• The de facto destruction of the KMT’s modernization initiatives and programs during the Nanjing Decade.  These had resulted in considerable industrial and economic growth, the building of railways and other infrastructure, along with impressive strides towards Chinese unity.  China would not see such levels of economic growth and significant progress until decades after the war, the death of Mao Zedong, and the coming to power of Deng Xiaoping in the late 1970s.

Regarding Japan, the first four years of the Second Sino-Japanese War gained it little despite impressive and constant military successes.  For Japan the results included:

• Approximately 500,000 dead or wounded Japanese soldiers (including 132,000 killed in combat and 48,000 dead via disease) during more then 50 months of fighting in China.  It has also been suggested the Japanese often killed many of their wounded soldiers to prevent their presence demoralizing the home front in Japan.
• The deployment of nearly 700,000 Japanese soldiers (not including hundreds of thousands more stationed in Manchuria) in occupied China fighting a never ending war by the time of Pearl Harbor.
• The exhaustion of considerable money and resources for the war in China.  For example, the expenditures of the Imperial Japanese Navy from 1937-1945 in China alone, which actually did a lot of fighting against China (including most of Japan’s strategic bombing efforts) could instead have produced 100 medium sized aircraft carriers.
• Hans Van de Ven has observed that Japan’s occupied areas of China were net food importer regions and the Japanese ended up having to feed over 100,000,000 Chinese.
• Chinese scorched earth methods, the costs of occupation, Japanese resources spent in China, not to mention the widespread destruction caused by the conflict, meant the invasion of China severely hurt the Japanese economy.  Nor did it bring in significant Chinese goods to Japan..  Thus ironically, instead of helping Japan’s attempts at autarky the war made it less rich and more dependent upon foreign imports (notably from the United States).  This was in striking contrast to Japan’s success in pacifying Taiwan and Manchuria, and making them into show pieces of Japanese colonialism via impressive industry, infrastructure, sanitation, and relative stability.
• Japanese aggression against China alienated major foreign powers such as America, Britain, and the Soviet Union by warcrimes, aggressive diplomacy, and denying them access to Chinese markets.  This led to heightened tensions between these nations and Japan, which helped push them towards war.
• While Japan saw impressive economic growth from 1931-1936 from 1937 onwards this plateaued then declined.
• The continuing war in China resulted in ever increasing military budgets for Japan.  The 1937 military budget was triple the amount of the 1934-1936 period, and the war budget doubled again in 1939.  In 1941 Japan spent just over 75% of its annual budget on military expenditures.
• In order to control industrial production the Japanese military discarded Japan’s market economy and adopted central planning methods similar to the Communist system it claimed to oppose.
• All of these economic woes lead to shortages, rationing, inflation, along with price and wage freezes in the Japanese home islands.

Therefore, Japan’s four years of war in China not only brought misery, death and economic privation to the Chinese but also resulted in considerable military casualties and economic decline for Japan itself.  Besides this, the war unified most of the Chinese nation (KMT, CCP, warlords and the Chinese masses) because of the cruel methods of the Japanese invaders.  Japan’s jingoistic populace and military hawks also guaranteed any peace terms offered to China would be too drastic for the Chinese to accept.  These conditions made Japanese leaders desperate to end the war and resulted in actions such as the occupation of South Indochina that finally provoked the United States, and other powers to take a stand against Japan.

Unfortunately for Japan, but luckily for China, this would lead to Pearl Harbor, American entry into the war, and the beginning of the Pacific Theatre of World War 2.