July 23, 2024

“Russia is never as strong as she looks; Russia is never as weak as she looks.” -Winston Churchill

On the first anniversary of Russia’s unprovoked war against Ukraine, President Zelenskyy told the Ukrainian people that “2023 will be the year of our victory!” Whether this was for domestic consumption, or he genuinely believed it, there was hope in Ukraine and among its allies, that Putin’s army could be crippled on the battlefield. After inflicting humiliating defeats on Russia at Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Kherson in 2022, Ukrainian forces seemed unstoppable. Russia’s pyrrhic victory by seizing the ruins of Bakhmut, at a disproportionate cost, did little to alleviate this. Surely, after receiving considerable NATO weapons and training over the winter and spring, Ukraine would easily break through Russian lines, rout Putin’s army, and win the war.

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The summer of 2023 was seen as an ideal time to launch an offensive against Russian forces in Ukraine.

Russia’s army lacked offensive capabilities, was low on ammunition, and had issues integrating conscripts after Putin’s unpopular partial mobilization. Ukraine would achieve artillery superiority with modern pieces and considerable shells provided by NATO and South Korea. HIMARS (High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) would continue to devastate Russian logistics and forces. NATO supplied modern armored vehicles like Leopards, Bradleys, and Marders would breach Russian lines and advance into open country. While Russia still had air superiority over Ukraine’s small airforce, and had built strong defenses (named the Surovikin Line), it was assumed western technology and Ukrainian ingenuity would surmount these issues and crush Russia’s demoralized army.

Another compelling, if less advertised reason for Ukraine to launch a counteroffensive in 2023, was due to political considerations in Western nations like France, Britain, and especially America. With increasing economic woes, political polarization, and upcoming elections in Western capitals, support for Ukraine would slowly wane as they focused on domestic issues. As such, foreign weapon shipments and support for Ukraine would arguably peak in 2023. If Ukrainian forces did not inflict a notable defeat on Russia, many western voters and bean counters would question why 10s of billions of dollars were being spent to support a long war.

Remembering the fall of Saigon, the recent collapse of Afghanistan, and the costly Iraq War, this was understandable. But Ukraine was not South Vietnam, Iraq, or Afghanistan. Unlike them, the Ukrainian leadership and people were united, increasingly clamped down on corruption, and had consistently proven themselves on the battlefield. Ironically, American and western support for a credible ally like Ukraine has diminished quickly versus the decades of support given to corrupt, incompetent regimes in Saigon, Kabul, and Baghdad.

Objectives, Plans, and Concerns

The main objective of the counteroffensive was for Ukrainian forces to pierce the Surovikin Line in a quick armored assault, backed by artillery, and advance to the Sea of Azov. This would split Russian forces in Southern Ukraine in half, sever Putin’s land bridge to Crimea, and isolate the Crimean Peninsula. Afterwards, it was hoped Crimea could be forced to surrender by blockade and long-range missile attacks, or be overrun by Ukraine. Having suffered such military disasters it was hoped Putin would either end the war, be overthrow by the Russian people, or be removed in a palace coup.

The battle plans were created after eight war games conducted by American, Ukrainian, and British officers. Notably, the KORA system, that analyzed these simulations, suggested Ukraine had a 50% chance of success (which was hardly encouraging). Tellingly, the war games deduced in an ideal scenario where the attacks went precisely to plan, Ukrainian forces could reach the Sea of Azov in 60-90 days. Given that American officers especially knew “no plan survives contact with the enemy,” based on their formal education and experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan, much of this was wishful thinking.

Such sentiments extended to NATO and Ukrainian officers as well. NATO thought Ukrainian forces could advance up to 30 kilometers a day. Ukraine’s 47th Mechanized Brigade, which led the main assault, believed it could advance nine miles in the first 24 hours to reach Robotyne. According to Lieutenant Mykola Melnyk, a Ukrainian company commander, the reality “was a little different” and he later criticized the planners of the counteroffensive: “The whole strategy was that the enemy would see us, get scared and start retreating.”

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Disagreements between Ukrainian and American planners, among other factors, also highlighted concerns for the upcoming counteroffensive.

While American officers advised Ukraine to concentrate its newly trained and equipped forces on a single part of the front (around Robotyne in Zaporizhzhia Oblast), the Ukrainians decided to attack on three axes. Besides the Robotyne axis, this included a thrust towards Berdiansk and most controversially, another near Bakhmut. The Americans believed the best chance of breaching the Surovikin Line was massing armor and firepower in one area. But the Ukrainians wanted to pin down the Russians in multiple areas, to prevent them from easily shifting reserves during the offensive. Ukraine’s decision to attack on three fronts lowered the chances of piercing Russian defenses, while its offensive near Bakhmut was arguably misplaced, as gaining territory there would not give Ukraine strategic benefits.

However, America was mistaken in asking Ukraine to attack in April 2023, before Russia finished the Surovikin Line. On paper it made sense, but in reality it was unlikely. America and NATO had initially delayed weapon shipments like tanks and de-mining vehicles to Ukraine, to avoid excessive escalation by Russia. Ukraine’s allies also did not provide weapons like F-16s and long-range missiles like ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System), before the offensive. Obviously, late weapons shipments gave Ukraine less time to train with them. Holding up other weapon systems also denied Ukraine crucial capabilities, like increased air support and the ability to hit important targets far behind the front.

Perhaps the idea Ukraine could have attacked earlier than June is academic anyway, given Ukraine’s Rasputitsa (mud season) lasted longer than expected. The wet, muddy terrain made a successful offensive with armored fighting vehicles virtually impossible. One Ukrainian official said the mud was like a soup and “you just sort of sink in it.”

Ukraine and NATO also struggled to train the 12 new brigades, equipped with Western weapons, in combined operations, in time for the counteroffensive. Some of this was due to late shipments of Western weapons, some of it was because the Ukrainians decided to form most of the brigades with inexperienced soldiers. Instead, Ukraine made the questionable decision to commit veteran forces to Bakhmut, while they created the newer brigades around greener troops. Another issue was transitioning Ukrainian forces equipped with Soviet weapons to more advanced western ones, and train them in crash courses in complex, NATO-style maneuvers. Given NATO soldiers train for years to master combined arms and Ukraine did not have much experience with large-scale offensives (the Kharkiv offensive in 2022 had only four brigades), there was concern the new brigades did not receive enough training going into the battle.

The Enemy Gets a Vote: Russian Forces and the Surovikin Line

Thanks to Putin’s partial mobilization of 300,000 soldiers and incentives/coercive means to attract other manpower, Russia replaced its heavy losses from 2022 and was in a good position to meet Ukraine’s counteroffensive. Philippe Gros, a defense researcher, suggests there was relative parity on the battlefield, with Russian troop strength between 350,000 and 400,000, and the  “Ukrainians probably have a little more.”

Russia also enjoyed air superiority, even if Ukraine’s air defenses denied it outright aerial dominance. It heavily outnumbered the Ukrainian air force, its fighter jets outranged Ukraine’s less advanced ones, and NATO failed to provide F-16s to improve Ukraine’s prospects in the air. Russian attack helicopters posed a significant risk to Ukrainian ground units, especially armored vehicles.

The Surovikin Line was no pushover either. It was composed of three lines of defense, often sited on high ground, and could not be outflanked. It was a sophisticated network of trenches, anti-tank traps, fortresses, landmines, and artillery positions. According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, Russia’s defensive line was the most “extensive defensive works in Europe since World War II.”

Mines would prove to be especially troublesome for Ukrainian forces. Then Ukraine’s Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, claimed Russian minefields were laid up to a depth of 15 to 20 kilometers. They had five mines per square meter in some areas and Ukraine remains the most mined country in the world.

Finally, Russia’s leadership and forces had improved since their poor showing in 2022. Many of its bad (and dead) generals had been replaced by competent ones, such as Major General Ivan Popov. Harsh lessons had been learned and Russian forces adopted appropriate defensive doctrine. They employed an elastic, defense-in-depth method to cede territory when needed, then launch quick counterattacks after Ukrainian forces became weakened after advancing. Frontline soldiers were also “motivated” to hold vital ground when necessary, due to Russian blocking detachments that would shoot those who retreated without orders.

The Beginning of the Counteroffensive

As Ukraine started offensive operations in early June 2023 Russia blew up the Kakhovka Dam. This flooded the lower Dnieper River, causing vast destruction and preempting potential Ukrainian assaults from the Kherson region. Any chance of outflanking the Surovikin Line from the west had been eliminated.

To break through Russian defenses Ukraine deployed its 12 new Brigades (roughly 60,000 soldiers) to advance in three axes towards Melitopol, Berdiansk, and Bakhmut. While Ukraine lacked significant airpower, it tried to compensate with its temporary 2-1 to 3-2 artillery advantage by concentrating it at the point of attacks. It was hoped effective artillery bombardments would weaken Russian defenses and suppress their forces, giving Ukraine’s de-mining vehicles a window to clear minefields. This was to be done quickly to let Ukrainian soldiers and armored vehicles break Russia’s first line of defense before Russian reinforcements arrived to stall any advance.

The first week of the counteroffensive in June 2023 did not go according to plan. Robotyne was not reached in 24 hours, the first part of the Surovikin Line was not pierced, and Russian forces stood firm. Ukrainian losses, including many Leopard Tanks and Bradley Fighting Vehicles, were substantial. A place near Robotyne was named Bradley Square, due to many knocked-out Bradleys littering the area. An article from The Washington Post described the fate of one Ukrainian assault:

“The Russians, positioned on higher ground, immediately started firing antitank missiles. Some vehicles in the convoy were hit, forcing others behind them to veer off the path. Those, in turn, exploded on mines, snarling even more of the convoy. Russian helicopters and drones swooped in and attacked the pileup.”

Ukraine’s de-mining vehicles, being prized targets, suffered disproportionate losses. Russian drones provided targeting information to helicopters and artillery to attack these vehicles, while loitering munitions and kamikaze drones hit them as well. Ukrainian tanks equipped with rollers to detonate mines were knocked out by Russian mines stacked two to three on top of each other. Perhaps 60% of Ukrainian de-mining equipment was destroyed or damaged in the first week of the attack, which was disastrous as the first line of defense was not breached.

Besides effective Russian defenses and tactics, it is likely the timing and axes of the offensive were anticipated by Russia. The 47th Brigade believed its assault had been tipped off by spies and drones, while the routes of advance in the south were obvious to overrun critical centers like Tokmak, Melitopol, and Berdiansk. Open speculation by western mainstream media, military experts, and pundits before the counteroffensive, arguably did not help.

On June 8, Russian media listed several reasons for Russia’s initial defensive victories, including air superiority, effective mining, and electronic warfare (which limited the use of drones and HIMARS). During the same day, the highly esteemed, pro-Ukrainian, Institute for the Study of War admitted: “Russian forces apparently defended against this attack in a doctrinally sound manner.”

Like the Battle of the Somme in 1916 and the Nivelle Offensive in 1917, which were hyped-up as potential war-winning offensives, Ukraine’s initial attacks in June 2023 floundered with unexpected losses and limited gains. Russia had won the first round and Ukraine temporarily halted offensive operations to re-evaluate its plans and tactics.

Ukraine Adapts and Slowly Advances

Rather than continuing big, armored assaults that were vulnerable to Russian firepower, General Zaluzhnyi ordered Ukrainian forces to dismount and continue the battle on foot. The campaign evolved into an attritional slog, where small infantry units would make controlled advances and use overwhelming artillery to storm Russian strongholds. Such methods prevented further heavy losses for armored vehicles and lowered Ukrainian casualties, but could not lead to a decisive breakthrough. However, it did allow Ukraine to advance and inflict significant losses on Russian forces.

As the Institute for the Study of War described in more conventional terms, the goal of Ukrainian forces was:

Creating “an asymmetrical attrition gradient that conserves Ukrainian manpower at the cost of a slower rate of territorial gains, while gradually wearing down Russian manpower and equipment” and “destroying Russian manpower, equipment, fuel depots, artillery, and air defenses.”

To get through minefields small squads of infantry disarmed the mines by hand at night, when they were harder to detect. Using sneak and peak tactics infiltration groups assessed Russian defenses, found weaknesses, and used artillery and airpower to take strongholds and wear down Russian forces. Such tactics defeated Russian units but took considerable time to gain territory, which was often conquered one tree line at a time. Veteran troops were deployed to help with this but too many remained on the strategically dubious Bakhmut front. These soldiers, without advanced western kit, performed better than the newer, better-equipped brigades. This was another example in military history where leadership and experience compensated for material disadvantages.

Ukraine’s superiority in artillery was vital for success. Besides giving Ukrainian soldiers firepower to attack strongholds and precision to hit vital targets, it was decisive in counter-battery fire, which took a big toll on Russian artillery. Having no counter-battery radar systems, Russian units were vulnerable to Ukraine’s superior artillery and cheap drones. For example, after a few exchanges, Russia lost 32 artillery pieces compared to eight for Ukraine in early July. It became so bad that General Ivan Popov criticized Russia’s military leadership for the lack of counter-battery systems, which he blamed for “the mass deaths and injuries of our brothers in enemy artillery fire.”

However, such tactics expended artillery shells at a prohibitive rate, so America agreed to provide Ukraine with cluster munitions in July as a stopgap measure. As in World War I, the rate of artillery fire was more than expected and NATO had not adequately expanded its munitions production (especially for vital 155 mm shells). This complacency would allow Russia, backed by stockpiles of shells from North Korea, to regain artillery superiority as the year came to an end. Given the vast superior industrial and economic capabilities of NATO versus Russia and North Korea, this was completely preventable had Ukraine’s allies been more forward-thinking.

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While Ukrainian forces advanced and inflicted substantial losses on Russian forces, the fighting was desperate. Often, rather than pullback, Russian soldiers clung to their positions despite being subjected to heavy artillery fire. This led to Ukrainian units engaging in close combat, which was costly for both sides. Russian soldiers also used deadly tactics like leaving trenches full of remote-controlled mines, and then detonating them once Ukrainian soldiers occupied them. Russian electronic warfare continued to jam many drones and HIMARS.

NATO restrictions also limited Ukrainian advances. Besides not providing enough tanks or aircraft before the offensive, America did not give Ukraine long-range missiles like ATACMS until October 2023. Ukraine used them on October 17 to hit Russian airfields, destroying nine Russian helicopters, and leading Russia to send its helicopters far behind the front. Had they been given before the summer they could have prevented considerable Ukrainian losses in manpower and tanks.

During the summer and fall Ukrainian forces slogged on and took ground slowly. Robotyne, which was supposed to be taken in four days, was captured on August 28, 2024; 82 days into the offensive. Along with the capture of Verbove on September 3, Ukraine finally breached the first part of the Surovikin Line. However, Ukrainian momentum soon faltered and both sides became exhausted.

The offensive reached the Clausewitzian point of culmination in October when Ukraine ran low on artillery shells and fresh infantry units. The final advance fell well short of the offensive’s minimal goal of Tokmak, an important supply junction. In November 2023 General Zaluzhnyi admitted the war had reached a stalemate, apparently infuriating President Zelenskyy, who wanted to convince NATO the war would not last for years.

Results and Why the Counteroffensive Failed

Ukraine’s 2023 counteroffensive failed to reach the Sea of Azov, split Russian forces in half, and make Crimea untenable for Putin. As winter approached it was clear the war reached its equivalent late 1915 moment where, like combatants in World War I, Russia and Ukraine realized decisive battles were unlikely, and attrition would be the norm.

Unlike Ukraine’s blitzkrieg-like Kharkiv offensive and its slower Kherson offensive in 2022, the counteroffensive in 2023 did not advance far or take considerable territory. Its maximum advances on the three axes alternated between seven to 19 kilometers. In total Ukraine liberated 14 villages, with a pre-war population of 5000, and 370 square kilometers (less than half the territory Russia took in 2023). On a map, it looked somewhat impressive, given the bulge it created by overrunning the first part of the Surovikin Line. In reality, it merely created a strategically dubious salient (like Ypres in World War I), vulnerable to Russian attacks on three sides.

Casualties and losses are hard to confirm. On the Zaporizhzhia front alone Ukraine lost 518 visually confirmed vehicles versus 600 by Russia by November 10. A report by Forbes suggested both sides generally suffered the same losses in soldiers and equipment. On one hand this reflects well on Ukrainian forces. Ukraine had many disadvantages like attacking strong defenses with inadequate forces, in a mostly open battlefield infested with drones and vulnerable to Russian air superiority. Admittedly, Russia won on the strategic level by preventing Ukraine from reaching the Sea of Azov, and on the operational level by stopping a breakthrough of the Surovikin Line. On the tactical level however, Ukrainian forces, mostly on foot, won the tactical contest by breaking Russia’s initial defenses and inflicting more losses on the enemy.

As noted by Michael Kofman, a Russian military analyst: “From the standpoint of an offensive operation, where usually the attacker bears the larger share of casualties and material losses, the Ukrainian military did reasonably well, certainly about as well as could be expected under the conditions and the level of training that they had available.”

Another analyst, Franz-Stefan Gady, noting Russia’s advantages on the battlefield, pointed out that “Ukraine did adapt to these realities, often impressively so. No other military with new weapons and just a few months of training in new ways of war would have likely done a better job in this situation.”

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Why did the counteroffensive fail? Many factors have been listed above but NATO, Ukraine, and Russia contributed to the outcome.

NATO gave Ukraine too few weapons and capabilities too late. Ukraine conducted the offensive on too many fronts, initially kept its veteran forces at Bakhmut, while its new brigades were green and inadequately trained in combined operations. America and Ukraine created an unrealistic plan that overestimated Ukrainian capabilities and underestimated obstacles like Russian air superiority and numerous weapon systems that savaged armored assaults. Russian fortifications, defensive doctrine, and military performance were more effective than anticipated.

A critical factor was the evolving nature of the conflict. Advances in intelligence and communications and the sheer numbers, range, and lethality of weapons from drones, anti-tank missiles, to heavy artillery, gave the defense a decisive advantage. This was highlighted by Russia’s subsequent struggle to take Adiivka (October 2023-February 2024). Like Ukraine’s counteroffensive, Russian minesweepers, tanks, and armored vehicles suffered severe losses, and Russia lost 4000 troops in the first three weeks. The Russians were forced to switch to infantry assaults, backed by heavy artillery, and made slow advances over four months; as Ukraine had done in the summer.

Final Thoughts and the Future of the War

The head of Ukrainian military intelligence, General Kyrylo Budanov, noted that without a technological breakthrough to overcome the stalemate by Ukraine, Russia had the advantage in an attritional war, due to its superior manpower and resources. General Zaluzhnyi echoed this by saying “like in the First World War, we have reached the level of technology that puts us into a stalemate.” Such a breakthrough had broken the stalemate in late 1918 during that conflict. British and allied forces used evolving technology and tactics to create the genesis of combined operations, to defeat German forces. In Ukraine’s case, despite its advantages in innovation versus Russia, it will need constant backing of NATO technology and resources to produce a similar breakthrough.

Without such a military revolution to inflict decisive battlefield defeats, the war will be decided by the nation that maintains the political will to outlast the enemy.

In the case of Ukraine, facing an existential threat to its sovereignty, it will fight until it runs out of every shell, bullet, and Molotov cocktail. Memories of historical Russian oppression, along with Russia’s current efforts of cultural genocide, give Ukraine an advantage in political will.

The Russian people and elites face no existential threat, are seeing increasingly heavy casualties and economic woes, and mostly pay lip service to the war effort. However, for Vladimir Putin, the conflict represents a fatal threat to his regime and personal survival. Combined with his perverse sense of history and destiny, Putin has no incentive to end the war. Only a one-sided settlement, where Russia keeps considerable territory and Ukraine remains a weakened state, would satisfy the paranoid dictator.

If Ukraine and Putin’s regime will continue the war until one side cannot continue the fight, the resolve of NATO members, especially America, is less certain. If Ukrainian society is united and Putin dominates Russian policy, the democratic nature of NATO poses concerns for the future.

Elections, like the French one in 2022 and America’s upcoming one in 2024, could elect leaders like Marine Le Pen and Donald Trump, who sympathize with Putin. Actions of cynical member states, like Turkey delaying Sweden’s and Finland’s accession to NATO, and Hungary, which delayed a 50 billion-euro aid package to Ukraine, undermine NATO’s unity. Political polarization and economic issues at home also means problems abroad become less important to voters over time. This helped delay America’s own 60 billion-dollar aid package to Ukraine in 2024. Like America’s wars in Korea, Vietnam, Iraq, and Afghanistan, the conflict in Ukraine may be decided by Western leaders and voters, instead of soldiers in the field.

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War is the most unpredictable of human endeavors and the conflict could end in many ways.

Ukraine, if backed by strong and consistent NATO support, could inflict a decisive defeat on Russian forces, leading to a revolution or coup against Putin. Alternatively, heavy casualties, economic woes, and oppression could initiate a coup or revolution against Putin; leading to a Russian defeat in the field, or Russia withdrawing from Ukraine. If Donald Trump comes to power and/or NATO members’ electorates become wary of the conflict, the war could end in a stalemate. This would result in an unfavorable peace treaty for Ukraine, or an armistice and partition of the country, as happened in Korea in 1953.

Either way, if Ukraine and NATO entered 2023 with optimism, thinking Russia would lose the war that year, their hopes drowned in mud and blood on the battlefields of Robotyne, Bakhmut, and Adiivka. Like in World War I in 1914 and 1915, World War II in 1944, and Korea in 1950, the war in Ukraine did not end before Christmas in 2023. Mark Twain once said, “history doesn’t repeat itself, but it often rhymes.” Like their predecessors, NATO and Ukrainian politicians and generals succumbed to wishful thinking, over confidence, and perhaps even complacency.

If 2022 was a year of victories for Ukraine, 2023 was arguably a victory for Putin and his underestimated Russian army. For 2024 and beyond the results are far from certain given an ever-changing battlefield, and the fragile political will in NATO capitals.

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