May 7, 2024
“You can build a throne with bayonets, but you can’t sit on it for long.” -Boris Yeltsin, Vladimir Putin’s predecessor
The Battle of Kiev (February-April 2022):
The Battle of Kiev was the first major campaign of the war and decisive in preventing Russia from winning the conflict by a short blitzkrieg. Putin hoped to take Kiev, overthrow its government, replace it with a puppet regime, and declare victory. But instead of facing minimal resistance as he hoped, the Ukrainians fought back like lions, while Russian tanks and trucks floundered in the mud north of the city.
The Russians lost due to several factors.
Firstly, they were unable to deploy enough forces to enter Kiev in strength. Russia had only massed 200,000 soldiers to invade the second biggest country in Europe and the contingent sent against Kiev was no bigger than 30,000. Any chance to quickly overrun Kiev before it organized its defenses was lost due to Russia’s inability to airlift troops into Hostomel Aiport after it was taken, and by logistical woes facing the Russian army. Indeed, a combination of corruption, poor maintenance, and Ukrainian resistance stalled the armored columns headed for Kiev, which became sitting ducks in a 40 mile convoy north of the city.
U.S. and NATO supplied weapons like javelins, stingers, and drones destroyed Russian tanks, trucks, and aircraft, while Ukrainian artillery inflicted disproportionate Russian losses. The will of the Ukrainians to fight was crucial and during the initial days there was some panic and many thought President Zelenskyy would flee (as his counterpart in Kabul had done a year later, leading to conquest of Afghanistan by the Taliban). Instead, Zelenskyy reassured his people and helped prevent a rout when he responded to America’s offer to evacuate him by saying “I need ammunition, not a ride.”
Ultimately, Russia’s war plans were seriously flawed and based on faulty intelligence, hubris, and yes-men. These generals and bureaucrats dared not tell Putin the likeliness of Ukrainian resistance, or the flaws in his bloated, corrupt, and poorly motivated army. As Russian forces retreated from Kiev and the rest of north Ukraine in late March 2022, it was clear Putin would not win a short war. Ukrainians held their heads high and it became obvious the combat effectiveness of the Russian army had been vastly overestimated, even by defense analysts. Those who had studied Russian military history in-depth were less surprised.
But despite Ukraine’s strategic defensive victory the war had only just begun.
The Siege of Mariupol (February-May 2022):
“If everyone saw what happened to Mariupol, that will at least give some meaning to this horror, because worse than dying, can only be dying without meaning.” -Vladimir, 20 Days in Mariupol
The Siege of Mariupol was a Pyrrhic victory for the Russian forces that finally overwhelmed the surrounded and outnumbered Ukrainian garrison in late May 2022. Located on the Sea of Azov and close to Russian occupied Donbas, Putin’s forces needed to take Mariupol to conquer a land bridge to connect Russian territory to Crimea. The city was cut off in a few days, lost electricity and heat, while food, water, and medical supplies inevitably dwindled. Despite such privations, Russian firepower, and little hope of relief, the garrison held out for over 80 days. Retired American General David Petraeus has referred to its defense as “a Ukrainian Alamo.”
Ukrainian attempts to bring in supplies and evacuate people by helicopter mostly failed due to Russian airpower. Efforts by the Red Cross to evacuate civilians in convoys mostly failed when they came under fire. Russian forces had to conquer Mariupol block by block and hit the city with so many shells and bombs that 90-95% of its buildings were damaged or destroyed. The siege ended with the surrender of the last Ukrainian forces at the Azovstal (a vast industrial facility), that Russian forces initially decided to reduce by bombing and blockade due to its defensive strength.
The siege witnessed two notorious incidents of Russian brutality. On March 9, 2022 Russia bombed a maternity and children’s hospital, under the false accusation Ukrainian forces were stationed there. Graphic video footage of pregnant women being evacuated shocked the world. Another instance occurred on March 16, 2022 when a theater building, sheltering hundreds of civilians, was bombed despite the Russian word for children being drawn in large letters on the pavement outside. The death toll has been estimated between 12-600. It has been alleged that 82 of 106 hospitals and healthcare facilities in the city were destroyed or damaged in the fighting.
Military casualties are debated but it’s likely 3500-4000 Ukrainian soldiers were captured and probably at least 8000 civilians died in the 85 day siege. After the battle Russia began to deport residents and Russify the city to erase any Ukrainian identity. In February 2022 Mariupol’s population was 430,000, today it may be as low as 120,000.
The Battles of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk (May-July 2022):
“The worst policy is to attack cities.” -Sun Tzu
After failing to take Kiev and win the war in a swift campaign, Russia’s leadership debated what to do while its forces licked their wounds. Temporarily putting aside the main goal of subverting all of Ukraine, Putin decided to focus on taking the Donbas (Ukraine’s Luhansk and Donetsk Oblasts). Russia occupied much of them in 2014 and disingenuously suggested its Russian-speaking populations were oppressed by Ukraine, to help justify Putin’s unprovoked invasion in 2022. Seizing the Donbas would help Russia save face after its humiliating defeat at Kiev and give Putin a victory to sell to the Russian people.
Towards this end Russian forces attacked the twin cities of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk in the late spring to early summer of 2022. These cities were the last significant settlements Ukraine held in the Luhansk Oblast and their capture would give Russia a symbolic victory.
Severodonetsk was attacked first, with continuous aerial bombing and shelling starting in April. Like the siege of Mariupol the city would see brutal urban warfare, the disruption of power and water supplies, and the destruction of most of its buildings. Fortunately, unlike Mariupol, most civilians managed to flee the city before the end of April.
Ukraine’s forces had many disadvantages in the struggle. Besides Russia’s far larger armored and air forces, it also had 10 times more artillery, according to Kyrylo Budanov, the head of Ukrainian military intelligence. The supply routes into the city were constantly shelled, while Russian efforts to encircle it risked the capture of the defending garrison.
The main offensive started in late May with Russian forces slowly advancing block by block under powerful artillery barrages. The Ukrainians realized they wouldn’t be able to hold the city, as they had not yet received significant weapons from NATO, but they fought back stubbornly. The garrison adopted a flexible defense, designed more to inflict heavy Russian casualties, instead of holding the entire city. They launched timely counterattacks and closed with Russian infantry so the latter couldn’t always rely on artillery and airpower.
However, Russian numbers and shells inevitably pushed the Ukrainians back and with Severodonetsk’s bridges destroyed and its supply lines failing, the garrison retreated across the Donets river to Lysychansk on June 24, 2022. The next day Russia conquered a broken city with 90% damaged or destroyed buildings, and 10,000 remaining civilians.
***
The Ukrainians hoped Lysychansk, situated on high ground across the river from Severodonetsk, would let them mount an effective defense. Unfortunately, Russian firepower was again overwhelming. Not only did it destroy and overwhelm Ukrainian positions one by one, but it also slowly cut off the garrison’s supply routes. Ukraine scored some local victories, like repelling a Russian armored assault, where Ivan “Brest” Marchuk, leading a Pro-Ukrainian Belorussian battalion, played a major role. Marchuk gave his life during the engagement.
However, the Ukrainian defenders fell back again as Russian forces surrounded Lysychansk from the east, south, and north. Russia captured the city on July 3, 2022. After the battle a Facebook post from the Ukrainian army highlighted Russia’s superiority in weapons, manpower and munitions during the struggle for the city: “We continue the fight. Unfortunately, steel will and patriotism are not enough for success – material and technical resources are needed.”
There’s little doubt which audiences (or governments) the message was directed to.
With the fall of Severodonetsk and Lysychansk Putin could claim the de facto “liberation” of Luhansk Oblast by Russian forces. Besides this symbolic victory all Russia gained were the bombed out remains of two cities that provided it with little strategic value. The ISW (Institute of the Study of War) noted Russia had “concentrated the vast majority of its available combat power to capture Sievierodonetsk and Lysychansk at the expense of other axes of advance” and suffered “heavy casualties to do so.”
To this day Russia has yet to conquer the entire Donbas to accomplish Putin’s supposedly limited objectives in Ukraine.
The Kharkiv Counteroffensive (September-October 2022):
“There is nothing as likely to succeed as what the enemy believes you cannot attempt.” -Niccolò Machiavelli
On September 6, 2022 Ukraine launched a surprise counteroffensive to liberate territories east of Kharkiv, its second biggest city. Within three weeks it took more territory than Russia did during the six months since the Battle of Kiev. The Ukrainian offensive was the only successful large-scale battle of maneuver in a war epitomized by minimal advances, artillery duels, and urban warfare.
While this showed the world what Ukraine could accomplish with adequate western support, it also shocked Putin’s regime, forcing him to declare a partial mobilization. Since then the conflict has become a tug-of-war between western political will to provide enough weapons to let Ukraine win, and Russia’s ability to outlast western resolve and overwhelm Ukraine with shells and manpower.
Russia conquered much of Kharkiv Oblast early in the war and advanced upon the city. Like other Ukrainian cities it was continuously hit by Russian artillery, cluster bombs, and rockets. Amnesty International believes 1800 civilians were killed or injured by June 2022.
However, the frontline became mostly static in May when Russia focused on capturing Severodonetsk and Lysychansk. After they were conquered in the summer, Russia sent reinforcements to the Kherson region, especially its bridgehead on the west side of the Dnipro River. There were signs Ukraine was preparing an offensive to eliminate the bridgehead and Russia didn’t want to lose territory it could use to overrun Mykolaiv and Odessa to cut off Ukrainian access to the Black Sea. Once Ukraine began this attack in late August Russia concentrated its attention on it.
Meanwhile, recently arrived western weapons, like HIMARS that could hit Russian logistics far behind enemy lines, were striking targets in the Kherson and Kharkiv regions. Unknown to the Russian leadership and the world, Ukraine had executed a deception campaign (like the one preceding D-Day in 1944) in an age of cell phones, drones, and instant communications. Sun Tzu advised to “let your plans be dark and impenetrable as night, and when you move, fall like a thunderbolt.” When Ukraine unleashed its surprise attack in Kharkiv Oblast in September 2022 the results were immediate.
***
In three days Ukrainian forces broke through Russian lines and liberated 1000 square kilometers. Izium, Russia’s main logistical hub in the region, was swiftly overrun, with the New York Times suggesting its loss was “the most devastating blow to Russia since its humiliating retreat from Kyiv.” Oryx, a credible website that documents war losses, claims Russia lost over 330 pieces of military hardware, including 200 tanks, in the early days of the offensive. By September 13 Ukraine had liberated all of Kharkiv Oblast west of the Oskil River.
The offensive continued as Ukraine seized territory across the river and also advanced on Lyman, a critical Russian supply hub in north Donetsk Oblast. After being encircled Russian forces fled the city, which fell on October 1, 2022. Of 27,000 original residents only a few hundred remained. Given Ukrainian forces found many torture and execution sites across the region during the offensive, including 10 in Izium, this wasn’t surprising.
Ukraine’s successful counteroffensive took 500 settlements, liberated 12,000 square kilometers, inflicted significant Russian casualties, and showed the world it could win the war if given the tools to finish the job. The Ukrainians won a swift victory because Putin was focused on Kherson and his forces in the Kharkiv region were undermanned, suffering from poor morale and logistical woes, and hadn’t constructed in-depth defenses.
Unfortunately, the defeat didn’t result in a popular uprising or coup against Putin. Instead, criticism of the war effort was directed against specific Russian officials and policies, but not him personally. Like most dictators Putin is effective at keeping elites and society in check, but not prosecuting warfare abroad.
So Putin increased rhetoric against the West and attacked Ukrainian infrastructure to appease the hawks. He also ordered a partial mobilization to assure most Russians they wouldn’t fight in a war few of them really support. If that weren’t true Putin would call the conflict a war, instead of a “special military operation,” and Russians would have flocked to recruitment centers like they did in World War 2. Far more, perhaps over 800,000, have fled Russia since the invasion of Ukraine.
But none of this mattered because whatever Ukraine’s brilliant victory accomplished, it did little to crush the Putin regime’s ability and willingness to continue the war.
The Kherson Counteroffensive (August-November, 2022):
“War is a test of will and a test of logistics.” -Lt. General (Retired) Ben Hodges
Kherson city was the only regional capital Russia captured in the war. Located on the western side of the Dnipro River in South Ukraine, it’s the gateway to Mykolaiv and Odessa. If Russia took these regions it would cut off Ukraine from the Black Sea, cripple its trade, and doom its future as a viable state. Taken in the first days of the war, the Ukrainians launched a major offensive from August to November 2022 to liberate it.
Unlike Russia’s disastrous assault on Kiev in the north and its slow crawl in the Donbas in the east, it advanced quickly in the south in the Kherson region in the early stages of the war. It took Kherson city the first week and overran the region east of the Dnipro with relative ease. Russia’s advance only weakened as it approached Mykolaiv in mid-March. While the battle lines remained mostly stable afterwards, the Russian bridgehead on the west side of the Dnipro still posed a threat to Ukraine’s future.
After Russia’s offensives in 2022 ran out of steam and Ukraine received significant NATO weaponry, the Ukrainians decided to crush the Russian bridgehead. Oddly enough they declared this openly from June onwards, which defense experts like Phillips O’Brien pointed out is unusual in military history. Many experts believed Ukraine was setting a trap for Russian forces in the area, but it was done to distract Russia from its upcoming offensive in the Kharkiv region.
While this deception let Ukraine inflict a decisive defeat in Kharkiv Oblast, the cost would become apparent during its advances in the Kherson campaign. By signalling their intentions in the south, the Ukrainians gave Russia time to fortify its bridgehead and amass reinforcements to defend it. Ukraine anticipated a tough fight, with Presidential Advisor Oleksiy Arestovych suggesting the offensive would be a “slow operation to grind the enemy.” Indeed, whereas Ukrainian forces advanced 7.5 kilometers a day on average in the Kharkiv operation, they advanced 600 meters a day on average to liberate Kherson.
To overcome the strong Russian forces and defenses Ukraine relied upon newly arrived weapons and the grim determination of its forces. Western artillery and guided munitions would wear down Russian formations and allow Ukrainian soldiers to advance. Meanwhile, long-range rocket launchers (like HIMARS) would target command centers, munitions depots, bridges, and other logistical targets to cut off Russian supplies and degrade morale.
***
The main offensive began on August 29, 2022 and while the first line of defense was quickly overrun, resistance became more stubborn as Ukrainian forces approached the second one. Casualties mounted and a day of mourning was announced on September 2 after the 128th Mountain Assault Brigade took heavy losses. Ukraine intensified its long-range strikes on Russian command and supply nodes, which helped its forces move forward. To delay the advance Russia blew up the Karachun dam on the Inhulets river on September 14, to flood part of the frontline.
By the end of September Russian forces were low on supplies, suffering from poor morale, and commanders asked Putin for permission to retreat to more defensible positions. He initially refused, as dictators who fail to face military realities have done so throughout history. Indeed, the refusal of Hitler and Stalin to authorize necessary retreats led to the loss of millions of German and Russian soldiers in World War 2.
However, Putin relented in time to allow a partial withdrawal in early October before Russian forces were encircled when Ukraine liberated many settlements. With the situation on the front continuing to deteriorate, Russian officials in Kherson city told residents to leave as Ukrainian forces approached. Russian forces were ordered to leave Kherson themselves on November 9, as supply lines were crumbling, and to save their lives according to the Russian Defense Ministry.
Ukrainian forces liberated the city two days later and were greeted by cheering crowds. However, despite President Zelenskyy declaring the triumph as the “beginning of the end of the war,” the victory remained bittersweet. Like other war-torn cities there was destruction, water and electricity shortages, and mines everywhere. Explosions continued as Russian forces remained just across the Dnipro River and the population had fallen from 300,000 to 80,000. The victory wasn’t cheap for Ukrainian forces, which suffered heavy losses from limited ammunition, and Russian artillery and strong defenses.
Meanwhile, Putin had little to celebrate as the end of the year approached. His forces had proven to be less effective than western analysts, the world, and especially himself, believed. The capture of Mariupol, Severodonetsk, and Lysychansk were costly, mostly symbolic, and gave Russia little strategic benefit. Against this Ukrainian forces had humiliated stronger, more modern forces at the gates of Kiev, accomplished a Blitzkrieg in Kharkiv, and won a tough but important victory at Kherson by destroying the Russian bridgehead.
With Russian criticism of the war mounting, along with rivalries between factions like the defense ministry and the Wagner Group, Putin’s grand designs for Ukraine, and political survival, were becoming increasingly under threat. By contrast Ukraine, backed by combat excellence and increasing supplies of foreign aid, was confident it could win a decisive victory over Putin’s forces in 2023.
As long as America and NATO gave Ukraine the weapons and capabilities it needed in a timely manner, this was a realistic possibility.
Sources:
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/11/10/russia-withdrawal-from-ukraines-kherson-explained-in-maps
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-61945914
https://www.cnn.com/interactive/2023/02/europe/russia-ukraine-war-timeline/index.html
https://www.csis.org/analysis/seizing-initiative-ukraine-waging-war-defense-dominant-world
https://www.defense.gov/Spotlights/Support-for-Ukraine/Timeline
https://www.rollingstone.co.uk/politics/features/how-ukraine-won-battle-kyiv-14872
https://www.theguardian.com/world/ng-interactive/2023/feb/23/mariupol-the-ruin-of-a-city
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Kharkiv_counteroffensive
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2022_Kherson_counteroffensive
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kyiv_(2022)#:~:text=The
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Sievierodonetsk_(2022)
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Siege_of_Mariupol
https://globalnews.ca/news/9291873/ukrainians-kherson-liberation
https://projects.voanews.com/ukraine/war-anniversary/timeline.html
https://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-9847/CBP-9847.pdf