“It is like a disease to think that an invincible status has been achieved after being satisfied with the past successful operations.” -Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku
As noted in the last chapter, after Japan seized its first objectives in the early months of the Asia-Pacific War it had several options available. Despite the weak positions of the British and Chinese in the region, or the temptation to attack Russia as it reeled from German pressure, Japanese leaders knew America was their main enemy. Not only were Japan’s other opponents temporarily weak or distracted, but American naval might and industry posed the gravest threat to Japan. Only America could outproduce the Imperial Japanese Navy, sink Japan’s merchant shipping, advance across the Pacific to take islands with naval and air facilities, and eventually bomb and blockade the Japanese home islands.
Indeed, all of this would occur later in the war. Knowing such risks, Yamamoto and other leaders wanted to destroy America’s main naval forces, especially carriers, in the Pacific before American industrial production dwarfed Japan’s current naval superiority in the region. Australia was also seen as a major staging ground for the Allies to advance on Japan from the south.
Thus, Japan’s navy planned two offensives in the Pacific: One to isolate Australia from America to stop the former becoming a base to attack Japanese possessions, and the other to lure America’s carriers into battle to destroy them. The first resulted in the Battle of the Coral Sea in early May and the second led to the Battle of Midway in early June. However, while Yamamoto got approval from the Japanese leadership to move against Australia to cut off its maritime communications with America, he faced resistance over the risky plan to attack Midway. However, this changed after an unexpected, arguably reckless, air raid against Japan in April, 1942.
The Doolittle Raid
Angry over Pearl Harbor and suffering multiple defeats by the Japanese, America’s leadership wanted to hit back against Japan to boost morale. This led to the Doolittle Raid, named after the man who commanded it, Lt. Colonel James Doolittle. The plan was to fly 16 B-25 bombers from the aircraft carrier Hornet to hit targets in Japan, then land them on airfields in Free China. It was ambitious but very risky. It was difficult for the aircraft (not designed for carrier operations) to take off from aircraft carriers, fuel was a concern given the considerable distances involved, and it would be hard to find the Chinese airfields.
It was also possible the bombers would be shot to pieces as they had no fighter cover. While some individuals, like the aggressive Vice Admiral William Halsey, wanted to hit Japan, at least one critic, Admiral Chester Nimitz, who took control of the Pacific Fleet after Pearl Harbor, saw it less charitably. Given the little damage it could do he questioned the wisdom of sacrificing a bomber squadron given the small forces America had in the Pacific to confront Japan.
Described briefly, the Doolittle Raid was launched April 18, 1942 from the Hornet 650 miles away from Japan. It was planned to launch closer to Japan but a picket boat saw the U.S. force, and with it worried about losing surprise the bombers took off immediately. This meant the bombers would be hard pressed to find the Chinese airfields after bombing Japan, as their fuel would be dangerously low. The bombers reached Japan undetected and luckily were not attacked by Japanese fighters. They bombed targets across Tokyo and Honshu, killed several dozen people, but caused limited damage.
However, one B-25 damaged the nearly completed light carrier Ryūhō and delayed its launch by many months. Japan also decided to keep some fighter groups at home for aerial defense, instead of sending them to reinforce upcoming operations in the Solomon Islands. After hitting Japan the bombers flew towards China and 15 of them crash-landed, or their airmen bailed out, while the last one landed in Vladivostok and was interned by Russia.
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Despite the small damage from the raid it had a disproportionate effect on Japan’s leadership. The military were stunned and suffered a loss of face from the danger it had posed to the emperor. Suddenly, the defensive perimeter they secured did not seem vast enough, so former opposition to Yamamoto’s plan to take Midway to destroy America’s carriers evaporated. This offensive would be launched a month after the first operation in the Coral Sea. However, this was not Japan’s only reaction to the Doolittle Raid.
Furious over the raid but unable to attack America, Japan’s army in China launched a major offensive. This was to prevent China’s eastern provinces from supporting future air raids against Japan, to punish China for allowing the raid (as if it had a choice), and find the American airmen involved. While the campaign will be described in detail another time, a few points should be noted. China was only informed of the raid by America at the last moment and Chiang Kai-shek was not enthusiastic, rightly fearing violent retribution by Japanese forces. Indeed, besides the approximately 70,000 Chinese military losses suffered during the operations in lieu of the Doolittle Raid, up to 250,000 Chinese civilians also perished; far higher than the few dozen Japanese killed by America in the Doolittle Raid!
For example, Peter Harmsen has described how in the town of Yihuang the Japanese killed priest Father Humbert Verdini and the elderly and orphans he was sheltering. Highlighting the disproportionate response to the Doolittle Raid, Alastair Horne in Hubris said this “figure has never, to my knowledge, been disputed; if accurate, it must make this act the most savage reprisal in all of the Second World War.” Naturally Chiang Kai-shek was angry at Japan, along with America that had presented the raid to China as a fait accompli. However, Chiang also wrote presciently in his diary that Japan would change its plans to avenge the Doolittle Raid, leading to the approval of the Midway operation.
Since the Doolittle Raid led to Midway, the often touted turning point of the Pacific War, some have suggested the loss of the bombers, even the vast number of innocent Chinese, was worth it. But the raid alone did not lead to the Battle of Midway, nor did it directly influence the operation in any way. It is true the raid was the direct catalyst leading to Midway but given America and its carriers were the biggest threats to Japan, it is likely the Japanese leadership would have approved the operation soon anyway.
On the other hand by launching the Doolittle Raid America sent two carriers to the North Pacific as Japan prepared its offensive in the Coral Sea. Thus, two American carriers were absent at the Battle of the Coral Sea, which gave Japan the advantage in naval airpower, which influenced its outcome. As will be shown this could have been exploited decisively to the ill of the Allied war effort. So while the Doolittle Raid is often credited for leading to the American victory at Midway, it could also be said it gave Japan the edge in the Battle of the Coral Sea, due to the absence of the American carriers used to launch the raid.
The Battle of the Coral Sea
“After a battle is over, people talk a lot about how decisions were methodically reached, but actually there’s always a hell of a lot of groping around.” -Admiral Frank J. Fletcher
Between the Doolittle Raid and the Battle of Midway Japan launched its operation against Australia and America, leading to the Battle of the Coral Sea. The Japanese plan, called Operation Mo, was to take Port Moresby in New Guinea and Tulagi in the Solomon Islands. This would give Japan airfields and ports to dominate the area and after taking islands like Fiji and New Caledonia, let Japan cut maritime communications between Australia and America. Another crucial objective was to lure Allied naval forces in the region into battle to destroy them.
Regarding both forces Japan had a numerical advantage with two aircraft carriers, a light carrier, and a decent fleet of cruisers and destroyers. The Allies had two aircraft carriers and a smaller force of cruisers and destroyers. In this battle Japan’s carrier force would perform more impressively than the Allies’ equivalent. Having more experience and training Japanese pilots were better at coordination, aerial assaults, and showed superior accuracy during attacks. However, America had advance notice due to intelligence warnings and things would not go as planned for Japan. Tellingly, the fight was later called a “Battle of Naval Errors” by naval historian Samuel Eliot Morison.
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In early May 1942 Japanese naval forces sailed towards the Coral Sea in separate contingents. In the west a landing party for Port Moresby was protected by a force that included the Japanese light carrier Shōhō. Another landing party bound for Tulagi was protected by an another covering force, while the larger Japanese carriers Shōkaku and Zuikaku looped around the Solomons from the east to catch Allied forces in a pincer. Tulagi was taken on May 3 and the next day the Battle of the Coral Sea began.
In a confusing set of engagements, where weather interfered with operations, both sides often misidentified ships, had trouble locating each other, but the battle itself is not hard to describe.
A day after the Japanese landed on Tulagi Rear Admiral Frank J. Fletcher, in charge of the Allied force, sent dozens of aircraft against Japanese ships off the island. They sank a destroyer, three minesweepers, and damaged other ships. Yet the assault was disappointing as it was not as effective as it could have been, particularly attacks by torpedo bombers. Perhaps worse, the raid against Tulagi alerted Japan to the presence of U.S. carriers, giving away the chance they could take Japanese forces by surprise. The next two days were mostly uneventful as both sides tried locating each others’ carriers by aerial reconnaissance and wireless intercepts but were unsuccessful.
On the morning of May 7 the battle escalated after Japanese reconnaissance saw what it thought were U.S. carriers and planes were sent to sink them. But they had misidentified the vessels, which were an oiler and smaller ships. This would prove costly as another reconnaissance force found Fletcher’s carriers an hour later. Faced with conflicting reports the Japanese continued their first attack but also turned their carriers towards Fletcher’s carriers, to launch a future strike against them. They soon realized the first reconnaissance reports were wrong and ordered most of their planes to return but some continued on to sink a destroyer and the oiler.
During the morning the Americans also spotted Japanese ships, thought it was the enemy’s main carrier force, and sent aircraft to hit it. Like previous Japanese reconnaissance this was mistaken, as Japan’s main carriers were not present. But the Allies were luckier by finding Japan’s light carrier, the Shōhō, in a vulnerable position, as most of its aircraft were being armed to attack American carriers. The Shōhō was overwhelmed, apparently hit by 13 bombs and 7 torpedoes (one of the few successful attacks by American torpedo bombers during this period of the war). Unsurprisingly, the light carrier sank within an hour.
This had notable results as the Shōhō had covered the invasion force bound for Port Moresby so its transports, now devoid of air cover, pulled back to await the duel between both sides’ carriers. The rest of the day saw Japan trying to find the U.S. carriers and bombing ships mistaken for them. Perhaps worse, by launching aircraft late in the day Japan lost many planes due to ambushes by American fighters and the difficulty of finding their carriers (some trying to land on the American carrier Yorktown by mistake).
Rear Admiral Fletcher for his part was cautious, believing he did not have enough sunlight left to launch a successful attack. He also had intelligence suggesting he could be facing four Japanese carriers (instead of the two that remained). The Allies and Japanese considered night attacks, which Japan’s cruisers and destroyers were more skilled at, but both ruled this out as too risky.
The battle climaxed on May 8 as both sides found each others’ carrier force. The first discoveries were made in the morning but the Allies were unlucky as it was cloudy over the Japanese carriers, but weather conditions were favorable over theirs. Yorktown’s aircraft reached the Japanese carriers first and those from the Lexington did an hour later. Between both waves they hit the carrier Shōkaku with three bombs, which did not cause critical damage, while the carrier Zuikaku avoided any harm. The attacks by American torpedo bombers were especially disappointing, failing to score a single hit.
Around the same time Japanese aircraft attacked the American carriers and enjoyed more success, due to superior training and combat experience (and help from better weather). In fact, despite detecting Japanese aircraft by radar 70 miles away and having more than 40 planes for defense, the Lexington was hit with four bombs and torpedoes. While it held together at first, with damage control stopping the initial fires, a large explosion soon ignited gasoline to doom the ship. It was later put down by American destroyers. The Yorktown was also hit by a semi-armor piercing bomb, which penetrated four decks and caused significant damage.
Before the internal explosion on the Lexington the American carriers retrieved their remaining aircraft, but Fletcher withdrew from the fight due to concerns about fuel, the poor state of his carriers, and receiving false reports that no Japanese carriers were hit. The Japanese were also worried about fuel, had few remaining operational aircraft, and believing they sank both U.S. carriers, also withdrew. This was lucky for the Allies as later that evening Yamamoto, who was not present during the battle, ordered his forces to turn around to pursue enemy ships, but it was too late. Thus, Japan lost an opportunity to sink the Yorktown and other vulnerable vessels.
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Regarding losses and results the Battle of the Coral Sea was mixed. Japan won at the operational level by sinking twice as much shipping, including the carrier Lexington and severely damaging the Yorktown. By contrast its only major loss was a light carrier and slight damage to a large one. On the other hand, Japan lost more aircraft and worst of all much of its elite airmen, of which it had a limited amount. Apparently, by the end of the battle the Japanese carriers only had 39 planes.
Meanwhile, America, despite a less than stellar performance, won strategically by preventing the occupation of Port Moresby, as Japan’s invasion force withdrew during the battle. This was the first time in the Pacific War a Japanese offensive failed and it prevented Japan from advancing southeast to cut the sea routes between Australia and America. Notably, the Battle of the Coral Sea was the first sea battle in history where no sides’ ships saw or fired at each other; the fighting being dominated by naval aircraft.
Additionally, with the Shōkaku returning to Japan for repairs and the Zuikaku needing new aircraft, meant that unlike the Yorktown these carriers would not be present during the Battle of Midway. In fact, despite estimates it would take three months to repair the Yorktown, impressive efforts by American dockworkers meant it was ready in time for the battle.
As such, when the Japanese attacked Midway they were overconfident, thinking they outnumbered the American carriers four to two, when in reality it was four to three. This, along with America learning hard lessons from Coral Sea, and Japan heeding few of its mistakes made in the Indian Ocean Raid and at Coral Sea, narrowed the odds for the struggle at Midway.
The Battle of Midway
“There is a story, no doubt apocryphal, that gamers at the Naval War College in Newport, Rhode Island, have many times replayed the 1942 Battle of Midway – but have never been able to produce an American victory.”
-Robert Cowley
The Battle of Midway is probably to the Americans what the Battle of Britain is for the British, and Stalingrad for the Russians. Like these other battles Midway was an important victory, a morale boost, and a turning point to some degree. Additionally, similar to these battles, there is no lack of myths or exaggerations regarding Midway. While it is often portrayed as a David vs. Goliath struggle America actually had more aircraft, when those on Midway’s atoll are included. At sea the Japanese surface fleet significantly outnumbered and outgunned the Americans in battleships, cruisers, and destroyers, but the battle would be overwhelmingly conducted by carriers and aircraft.
Regarding aircraft the Japanese had an advantage with their Zero fighters but American aircraft, tactics, and experience were catching up quickly. American radar capabilities were far ahead of the Japanese, whose few units were not given to their carriers but vessels like battleships, that stayed away from the carriers. Radio was another Japanese shortcoming as their radio sets were underpowered, had poor range, and not seen as reliable by their pilots. Lack of radar meant the Japanese had to send up constant CAPs (combat air patrols) to prevent their carriers being surprised by the enemy, lowering the number of aircraft they could use offensively. Unreliable radio meant once airborne it was difficult to coordinate the movements of, and communicate with, Japanese aircraft; limiting their flexibility and effectiveness.
Others factors influenced the battle. This included intelligence, damage control and safety precautions, and aerial reconnaissance. America, having broken Japanese military codes, knew Japan’s plans, deployed its carriers accordingly and set a trap. Regarding damage control and safety precautions the Americans had learned many lessons on how to fight fires, seal leaks, and limit other damage (like how the ignition of gasoline doomed the Lexington at Coral Sea). Meanwhile, the Japanese had no idea their codes were compromised and being overly focused on offensive and tactical considerations, did not devote much attention to damage control and safety; which will be vividly illustrated later. Finally, the Japanese devoted fewer aircraft to aerial reconnaissance than the Americans and were not as well trained in it.
The Japanese plan involved a big attack against Midway to lure the American carriers into battle. A smaller effort would also bomb Dutch Harbor and take Attu and Kiska in the Aleutian Islands off Alaska. In the first instance Japan would bomb Midway to soften it up, then invade it to provoke a showdown with American carriers. Taking Attu and Kiska would preempt a potential American advance across the North Pacific and deny America advanced bases to bomb Japan. But this effort was unnecessary and wasteful as the Americans ignored it and Japan devoted two light aircraft carriers, with 80 planes, that could have made a difference at Midway.
Not knowing where the American carriers were before the battle Japan sent out a screen of submarines to get advanced warning. However, they arrived late as the carriers had already passed through the area due to advanced intelligence warnings. The carriers were in fact much closer than the Japanese could have believed and this would cost them dearly in the upcoming battle. The Imperial Japanese Navy was supremely confident, with Captain Fuchida Mitsuo, who led the first wave against Pearl Harbor, saying “we can just hope that the enemy fleet does come out so we can destroy it.”
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The Battle of Midway has been covered extensively in many works so only a general outline will be offered here. In early June 1942 Japanese naval forces, divided into five groups, approached Midway and the Aleutians. In the latter case they bombed Dutch Harbor and took Attu and Kiska, but failed to distract the Americans. Instead Admiral Nimitz wisely ignored this hollow threat and concentrated his forces northeast of Midway.
Besides sending two light carriers to the Aleutians Japan had four other groups approaching Midway. This included its strong carrier fleet and a formidable force including battleships like the Yamato, to be kept back to destroy what was left of the American fleet once it had been hit hard by Vice Admiral Nagumo’s carriers. At first, this did not seem detrimental for the Japanese as the battle was fought mostly between carrier forces. But given Japan’s surface ships had anti-aircraft guns and radars on the battleships, more of them could have been deployed around carriers to provide early warning and air defense against American aircraft.
The first act of the battle occurred June 3 when American aerial reconnaissance found the Japanese transport force 600 miles off Midway, resulting in a contingent of B-17 bombers being sent from the island to bomb the ships without success. The next morning Japanese carriers launched a strike against Midway to neutralize its airfields and soften up defenses prior to invading. Unfortunately for them America had learned from Pearl Harbor and the Philippines and none of its planes were caught on the ground. This, along with the lack of a powerful bombardment force (as Yamamoto kept most of his big ships back) and Nagumo keeping a large portion of his planes in reserve in case of an attack on his carriers, meant the aerial assault on Midway was insufficient to weaken its defenses.
Meanwhile, the Americans had spotted another Japanese force that morning and sent B-17s and other aircraft from Midway to attack the Japanese carriers. While the planes attacked this force they enjoyed no success as the B17s, bombing from thousands of feet up, found it nearly impossible to hit moving Japanese vessels. Torpedo and dive bombers from the same contingent were shot up as their fighter escort was obsolete against Japan’s Zero fighters. In fact, during this first attack against Japanese carriers America lost 17 planes versus two for Japan. On the other hand, Japanese aircraft striking Midway suffered high losses with half of the nearly 100 aircraft being damaged or destroyed, mostly due to unexpectedly accurate anti-aircraft fire.
Having failed to soften up Midway, being attacked by planes sent from it, and assuming the American carriers were far away, Nagumo ordered his reserve planes to be armed with bombs to strike the island a second time. However, he soon received reconnaissance reports, the second of which suggested the presence of an American carrier, which put Nagumo in a difficult position.
He could have used the planes that were ready to strike this new threat but it would not be a massed attack. They would also be armed with bombs, that were not as effective against carriers as torpedoes. Alternatively, he could have rearmed his planes with torpedoes to strike with a stronger force, but this would take more time as many aircraft had just been equipped with bombs to hit Midway. This was also complicated by Japanese aircraft returning from the first strike on the island that needed to land.
Ultimately, Nagumo decided to risk the time delay and re-equip his aircraft with torpedoes. This resulted in a messy situation on his carriers as bombs were thrown off the planes to the side. Along with exposed fuel lines and gas sloshed around the decks, meant a potentially explosively situation if his carriers were hit by a sudden American attack.
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In fact, Nagumo’s force was about to be struck by waves of torpedo and dive bombers, including all aircraft from the carriers Hornet and Enterprise and half of Yorktown’s complement. This was a calculated risk by Rear Admiral Raymond A. Spruance, in command of the carrier force. After seeing early reconnaissance reports, he launched most of his aircraft at extreme range, hoping to hit the enemy as soon as possible. The decision would reduce coordination between American aircraft and result in piecemeal attacks, but the planes had a chance to hit something while Japanese aircraft were rearming and laying vulnerable on their carriers’ decks.
Japanese combat air patrols and surface ships found the American torpedo bombers, that were vulnerable without fighter cover as their escorts either lost contact or ran low on fuel. The torpedo bombers, flying low and steady to make runs against the Japanese carriers, were slaughtered by Japanese Zeros (of roughly 40 bombers only a few survived). This torpedo assault, the third major strike against Japanese naval forces in the battle, failed unequivocally. Of the torpedoes launched before the destruction of the bombers some fell short from being released early, others went under the ships, and still more fell apart in the water. No hits were scored on any Japanese ship.
However, the sacrifice was not for nothing. With Japanese fighters and attention focused on the torpedo bombers, along with Japan’s limited radar detection, meant the American dive bombers flying towards the Japanese carriers were not detected in time. This force nearly missed the Japanese formation as they had pressed on despite being low on fuel after seeing the wake of a Japanese destroyer; leading it to the carriers. Thus, a few minutes after the failed torpedo assault these dive bombers found and attacked three of the four Japanese carriers.
Without fighter cover and anti-aircraft fire from large surface ships, the carriers were dependent upon their own anti-aircraft guns. Unfortunately for them Japanese carrier anti-aircraft fire was generally poor during the war with bad fire-control systems, limited accuracy, and the lack of proximity fuses for their munitions. Either way, the dive bombers came at a critical time as the Japanese had been a few minutes away from launching their own aircraft to attack the American carriers.
In a few moments the dive bombers dropped a handful of bombs on the carriers Sōryū, Kaga and Akagi, effectively handing the initiative to America in the Pacific War. It was here Japan’s focus on martial prowess and the neglect of defensive and safety arrangements, proved disastrous for its war effort. Comprised of wooden decks, with exposed fuel lines and gasoline and bombs littering their hanger decks, the Japanese carriers could not have been more vulnerable to the few American bombs that hit them. Smarter precautions could have limited the initial damage while better damage control might have made some difference towards saving the ships from complete destruction.
Instead the three carriers soon sank, or were scuttled, to be followed by the last carrier a few hours later. With the loss of the carriers the remaining Japanese aircraft, that had done so much damage to the Allied cause since Pearl Harbor, that sank countless capital ships and secured Japan’s new conquests, were forced to land on the water. They quickly sank beneath the waves in an unceremonious manner that provided them no glory at the end of their winning streak. Three years later the rest of the Japanese Empire would drown with them.
However, in the interlude the last Japanese carrier, the Hiryū, found and hit the American carrier Yorktown, in a more tactically impressive strike than anything America managed in the battle. Fighting through a fighter and anti-aircraft screen the Japanese struck the Yorktown in two waves, hitting it with multiple bombs and torpedoes (the only successful torpedo assault of the battle). Incredibly, America’s superior safety precautions and damage control allowed the Yorktown to survive initially. Unfortunately, a few days later a Japanese submarine sank it with a destroyer alongside.
Despite this disappointment America settled the battle after a successful strike against the Hiryū later in the afternoon of June 4 (it sank the next morning). Yamamoto hoped to salvage something from the situation by engaging American forces at night but Spruance wisely refrained from fighting a stronger surface force that enjoyed superior night fighting capabilities.
The Battle of Midway was over.
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While Japanese aircraft were better at shooting down their opposite numbers the loss of Japan’s carriers, and the survival of America’s carrier fleet, meant Midway was an unequivocal American operational and strategic victory. Besides losing four carriers to America’s one, Japan also lost 250 planes and 3000 sailors and airmen; compared to 150 American planes and 300 servicemen. Japan also lost a cruiser, with another one damaged, after a belated attempt to bombard Midway. The Imperial Japanese Navy had just lost a third of its carriers (four of twelve) and while it still had more carriers than America the latter had three large carriers, versus two for Japan, and could deploy nearly as many naval aircraft in battle as the Japanese.
American industry would also produce far more carriers and aircraft than Japan could match and the initiative at sea switched to America, never to return. However, despite these realities, the hard, attritional fighting in the subsequent Guadalcanal campaign, and costly carrier engagements later in the year, meant it would be well into 1943 before America gained naval supremacy. In fact, at one point in late 1942 the Americans only had one operational carrier, the USS Enterprise, in the Pacific.
Besides the loss of vital carriers and aircraft the death of so many elite airmen would haunt Japan throughout the war. With declining numbers of pilots the Japanese began shorter training programs, lowering the quality of new recruits. They also exhausted their veterans in constant battles, instead of allowing enough rest or placing them in training roles. Thus, Japan’s naval airmen became more vulnerable over time to their American equivalents, that did not adopt these questionable procedures.
So it is no surprise that from the latter half of 1942 to mid-1943 Japan’s land-based aircraft would suffer a 87% casualty rate and its carrier-based aircraft suffered an astounding 98% casualty rate! Similar to the poor conduct of Arab armies in the Arab-Israeli Wars, this shows excellent military equipment manned by poorly trained personnel rarely compensates against superiorly trained personnel equipped with even inferior weapon systems.
For a long time it has been suggested American luck had a disproportionate impact on the battle, but this has been overstated. Certainly, if American dive bombers had turned back when they were low on fuel, or more of their bombs had missed hitting Japanese carriers, then maybe Japan could have rallied and won the battle. Then again, America still had a better picture of where the Japanese carriers were and there is no guarantee later Japanese strikes could have found and crippled the U.S. carriers.
In truth no one knows what would have happened if American dive bombers had not found and destroyed three of the four Japanese carriers in the late morning of June 4, 1942. What is true is America’s plan and operational moves (if not the skill of their pilots or superiority of their aircraft) during the battle was better than Japan’s; as was its intelligence, aerially reconnaissance, and safety precautions. These American strengths even compensated for the disappointing performance of the USS Hornet, whose dive bombers never located the Japanese fleet, while its torpedo bombers were massacred by Japanese Zeros.
While Japanese fighters were more effective at shooting down planes Nimitz and Spruance positioned and concentrated their forces better, had superior intelligence, and were bolder and more decisive by launching many (if not always well coordinated) strikes against Japan’s naval forces. Meanwhile, Nagumo’s caution and indecision left his carriers defenseless at a key moment. If America had considerable luck during the battle, it had positioned itself to exploit it, while Japanese mistakes only increased it.
At least one Japanese naval leader, Commander Genda Minoru, realized Japan’s poor performance when he said to Captain Fuchida Mitsuo, who led the aerial assault on Pearl Harbor, “we goofed.” This suggests the British are not the only people capable of excessive understatement. A harsher sentiment was given by Rear Admiral Kusaka Ryūnosuke, who scolded upset officers by saying: “You are just like hysterical women. First you get excited over easy victories and now you are worked up to commit suicide because of a defeat!”
A potential Japanese victory at Midway is one of the great what ifs of World War 2 and has been covered by books like Rising Sun Victorious and What If?
But besides delaying America’s counteroffensives across the Pacific for some time and giving the Japanese the chance to further isolate Australia, it would not have produced ultimate victory for Japan if America decided to fight on. This was unlikely, as was the prospect of America abandoning its commitment to the Europe first policy to the extent Germany could have won the war there.
Following the disaster, Japan’s leaders acted in a typically dysfunctional manner. At least Yamamoto deserves respect for taking full responsibility for the debacle, but the Imperial Japanese Navy dropped the ball by failing to notify the army and government immediately. Not even Prime Minister Tōjō Hideki was informed until more then a month later. The public was also deceived with the media claiming another great victory. Many of the wounded airmen were cut off from Japanese society, treated appallingly, and sent back to the South Pacific to die. Emperor Hirohito was told but mentioned it to no one.
Typically, in wartime, crucial information is compartmentalized according to the concept of a “need to know basis.” But in this case Japan’s combined leadership did not even share such information amongst itself. This may not have been the smartest way to conduct a war. Indeed, the Imperial Japanese Army continued its war planning assuming the navy still had 12 carriers!
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Midway foreshadowed the beginning of the end of the Japanese Empire. Vice Admiral Nagumo’s carrier fleet (Japan’s equivalent to Napoleon’s Imperial Guard), which had temporarily stymied the American fleet at Pearl Harbor, pushed British naval power back as far as Kenya, and temporarily won naval supremacy over Southeast Asia and much of the Pacific, met its Waterloo on June 4, 1942. For the first time since the Meiji Restoration and the modernization of the Japanese nation and armed forces, Japan suffered a decisive military defeat.
In 1894-95 Japan beat the decaying Qing Dynasty, that was hopelessly backwards and unable to concentrate its far larger forces. A decade later, during the Russo-Japanese War, the Russians put up a better fight but their caution, incompetence, and distraction by revolution at home helped Japan gain victory. In World War 1 Japan cynically seized the Qingdao concession and German island chains in the Pacific against little resistance and at minimal cost. From 1937-1941 Japan occupied China’s most important cities and destroyed countless Chinese armies, but became bogged down in a costly, protracted conflict. In none of these wars could it be said Japan’s enemies were particularly effective, or even equal combatants to Japanese forces.
Against America the situation was different. Whatever America’s flaws its industrial power, technology, political stability, and leadership were superior to Japan’s previous enemies. Even regarding morale, staying power, and fighting spirit (qualities that Japan hoped Americans lacked) it held up as well. While Japanese arms had won decisive victories against the Chinese and Russians much of this was due to the disunity, incompetence and weaknesses in their war efforts. Aggressive maneuvers, fanaticism, and risky gambles had paid off many times in the past, but Japan’s winning streak from 1894 onwards came to a sudden halt at Midway.
While nearly 50 years of overall success is impressive in military history Japan’s defeat, occupation by America, and end of empire would occur less then 40 months after Midway. Winston Churchill’s quip about the head of the Royal Navy in World War 1, Admiral John Jellicoe, as being “the only man on either side who could lose the war in an afternoon” could be seen as an exaggeration in this case, but the end result would be the same for Japan.
However, the Asia-Pacific War would take over three more years to conclude and saw little relaxation of effort, aggression, and loss of faith in ultimate victory on the part of Japan. During these years 10s of thousands of Americans and Westerners, 100s of thousands of Japanese, and millions of Asians and Chinese would lose their lives