“We are paying very heavily now for failing to face the insurance premiums essential for security of an Empire!” -General Alan Brooke
Unlike Malaya, the Dutch East Indies, and other territories Japan attacked in 1941, the Philippines had few natural resources needed for autarky, or fuel its war machine. There has been debate as to whether Japan should have avoided attacking the Philippines and Pearl Harbor. The point being there was no guarantee America would have entered the war if Japan had only attacked British and Dutch possessions in Southeast Asia.
There’s no clear answer but there was a chance the Japanese could have taken British and Dutch colonies, and had America stood on the sidelines Japan would have solved its oil issues, and isolated China by taking Hong Kong and Burma. It’s also possible doing this could have been enough to finally force Chiang Kai-shek to the negotiation table, or be overthrown by a peace party. By this point Chiang realized China’s fate was dependent upon America entering the war. Japan choosing not to attack America in December 1941 is one of the more interesting “what if” scenarios regarding World War 2 but should be considered as unlikely.
Firstly, even moderate Japanese leaders like Admiral Yamamoto favored attacking the Philippines. Secondly, by sparing the Philippines and Pearl Harbor, Japan would miss the chance to severely degrade American military capabilities, especially battleships and potentially aircraft carriers, which were expected to become too numerous to match in 1942. Thirdly, seizing bases in the Philippines helped Japanese advances into Southeast Asia, especially the Dutch East Indies. Finally, the Philippines were positioned along the sea routes between Japan and Southeast Asia. If left unoccupied it could have allowed a stronger America to interdict Japanese merchant shipping with planes and submarines in the future.
It’s implausible Imperial Japan, paranoid of encirclement and afraid of American might, would have tolerated such a threat to its future lifeline regarding oil and resources from Southeast Asia. Against the chance America wouldn’t have eventually entered the war, after increasing aid to Britain, the Soviet Union and China, building up forces in the Far East, and putting diplomatic pressure on Japan after July 1941, this seemed like a poor bet.
The Battle for the Philippines:
Like the Dutch East Indies the geography of the Philippines, with more than 7000 islands, presented a formidable task for Japanese forces. However, in late 1941 Japan had most advantages. The Philippines were 8000 miles from America, poorly garrisoned with weak naval and air contingents, and had mostly ill-trained, ill-equipped ground forces. It was assumed by American leaders to be too close to Japan to be defendable and after Pearl Harbor the chances of major reinforcements, or relief, was doubtful.
By contrast, Japan was closer and could deploy overwhelming military power. Japanese forces also had years of combat experience and were well prepared for military operations, while their American equivalents had less recent combat experience than Russian, British, Chinese, and even Dutch forces. Hollow boasts by General Douglas MacArthur, the local American commander, and belated efforts to build up military capabilities in the Philippines in the autumn of 1941, did little to change such unpleasant realities.
Allied forces in the Philippines, led mostly by American officers but composed primarily of Filipinos, had more troops for the upcoming campaign than Japan. However, Japan deployed over 500 planes against 200 at best for America. Regarding quality the American planes were often good, but their pilots had little combat experience versus the Japanese. At sea Japan’s naval task force outmatched the United States Asiatic Fleet stationed in the Philippines with a carrier, 10 cruisers and almost 30 destroyers compared to 3 cruisers and 13 destroyers.
America’s Asiatic Fleet had a potential counterpunch to Japanese ships with 23 modern submarines. Unfortunately, these failed to make a notable contribution to the campaign due to cautious commanders, Japanese countermeasures, and defective torpedoes. One historian highlighted the experience of the USS Sculpin, that fired nine torpedoes at three merchant ships over the period of a week without sinking any of them.
Both sides had similar numbers of tanks but Japan enjoyed a significant artillery advantage. On land the Japanese were outnumbered three to two in soldiers, but they enjoyed superior combat effectiveness and cohesion. For example, American troops varied widely regarding quality, equipment, age, and training. Perhaps worse, there were so many local dialects it was difficult not only to communicate between American officers and Filipino soldiers but even amongst Filipino forces themselves! However, the relatively better treatment of the Filipino population by the Americans (versus relations between British and Dutch overlords and their colonial subjects), and the promise of Filipino independence in a few years, meant Filipino troops were more loyal and motivated to fight than other indigenous equivalents across Southeast Asia.
Despite having more than 7000 islands the key to capturing the Philippines was neutralizing American air and naval power and seizing its two main islands (Luzon and Mindanao), where the main population centers and military forces were. Given the weak forces they expected to fight and since Japan had more important objectives elsewhere, like the oilfields of the Dutch East Indies, the Japanese planned to conquer the Philippines quickly to transfer a big portion of their units for other operations in Southeast Asia. However, despite initial successes Japan would become bogged down and the battle for the Philippines would be far longer and bloodier than anticipated.
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The opening actions began December 8, 1941, after General MacArthur learned of the attack on Pearl Harbor. While there were intentions to launch preemptive airstrikes on Taiwan, this wasn’t done due to confusion, poor communications, and hesitation by MacArthur. Meanwhile, Japanese aircraft in Taiwan didn’t strike immediately either due to unfavorable weather conditions. However, American aircraft in the Philippines weren’t idle as many were sent into the air to avoid being hit on the ground while waiting for permission to hit Taiwan. Unfortunately, indecision continued until 200 Japanese planes approached Clark Field on Luzon Island 10 hours after the strike on Pearl Harbor once the weather improved.
Despite some radar detection and American squadrons in the air the Japanese surprised Clark Field and devastated aircraft on the ground. In less then an hour a big portion of the American air force in the Philippines, including nearly half its modern bombers, were lost. In later weeks the aircraft that survived were worn down, the remaining bombers left for Australia on December 19, and by the end of 1941 only 7% of the original airpower in the Philippines remained. Likewise, American naval forces in the Philippines also withdrew when their situation became untenable.
There has been much ink spilt to assign blame, or determine how this occurred, but these debates are academic. While it’s plausible American aircraft could have escaped the disaster at Clark Field, there’s little reason to believe this would have made a difference in the unfolding campaign. The idea American airpower could have hit Taiwan and won more than a short reprieve for the Philippines is dubious. They weren’t targeting Taiwan’s airfields, but its shipping, and even had they enjoyed some success Japan’s more seasoned pilots, and ability to project far more planes into the war zone, meant American airpower would have been worn down eventually. There’s no reason to suggest the disorganized, confused, and relatively green American air force in the Philippines could have won a lasting victory against Japanese naval and airpower in December 1941 and alter the trajectory of events.
Japanese forces landed at several locations in the Philippines between December 10-12, including Vigan and Aparri in the far north of Luzon and Legaspi in the southeast. MacArthur correctly identified these as subsidy landings and expected the main assault was still to come. Indeed, the landings in the north were to secure local air bases to project Japanese airpower over the Philippines. Likewise, the landing at Legaspi was initially too far away to be a threat to Manila. But as MacArthur concentrated most forces in the north and after stronger Japanese forces landed southeast of the capital in Lamon Bay December 24, the situation became more troubling.
The main landing occurred December 22 at Lingayen Gulf in Northwest Luzon. Due to high seas and landing at night the assault was disorganized and chaotic. However, the Japanese were not defeated at the water’s edge due to faulty American deployments and lack of sufficient reserves, as MacArthur held back significant forces to defend against other landings. American and Filipino soldiers had a mixed performance against more effective and better equipped Japanese soldiers. Another significant landing occurred on the southern island of Mindanao to protect the Japanese community and secure it to facilitate future landings in the Dutch East Indies. Ironically, the Japanese community in the Philippines was not at risk and MacArthur even denied permission to loot food from their businesses. The Japanese took Davao, and the nearby airfield, but fighting in Mindanao would continue until May 1942.
It was soon realized the main landing at Lingayen Gulf couldn’t be stopped and MacArthur declared Manila an open city to spare its population. In line with previous planning, he ordered his forces to withdraw to the Bataan Peninsula and the island of Corregidor, which guarded Manila Bay. The American retreat was to be done in stages, but while it alternated between order and chaos it was successful.
Part of this was due to Japan’s preoccupation with taking Manila rather than concentrate on crushing MacArthur’s forces. This was curious as the Imperial Japanese Army, influenced to a degree by Clausewitzian doctrine, often focused on battlefield success over taking cities. The American/Filipino forces in Bataan were also blessed by Japan withdrawing the 48th Division, its best force in the Philippines, to support the campaign in Indonesia in January 1942, thinking the main fighting was over.
While Allied forces retreated to Bataan and organized defensive lines their chances of holding out were reduced by two factors. Firstly, there was little prospect of relief or reinforcements, due to the battering of the American fleet at Pearl Harbor and Allied defeats across the Pacific and Southeast Asia. Secondly, MacArthur had failed to make sure the garrison was adequately stocked with food, medicine, and supplies. This was compounded by letting civilians withdraw into the Bataan redoubt, which stretched resources further. Thus, while American and Filipino units fought valiantly during subsequent months, they were ultimately worn down by disease, hunger, and exhaustion.
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The reduced Japanese forces, backed by decent artillery support, assaulted the first line of the Bataan defenses on January 9, 1942. To their surprise progress was slow, resistance was fierce, and they only broke through by brute force and advancing across Mount Natib, which the Americans believed would impossible to surmount. However, Allied forces withdrew to a rear battle position to prevent a dangerous rout. Rather than launch another frontal attack the Japanese took a page from their campaign in Malaya to outflank enemy positions by amphibious assaults.
Unlike in Malaya, these maneuvers were halted and chewed up, so Japan began a new offensive to overrun the rear battle position between January 27-February 17. This also failed after fierce, desperate resistance so the Japanese pulled back and called for reinforcements. This, along with the Third Battle of Changsha and the first assault on Wake Island, were the only significant setbacks for Japan during its campaigns from December 1941 to May 1942.
However, this defensive victory was only a reprieve for the Allies, as it was only a matter of time before stronger Japanese forces attacked again. In the meantime, the lack of food and medical supplies eroded the numbers and capabilities of the remaining allied forces. Back in Washington America’s leadership recognized the inevitable fall of the Philippines and decided General MacArthur shouldn’t be allowed to be captured. While he made many mistakes in the campaign and never failed to promote himself in dispatches, it was obvious the capture of a former Chief of Staff of the United States Army would be a major blow to allied morale. Therefore, President Roosevelt ordered MacArthur to escape the Philippines and head for Australia, to help lead the eventual counterattack against Japan later in the war. MacArthur reluctantly obeyed and left his command in March 1942.
Whatever criticism can be leveled against MacArthur regarding his personality and military conduct, President Roosevelt was wise to save him from captivity. For MacArthur, despite his flaws, was a symbol of hope and resistance not only for Filipinos and Americans, but allied forces fighting for survival across the globe. In the early days of 1942, when allied fortunes were arguably at the lowest point in the war, they desperately needed a symbol like MacArthur that radiated confidence and hope. He vowed to return to the Philippines, but it would be years before he could deliver on his promise.
On April 3, 1942, Japanese forces, having received considerable reinforcements, began a devastating aerial and artillery bombardment of allied positions in Bataan. By now most American and Filipino soldiers were sick, weak (the average calories consumed by individuals daily was usually 1000), or out of combat. During the next week Japan crushed resistance on the Bataan peninsula. Corregidor Island, guarding Manila Bay, would hold out another month.
After a big naval, artillery, and aerial bombardment, Japanese forces landed on the fortress island, but the first wave suffered 70% casualties. However, Japan brought in more forces, including tanks, and closed in on the stronghold of Lt. General Jonathan Wainwright. Wainwright led the remaining defenders in the Philippines once MacArthur left, and had done an admirable job defending Bataan. Realizing the futility of further resistance and the real threat of his soldiers being massacred by Japanese forces, who had been frustrated and held back for months, Wainwright defied Roosevelt and MacArthur’s orders and surrendered. While some units slipped away to engage in guerrilla warfare, the battle for the Philippines ended on May 8, 1942.
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Besides taking longer than its other campaigns at the time, Japan took more casualties, especially if disease is included, in the Philippines than elsewhere. Figures for combat casualties are difficult to determine, perhaps 7000-11,000 dead and wounded for Japan and a more debatable 45,000 dead and wounded for American/Filipino forces. However, it’s often implied more Japanese and allied forces were killed, or knocked out of combat, due to disease and sickness than fighting. The number of captured Allied forces is more agreed upon, with perhaps 100,000 (70,000 at Bataan, over 10,000 at Corregidor, and the rest elsewhere.
Japanese warcrimes occurred in the Philippines as well, made worse by their soldiers’ anger at allied forces for inflicting heavy casualties and holding out so long. The Bataan Death March is the most well-known instance, although more Allied prisoners would die after arriving at the prison at Camp O’Donnell than during the march itself. After being promised humane treatment if they surrendered, with one Japanese colonel famously stating, “we are not barbarians,” the POWs from Bataan experienced a hellish march of 65 miles to Camp O’Donnell.
Unsurprisingly, given the weak condition of prisoners due to disease or battle wounds, many had to be carried or fell along the route. Those unable to get up were usually murdered by bullets or bayonets. Access to water and rest was infrequent and POWs were beaten with rifles, bamboo sticks and even captured golf clubs. Many were beheaded and some prisoners were forced to bury alive fellow comrades or beat them over the head with shovels. Between 500-2300 Americans perished but once again the Japanese killed far more of their fellow Asians, perhaps 5000-10,000 Filipinos. The abuses did not end once the prisoners reached Camp O’Donnell and 100s would die daily after their arrival.
While Japan won the campaign for the Philippines the victory wasn’t as decisive, or impressive, as other operations at the time. There were no successful flanking maneuvers as in Malaya, a coup de main like Singapore, or the impressive coordination of many forces like the Dutch East Indies Campaign. Japanese battlefield and disease casualties were higher than elsewhere, allied resistance lasted longer, and Japan had to divert significant forces to the Philippines to win.
Ironically, after withdrawing strong forces after its initial successes in January 1942, to speed up operations elsewhere, Japan had to bring many back to win the battle. This would slow down later operations in the Solomon Islands and New Guinea, and give Australia time to prepare its defenses. Thus, compared to the lackluster allied conduct during the Malayan/Singapore campaign, the American/Filipino forces in the Philippines brought some benefit to the Allies in early 1942.
Defeat and Despair in Burma:
Burma had a lot of strategic importance for both sides. Besides notable resources like oil and rice, it was a buffer zone for India and would become the western defensive perimeter for the Japanese Empire, after its conquest in 1942. However, for Japan its most important asset was the Burma Road, the last remaining supply route to China in early 1942 after the fall of Hong Kong. Therefore, the Allies wanted it kept open to supply Chinese armies while Japan was determined to close it to isolate China from external aid.
But Burma wasn’t an ideal place for swift military operations. While there were plains there were also significant swamps and jungles, it was crisscrossed by rivers, and there were formidable mountains to the north. The monsoon season, which occurred from the latter part of May to October, also generally restricted offensive operations much of the year. Communications depended upon the railroad south to north from the capital and port city of Rangoon, so it was difficult to supply operations from India in the west and Thailand to the east.
Despite Burma’s importance to the Allies it was woefully defended. British and Empire forces were scarce due to major losses in Malaya, Singapore, and Hong Kong. Australia’s government had also refused to divert forces, coming back from the Middle East to defend Australia, to protect the colony. Burma’s garrison consisted of a few poorly equipped divisions, including Burmese soldiers of dubious loyalty, while Britain initially rejected Chinese offers to send forces. After this loss of face Chiang Kai-shek angrily retorted that “resisting the Japanese is not like suppressing colonial rebellions” and “for this kind of job, you British are incompetent, and you should learn from the Chinese how to fight against the Japanese.”
Britain later accepted Chinese forces for Burma but Chiang’s words would prove prophetic for the upcoming campaign. At sea the British naval position was weak after the fall of Singapore and the sinking of the Prince of Wales and Repulse. In the air the British had a paltry 16 planes, although they were reinforced with other aircraft by the American Volunteer Group (also known as the Flying Tigers).
Japan began the campaign with two understrength divisions, although they were later reinforced by two more. They also benefited from the Japanese trained Burma Independence Army, the size of a division, which spread disorder, panic, and led to the desertion of many Burmese allied soldiers. Japan enjoyed naval and air superiority, had tanks, and superior combat experience. Having overrun Thailand with ease in December 1941, Japan used it as base to invade Burma in stages. During the first part the Japanese occupied important airfields to prevent British aircraft reinforcing Singapore and gained a psychological advantage over British forces, which remained throughout the campaign.
The first big engagement in Burma was the Battle of Sittang Bridge in February 1942. Originally, the local British commander, Brigadier John Smyth, wanted to face the Japanese across the Sittang River, a good defensive position, but his superior overruled him in favor of a forward defense near Thailand’s border. After the main invasion of Burma began in January Britain suffered reverses near the border and the Salween River, where Japanese pressure forced British forces to retreat across the river, abandoning equipment and supplies. Later attempts to stop Japan, like at the Bilin River, failed as the Allies had insufficient troops and Japanese forces kept outflanking them. The retreat to Sittang River was also marred by friendly fire from allied planes and the breakdowns of many vehicles.
When British forces reached the Sittang River Bridge they were disorganized and weakened. The bridge also acted a chokepoint for a further withdrawal and progress was slow as Japanese forces pushed hard against the British. In the chaotic situation Smyth believed he couldn’t hold the bridge and decided to destroy it. This delayed the Japanese advance until bridging equipment was brought up, but it was also a disaster for British forces on the wrong side of the bridge. When some of the trapped soldiers tried crossing the river many drowned.
Japan’s next objective was Rangoon, Burma’s capital. It was also the logistical hub that dominated communications in the country, and the port that shipped supplies up to Lashio, and then onto China by the Burma Road. Unfortunately, allied setbacks in Burma had degraded their ability to defend Rangoon. While allied planes fought a losing battle in the air Japanese forces advanced on the city. Despite this British reinforcements arrived and the new commander, General Harold Alexander, ordered a counterattack. However, Japan’s forces were too strong so Alexander ordered Rangoon to be abandoned while British forces enacted a scorched earth policy to prevent Japan seizing important facilities (like oil tanks).
The retreat was almost too late as the Japanese advanced to bypass the British from the north and the latter’s forces were nearly cornered and destroyed. At one point a Japanese force blocked their path of retreat, but after beating back allied efforts to breakthrough it withdrew, perhaps being focused on taking Rangoon. While British forces slipped away this reprieve was overshadowed by Japan’s occupation of Rangoon. This decisively altered logistics for the campaign, letting Japan ship in two divisions and supplies, while decimating British communications. Rangoon itself had already suffered considerably, like with Japanese bombing which killed thousands of civilians.
The next phase of the campaign saw the arrival of Chinese soldiers, that became the majority of allied forces in the country. Chiang Kai-shek sent some of his best forces, like the elite 6th and 5th Armies, which included China’s only mechanized division and was equipped with Soviet tanks. Unfortunately, this advantage was undermined by distrust between China and Britain and interference by the newly arrived Lt. General Joseph Stilwell, who became America’s main liaison to Chiang, and would supervise lend-lease to China. By this point the British were naturally cautious but Stilwell, an aggressive but inexperienced, rude, and out depth officer, favored going onto the offensive.
Meanwhile Chiang Kai-shek, having the best appraisal of Japanese forces, after fighting them for many years, was pessimistic and considered withdrawing his forces from Burma. Chiang preferred adopting a defensive position in central Burma to lure Japan into a trap after it outran its logistics, as had worked during previous battles for the city of Changsha. He was wary of the British, disagreed with Stilwell about attacking, and afraid of risking his remaining best forces.
Instead Chiang Kai-shek, against his better judgement, went along with Stilwell to show Chinese solidarity with the Allies and avoid angering America, whom he hoped would provide material aid to China, and strong pressure against Japan. To be fair to Stilwell he found it difficult leading Chinese troops, who hardly trusted him, while Chiang often countermanded his orders. One hopeful development was the selection of Lt. General William Slim, a respected British officer in the Indian Army, to command British forces in Burma (Alexander would theoretically control allied forces in Burma, including Chinese). In later years Slim would turn allied fortunes in Burma around and arguably become the best battlefield commander Britain produced in World War 2.
If the Allies had more soldiers Japan had aerial and naval supremacy, while its personnel were man for man superior to their enemies. Emboldened by previous successes the Japanese moved north to confront allied forces in March 1942, after the fall of Rangoon. Ill-advised counterattacks by Stilwell and Slim failed and others ordered by Stilwell were abandoned due to interference by Chiang Kai-shek and Chinese officers, that refused to listen to the brash American. The best the Allies could now hope for was delaying Japan long enough for the monsoon season to arrive in May to end operations.
However, as in Malaya, Japanese forces traveled light and outflanked lesser mobile, road-bound enemies, through broken terrain and landings on the coast. Every attempt to hold Japan, first in central, then upper Burma, failed and allied forces became caught in desperate battles they barely escaped. In these clashes the Chinese, whom the Japanese would rate the most effective allied forces in Burma, usually fought better than British soldiers. They fought stubbornly until Japanese skill, firepower, and flanking maneuvers won the day.
But to be fair General Slim, despite making errors, prevented a complete rout of British forces, sought information on fighting Japan from Chinese officers, and learned harsh lessons. Given the reluctance of most British officers to respect Chinese forces and rationalizations by Stilwell, who failed to admit any responsibility for his mistakes, Slim survived the campaign with a good reputation. After mostly one-sided fighting in Burma from late March into May 1942, Japan conquered the country, closed the Burma Road, split allied forces into two, and forced them to retreat to India and China.
Of the roughly 100,000 Chinese soldiers sent to Burma perhaps 40,000 became casualties, 10,000 retreated to India, and 50,000 retreated back to China. Besides losing so many elite troops, the loss of much of the little remaining Soviet and German equipment was a heavy blow for Chiang Kai-shek. British forces suffered at least 13,000 losses and endured a 1000-mile retreat to India: The longest retreat in British military history. Illustrating the lopsided nature of the campaign Japan suffered as little as 4000-4500 casualties (although in aircraft both sides lost a similar amount). Japan took nearly 5000 POWs, 50 of which were Chinese, highlighting its practice of massacring most Chinese prisoners. The Burma Independence Army, despite its many successes, suffered up to 50% casualties.
If Slim and Chinese commanders usually showed courage and determination while retreating, Stilwell abandoned his soldiers and fled with a small group to India. There, in a public relations coup worthy of Montgomery and MacArthur, he glorified his walk out of Burma to a sympathetic press using salty language: “We got a hell of a beating. It was humiliating as hell. We ought to find out why it happened and go back!”
Typically, a commander going AWOL and abandoning his soldiers would receive severe punishment, but in this case Stilwell suffered no negative consequences. American officials like General George Marshall, who should have known better, didn’t recall or even censure him.
Chiang Kai-shek, for his part, was furious but covered for Stilwell, once more against his better judgement, to avoid antagonizing America early in the new alliance. In a liberal democracy a just fate would have seen Stilwell separated from military service. Given the Chinese military culture at the time he would’ve been shot had he been Chinese and not American. Instead, Stilwell remained America’s man in China, increasingly alienated Chiang, and did much to contribute towards military disaster for the Chinese war effort in 1944.
If the retreat of allied forces from Burma was unpleasant the ordeal of civilians, especially the Indian population, was a nightmare. As in Malaya and Singapore the British administration mistreated non-European refugees; refusing them access on transports and giving inferior care at refugee stations. There were exceptions, like forest officers who guided refugees and helped them find food, and humane relief provided by the Assam Tea Planters Association. But generally the British administration’s reluctance, often callousness, towards non-European refugees was shameful. It also undermined its rhetoric regarding the bogus white man’s burden to protect and civilize native populations.
Instead, the mostly Indian refugees found cholera, dysentery, malaria, and smallpox. They also found starvation, leeches, mud, primitive roads, and harsh terrain. Ultimately, they found misery, pain, and death. If maybe half a million refugees reached India, it’s estimated between 4000-80,000 (probably at least 50,000) died on the way. If that weren’t enough the loss of Burma, especially its rice, contributed to the Bengal famine later in the war.
The worst strategic consequence of losing Burma for the Allies in general, and China in particular, was the closure of the Burma Road. This ended the ability to adequately equip Chinese forces and psychologically isolated China from its allies. Chinese hopes that Britain and especially America entering the war would improve its prospects had been slowly dashed from Pearl Harbor to Malaya, and Hong Kong to Indonesia, only to implode with the inglorious ending of the Burma campaign.
Japan for its part was pleased, having finally cut off all supply corridors to China. With foreign aid to China eliminated (except for small amounts that would be flown over the Himalayas) Japan hoped Chinese morale would finally collapse once America and Britain came to terms. This would have quashed any prospect of ultimate victory for China.
The Indian Ocean Raid:
Japan’s last great victory in the spring of 1942 was the Indian Ocean Raid (March 31 to April 10). After conquering Malaya, Singapore and the Dutch East Indies, the Indian Ocean was now vulnerable to Japanese penetration. The Imperial Japanese Navy planned a powerful raid to destroy the British fleet at Ceylon, hit military installations on the island, sink British shipping in the Bay of Bengal, and facilitate operations in Burma.
Meanwhile, the British were afraid of losing their naval forces in the region, as well as Ceylon. This island was important for guarding maritime communications in the Indian Ocean, which allowed Britain to supply its positions in India and the Middle East. There were also allied fears, unfounded in hindsight, of a potential link up of Japanese and German forces somewhere in the Middle East. Either way, Japan’s seizure of the Andaman Islands off the coast of Burma in March heightened these concerns.
The Japanese naval forces that entered the Indian Ocean were, according to Richard B. Frank, “the most powerful single assemblage of naval might in the world.” Between Vice Admiral Nagumo Chūichi‘s and Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburō‘s contingents they had 6 carriers with over 300 aircraft, 4 battleships, 8 cruisers and 14 destroyers. This was were stronger than the contingent that fought at Midway two months later. They were confident after months of victories, extremely proficient, and used to working together.
By contrast, British forces (not including the aircraft on Ceylon) had three carriers with 100 aircraft, five battleships, seven cruisers, and a similar number of destroyers as Japan. The British force was a hodgepodge of hastily deployed units, weren’t accustomed to working together, and its planes were generally inferior Japanese ones. However, unlike the Japanese the British had an advantage in radar, which gave them the ability to use their aircraft at night. Thus, Japan hoped to catch British naval forces at port or at sea during the day, while Britain looked for opportunities to hit Japanese forces at night.
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In April 1942 the Japanese armada under Nagumo entered the Bay of Bengal and split into two forces. The lion’s share, including most carriers, sailed towards Ceylon to hit military installations and hunt British naval units, while Ozawa’s smaller contingent went north to hit British merchant shipping. Britain’s forces, under Admiral James Somerville, also split into two contingents and had been warned of Nagumo’s approach by British intelligence. As such, most British naval forces withdrew south of Ceylon to prevent being attacked at port and hoped to launch a surprise attack against the Japanese once they were located.
However, British intelligence got the timing wrong and after a few days Somerville went to a port in the Maldives to get more water and fuel. This was fortunate because had he returned to Colombo on Ceylon, his forces would have been hit by Japanese strikes launched against the port the next day. It should be noted British intelligence underestimated the size of the Japanese force by two carriers so Somerville didn’t realize how outmatched he was.
Nearly 120 Japanese aircraft hit Colombo the morning of April 5, sank a destroyer and armed merchant cruiser, damaged port and military facilities, and destroyed more planes than they lost. Later they sank two British cruisers but failed to find Somerville’s main fleet. Ironically, both sides sailed towards each other but didn’t locate one another, so a clash never developed. While Nagumo had no idea where the British were (but would have if his aircraft continued searching longer) Somerville had a general idea where the Japanese were, but was unable to find them at night, losing and an opportunity to hit them when they were vulnerable. At this point the British Admiralty, discovering the lopsided strength of Japanese forces, authorized Somerville to retreat to East Africa to keep his fleet in being. However, he recklessly pursued a surprise coup against his superior opponent.
After a few more days of playing cat and mouse Japanese carriers hit the other main base on Ceylon at Trincomalee with a similar number of aircraft as at Colombo. As the British had withdrawn most ships the Japanese only sank a merchant ship and the monitor Erebus. But Japan still damaged facilities and airbases, and destroyed more planes than it lost. However, this time they were luckier when they located the British carrier Hermes, which had belatedly fled Trincomalee, and overwhelmed it with 80 aircraft. The Hermes, along with a destroyer, a corvette, and other vessels, were sunk, but Japan spared a hospital ship.
Despite such successes a foreshadow of things to come occurred when a force of British bombers approached Nagumo’s force undetected and attacked a battleship and a carrier. While they failed to hit them, it showed the potential consequences Japan’s lack of radar could reap upon its naval forces.
Meanwhile, Japan’s naval contingent in the north, under Vice Admiral Ozawa Jisaburō, enjoyed much success against British shipping and bombed cities in India. Apparently on April 6 it sank 88,000 tons of merchant shipping, which became the worst day for Allied shipping of the entire war. Other attacks by ships and submarines brought the total to 125,000 tons of allied merchant shipping lost by the end of the Indian Ocean Raid.
Somerville finally had enough and withdrew his forces and Britain’s naval H.Q. in the Indian Ocean to distant Kenya. With General Erwin Rommel enjoying success in North Africa and Japan running wild in the Indian Ocean, the British were terrified by the consequences if Ceylon was captured and Japan established a permanent presence in the area. However, this wasn’t realistic as the Japanese had no short-term plans to continue operations in the region, but focused instead towards confronting America and Australia in the South Pacific.
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What about the results of the Indian Ocean Raid? Casualties were lopsided but not ruinous for the British. While they lost a carrier, two cruisers, two destroyers, over 20 merchant ships, and at least twice as many aircraft as Japan, most of their fleet survived. Meanwhile Japan lost nearly 20 planes, 30 more damaged, and this wasn’t trivial as it represented 1/6th of the armada’s naval air arm.
In fact, after four months of operations from Pearl Harbor to early April, Nagumo’s carrier fleet had suffered considerable wear and attrition and needed time to recuperate. Thus, some of his carriers were absent at the Battle of the Coral Sea and this influenced its outcome. More ominous were issues that plagued Japanese carrier operations during the Indian Ocean Raid. This included poor turnover times to rearm aircraft between torpedoes and bombs (taking between 1.5 and 2.5 hours), insufficient aerial reconnaissance, and failing to stop allied aircraft from piercing Japan’s combat air patrols, due to the lack of radar. These issues would prove disastrous during the Battle of Midway.
Therefore, the Indian Ocean Raid was an impressive operational victory for Japan but didn’t lead to notable strategic results. On one hand Japan accomplished some objectives by helping operations in Burma, and giving British shipping and facilities on Ceylon a good drubbing. But its naval victories were moderate and the ambition of inflicting a Tsushima like triumph against Somerville’s force failed. Meanwhile, British fears of Japan and Germany linking up in the Middle East, or Japan cutting maritime communications to India and the Middle East, were unfounded. It’s plausible Japan could have taken Ceylon, but less so that it could have stationed and supplied enough forces there to decisively interdict Britain’s maritime lines of communication.
It wasn’t sensible for Japan to try this anyway as Britain’s position in the Far East had been temporarily reduced to impotence, while America still had strong naval, especially carrier, forces and the ability to reinforce these in the future. America was Japan’s strongest enemy and the former’s naval power, industrial production, and political will constituted the centers of gravity for its war effort. Japan’s only chance to prevail was to neutralize at least one of these.
Britain’s Invasion of Madagascar:
A postscript to Japan’s run of victories occurred in May 1942 when Britain, weakened by many defeats and paranoid of Japanese designs in the Indian Ocean, launched an invasion of Vichy France’s Madagascar colony. Madagascar was ideally positioned to interdict Allied shipping coming around the Cape of Good Hope into the Indian Ocean, while the port of Diego-Suarez was an excellent base Japanese submarines could use given their operational range. It must be noted the Mediterranean route to supply allied forces in the Middle East and Far East was cut off as long as Italy remained in the war, meaning Britain had to use the route going south of Africa. Given Vichy France had given up Indochina to Japan without a fight, it was believed the same could happen with Madagascar.
With hindsight Japan had no interest in taking an island larger than France that was far away from its sphere of influence. But the British didn’t know this and refused to take any chances. Thus, they sent significant forces, including one battleship, two fleet carriers, many cruisers and destroyers, and three army brigades to launch the first notable allied amphibious assault of the war. In fact, the invasion of Madagascar was Britain’s first large scale amphibious assault since Gallipoli in World War 1.
The invasion began May 5, 1942 and Diego-Suarez was taken two days later after a desperate fight, that was decided when the destroyer HMS Anthony rushed port the port’s heavy guns and landed Royal Marines behind enemy lines. Most Vichy personnel across the island soon surrendered soon but others engaged in guerrilla warfare, that took until November 5 to pacify. This resistance was celebrated by the local French Governor General, Armand Annet, who according to Max Hastings, said “our available troops are preparing to resist every enemy advance with the same spirit which inspired our soldiers at Diego Suarez” where “the defence became a page of heroism written by “La France.’”
While these are pretty words the resistance of Vichy forces meant it took Britain six months to take Madagascar, and it’s hard to see what glory this gave France. Perhaps such rhetoric and stubborn resistance would have served the French better during the invasion of France where the country fell in six weeks. In reality, these Vichy forces, few of which later joined the Free French to fight the Axis, only inconvenienced the allied war effort that eventually freed France from Nazism.
Showing that fears of Japan interfering in the region weren’t completely unfounded some of its submarines arrived in May, which damaged a battleship and sank a tanker. Japanese submarines in the area would sink over 20 ships bound for North Africa, which highlighted the potential havoc Japan could have played on allied communications in the Indian Ocean, if it had ability to use Madagascar as a base.
Seizing Madagascar was the only allied victory, except for the Third Battle of Changsha and the initial repulse of the Japanese invasion of Wake Island, during the first six months of the Asia-Pacific War. However, it was little compensation for the loss of so many territories, natural resources, and military forces to Japan. On the other hand one can sympathize with leaders like Winston Churchill, who noted the capture of Madagascar “was in fact for long months the only sign of good and efficient war direction of which the British public were conscious.”
Summing up the First Part of the Asia-Pacific War
“Over all this vast expanse of waters, Japan was supreme and we everywhere were weak and naked.” -Winston Churchill
By May 1942 Japan had mostly accomplished its initial goals in the war against the western powers in Southeast Asia and the Pacific. Several historians and others, while providing different statistics, have described Japan’s successes in detail:
S. C. M. Paine, in The Wars for Asia, noted:
“In the first five months of 1942, Japan took more territory over a greater area than any country in history and did not lose a single major ship. The statistics overwhelm. Japan took 250,000 Allied prisoners of war, sank 105 Allied ships and seriously damaged 91 others, while it lost only 7000 dead, 14,000 wounded, 562 planes, and 27 ships, but no cruisers, battleship, or carrier. Paine also noted that “given the size of the many theaters, the Japanese deployed minimal forces with minimal equipment, but they succeeded in calling the Western bluff,” and that “the colonial powers had stationed inadequately equipped and marginally trained troops to protect their far-flung interests in Asia. Japan’s battle-hardened veterans from China made short work of them.”
According to the Illustrated World War 2 Encyclopedia Japan “had occupied the “South-East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere,” and “had obtained it at little cost: five destroyers, eight submarines, 50,000 tons of merchant shipping at sea; and 10,000 dead and 4000 wounded on land.”
Len Deighton, in Blood, Tears and Folly, pointed out “Japan’s war plans had estimated that the initial objectives would be taken in one year, at a cost of one-third of her naval strength,” but that “the imperial navy had grown stronger than weaker” with the addition of a light cruiser and the Yamato; the most powerful battleship ever constructed.
In Tower of Skulls Richard B. Frank declared:
This arguably marked the moment when the Imperial Japanese Empire reached its zenith. It now stretched across seven time zones and housed approximately 516 million people – far more than the approximately 360 million captive peoples controlled at the peak by Nazi Germany. In its campaign since 7 December 1941, Japan had killed approximately 65,000 Allied soldiers, airmen, and sailors while losing 15,000 servicemen. Over 300,000 Allied personnel had become prisoners of war. The Imperial Navy had lost no warship larger than a destroyer while savaging Allied naval forces.
In his book Hubris Alistair Horne noted “never had an empire been acquired in so short a time, and certainly never one with such a huge perimeter. Japan’s quest for raw materials, especially those essential to the unending war in China, now looked assured. The guardian outposts that protected that Empire were being swiftly and powerfully entrenched, and reinforced, by Japanese arms. Gained in but a few weeks, how many months if not years would it take to roll it up again?”
Emphasizing Japan’s naval successes Victor Davis Hanson observed “in just four early naval battles preceding the Battle of the Coral Sea-at Pearl Harbor, Singapore, in the Indian Ocean and the Java Sea-they sank or grounded six Allied battleships, one carrier, one battle cruiser, six cruisers, and five destroyers, and killed over six thousand British, Dutch, Commonwealth, and American seamen, all without suffering a single ship lost and fewer than two hundred dead.”
Madame Chiang Kai-shek, in a speech to the United States Congress in 1943 reminded the world “that Japan in her occupied areas today has greater resources at her command than Germany. Let us not forget that the longer Japan is left in undisputed possessions of these resources, the stronger she must become. Each passing day takes more toll in lives of both Americans and Chinese.”
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Put simply, in six months Japan conquered Malaya and Singapore, Thailand and Burma, Hong Kong, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, and many islands including Guam, Wake, and the Andaman Islands. It had bombed Pearl Harbor, India, and Australia, and gained naval and air superiority from the Bay of Bengal to the Western Pacific. Its territories from north to south reached from the colder parts of Manchuria to the tropics of Indonesia, and west to east from Burma to the Gilbert Islands. From north to south its possessions were as far away as 5300 miles, while its oceanic perimeter was as long as 14,200 miles, over half of the world’s circumference!
Japanese arms threatened India with bombing and invasion, and Australia with bombing and naval interdiction. America’s carrier fleet was weaker than Japan’s and faced potential annihilation if forced to defend American communications to Australia, or Midway and Hawaii. China was cut off from land and sea from the Allies with only the hazardous, dubious air route (nicknamed “the hump”) over the Himalayans remaining. Even Russia seemed vulnerable, having sent divisions from Siberia to fight Hitler as the Imperial Japanese Army built up strength in Manchuria, in case Germany decisively weakened the Soviet Union.
Of course, given Japan’s finite military power, vastly inferior industrial production, and exceedingly stretched logistics, it’s debatable if it could have completed any of these potential campaigns (let alone several of them). However, having previously underestimated the Japanese and losing countless territories and military forces, the worst fears of the Allies were perhaps understandable at the time. Few would have imagined a major turning point in the conflict would occur a month later.
Besides taking vital military bases and vast territories, Japan conquered 10s of millions of people and critical natural resources. These resources, especially the tin and rubber of Malaya, and the oil of the Dutch East Indies, initially solved many Japanese shortages. They also could have provided autarky for Japan and support continued hostilities against the western powers and China. Regarding the total population at the height of the Japanese Empire, this has been estimated between 460 million to 516 million people. This included over 70 million in Japan proper, 70 million in the Dutch East Indies and perhaps 200,000,000 in occupied China!
This was significantly more than the combined population of Britain, America and the Soviet Union (roughly 350 million people). It was also close to the total population of the British Empire, especially after it lost many of its Far Eastern colonies, making Japan’s empire the second most populous in history! While the Allies’ total was larger overall Japan still controlled 20% of the world’s population, and including the Nazi Empire (360 million subjects) this put the Axis total close to 900,000,000 human beings, roughly 1/3rd of everyone on earth at the time.
Given that since 1937 Japan attacked China (the world’s most populous nation), the Soviet Union (the world’s largest country) at Lake Khasan and Khalkhin-Gol, Britain (the world’s greatest empire), and America (the world’s strongest industrial power) these were no mean accomplishments. On the other hand, it brings into question the strategic wisdom of the Japanese leadership, controlling a small island nation with few natural resources, by making enemies of four of the strongest powers on earth.
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Despite these impressive achievements and statistics, there were weaknesses in Japan’s overall situation in May 1942. Although it controlled a huge population base, Japan could only really count on Japanese nationals in the home islands and colonies for loyalty. Besides enthusiastic military contingents like some Thai units, the Burma Independence Army, and some disenchanted Indian units that had been captured, most non-Japanese subjects became indifferent or hateful towards their overlords.
This was especially due to atrocities, slave labor, excesses, and other unpleasantries that usually, though not always, came along with Imperial Japanese rule. A contemporary US State Department memo noted “the stubborn resistance of the Chinese destroys Japan’s claim that she comes to emancipate either China or Asia!” As such, allied forces in Asia and the Pacific would continue to outnumber Japan in military personnel throughout the war. Ironically, they would often enjoy much support from former colonial subjects, often treated worse under Japanese occupation.
Superior allied industrial might also guaranteed Japan would become increasingly outproduced in ships, planes, and other weapons as the war continued. Despite seizing so much territory and resources conquering most of Southeast Asia netted Japan little industry. The Japanese already controlled the main centers of industry in East Asia prior to the Asia-Pacific War, located in their home islands, Korea, Taiwan, their Manchurian colony, and occupied China.
This meant weapons and goods could only be produced in these regions closer to Japan and not near the points of direct contact with enemy forces. It also meant its merchant fleet, already taxed by supplying military operations, had to first go to Japan’s new territories, bring resources back, wait for Japanese industry to produce weapons and goods, then send these back to numerous frontlines.
In fact, merchant shipping would prove to be a major weakness in the Japanese war effort. Japan had far less merchant shipping and ship production than the Allies, and would find it hard to transport natural resources and weapons, supply military operations, and feed occupied China and other colonies simultaneously. Particularly, the Japanese lacked sufficient oil tankers, having only 10% to serve their needs, as the majority of oil shipped to Japan had been done so by countries it was now at war with!
Japan’s merchant shipping woes would be compounded by its odd refusal to provide adequate naval protection for its maritime convoys. These convoys became increasingly vulnerable to allied planes and submarines. Instead of building ample numbers of escort vessels, the Imperial Japanese Navy focused almost exclusively on powerful warships. Unsurprisingly, by 1944 only half of Japanese oil imports from Indonesia made it though the Allies’ gauntlet and in 1945 shipments were stopped completely.
The experiences of World War 1 and the Battle of the Atlantic clearly showed the major threat submarines posed towards merchant vessels. Japan itself had often been humbled by Russian raiders attacking merchant ships during the Russo-Japanese War. On the other hand, given Japan believed it would take two years to create the necessary infrastructure in their colonies to procure valuable resources, suggests even with strong convoys Japan wouldn’t have been able to take advantage of them until late in the war anyway. American submarines would sink 55% of all Japanese vessels (naval and merchant) lost during the war and devastate Japan’s maritime communications.
Related to limits of Japan’s merchant shipping were flawed Japanese logistics. Much like Germany the Japanese neglected their supply networks, often looking down on logistical services, which the best officers and recruits tried avoiding being assigned to. This proved disastrous in the Pacific given the astronomical distances, few bases, and limited infrastructure involved. Japan had nothing similar to the American Seabees, that created impressive port facilities, airfields, and logistical hubs in the often unforgiving terrain and climate across the Pacific.
Japan’s medical logistics were also inadequate versus the Allies, with the lack of medical facilities and supplies exposing Japanese soldiers to diseases like malaria, dysentery, yellow fever, and typhus. These issues, made worse once America began interdicting Japanese maritime logistics, would take a heavy toll on Japanese lives. During World War 2 more Japanese soldiers would die by illness, malnutrition, and starvation than combat. This is an inconvenient truth offen downplayed, or forgotten by Japanese ultranationalists.
Superior allied technology would also count against Japan. During the conflict the Japanese produced impressive, sophisticated weapons like the Long Lance Torpedo, the Zero fighter, the battleship Yamato, and the Ohka rocket powered suicide aircraft. However, Britain and especially America superseded such technical marvels with improved radar, the proximity fuse, qualitatively superior fighters, the B-29 bomber, and eventually nuclear weapons! While these took time to become available to allied forces, they proved decisive in the latter stages of the war.
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However, none of these weaknesses would have mattered if Japan’s enemies had surrendered as hoped after the mauling they took in the opening months of the Asia-Pacific War. Knowing it had little chance of winning a prolonged conflict, Japan had gambled on the Western Allies, specifically America, becoming demoralized by such defeats, and quitting after the prospect of years advancing across the Pacific against fortified positions and suffering heavy losses. Surely now the supposedly materialistic, decadent, and soft Americans would repel from the time, effort, and blood to defeat Japan. With the Western Allies out of the war Japan could finally quash Chinese resistance, consolidate its empire, and become the superpower of Asia.
However, once the Western Allies refused to surrender, let alone negotiate, the Japanese strategy began to unravel. Japan now faced the prospect of launching additional military efforts to break allied will in the near future, or a lengthy fighting retreat to accomplish the same aim in the long term. The latter, with hindsight, was arguably the safer bet. However, once more Japan’s offensive disposition, and its history of pulling off impressive attacks against superior numbers, dictated the former strategy would be adopted.